ORDER :- Though ad interim relief in terms of prayer clause (d) was granted on 3rd July, 2002 and notice was issued, there is no formal order admitting the review petition. Admitted, by consent heard forthwith.

2. The present application for review is filed against the order dated 1st February, 2001. The respondents who were the plaintiff before the trial Court had filed the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The suit came to be dismissed. That suit was filed beyond the period prescribed by Section 6 for instituting a suit for possession. The respondents before this Court contend, that they had earlier initiated proceedings by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. That petition was not entertained by this Court on the ground that there were disputed questions of fact. However, while disposing of the writ petition, this Court observed that petitioners were at liberty to take such other legal steps as are advised. It is based on this order, that the suit under Section 6 came to be filed. Along with the suit the plaintiffs-respondents herein also moved an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the period when the petition was pending before this Court. That came to be dismissed by an order dated 26-11-1992, on the ground that the suit against the defendant was not maintainable under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. That order was challenged before this Court by way of writ petition being Writ Petition No. 168/93. That petition came to be disposed of by the order of this Court dated 1st February, 2001. The order of the trial Court was set aside. The delay in filing the suit was condoned, to exclude the period when proceedings were pending before this Court. It is this order which is the subject-matter of the present review petition.

3. At the hearing of the petition, on behalf of the petitioners it is contended that Section 6 is self-contained provision, providing a period of six months for instituting a particular class of suits for possession. Considering that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would not be available. Schedule to the Limitation Act also does not provide for a period of limitation for filing a suit under Section 6. This being the case, provisions of Limitation Act would not be attracted. At any rate it is contended, that if the period of six months is to be considered, it cannot include the period when the proceedings taken out, by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution were pending. Considering the language of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, facts on record would also show that the delay could not have been condoned. Reliance was placed on some authorities on behalf of the petitioner. They will be dealt with in the course of the arguments. It is further contended that while considering ratio of a judgment, it must be considered whether the issue now before this Court was in issue. It is only then, that the precedent or the ratio decidendi will be binding on this Court and not otherwise. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents, learned Counsel contends that the order does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record, nor has any new material been discovered, which would warrant this Court review its earlier order. Even otherwise, it is contended that the issue involved is no longer res integra having been concluded by judgments of the Apex Court. Learned counsel in support of that has relied on various judgments. They will be dealt with in the course of the discussion. Under these circumstances it is contended that this is not a fit case where the order should be reviewed.

4. With the above background we may now deal with the issue in controversy. The question that will have to be considered is whether the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable to suits instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. A corollary to that is that even if Sectio

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