The main legal point established in the judgment is that the period of limitation prescribed in S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is peremptory and cannot be extended beyond the prescribed period.

Judgment

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

( 1 ) NOTICING cleavage in views expressed in several decisions rendered by Benches of three learned Judges, two learned Judges referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and by order dated 30-10-2001 the matter was directed to be placed before a Constitution Bench, and that is how the matter is before us in C. A. No. 2226/1997. Special Leave Petition C. No. 12806/2000 was directed to be heard along with Civil Appeal.

( 2 ) LEAVE granted in SLP C. No. 12806/2000.

( 3 ) THE controversy involved lies within a very narrow compass, that is whether after quashing of Notification under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the act) fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another Notification under S. 6. In the case at hand such a Notification issued under S. 6 was questioned before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three-Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah and others v. State of Karnataka and others etc. (1996 (3) SCC 88) and held that the same was validly issued.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants placed reliance on an unreported decision of this Court in A. S. Naidu and others etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and others etc. (S. L. P. (C) Nos. 11353-11355/1988), wherein a Bench of three-Judges held that once a declaration under S. 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under S. 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the Notification under sub-section (1) of S. 4 of the Act. It has to be noted that there is another judgment of two learned Judges in Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (1995 (5) SCC 206) which takes a view similar to that expressed in A. S. Naidus case (supra ). However, in State of Karnataka and others v. D. C. Nanjudaiah and others (1996 (10) SCC 619), view in Narasim-haiahs case (supra) was followed and it was held that the limitation of 3 years for publication of declaration would start running from the date of receipt of the order of the High Court and not from the date on which the original publication under S. 4 (1) came to be made.

( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant submitted that a bare reading of S. 6 of the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984, leaves no manner of doubt that the declaration under S. 6 has to be issued within the specified time and merely because the Court has quashed the concerned declaration an extended time period is not to be provided. Explanation I (appended to the section) specifically deals with exclusion of periods in certain specified cases. If the view expressed in Narasimhaiahs case (supra) is accepted, it would mean reading something into the statute which is not there, and in effect would mean legislation by the Court whereas it is within the absolute domain of the legislature per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that the logic indicated in Narasimhaiahs case (supra) is in line with the statutory intent. Placing reliance on the decision in Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation), New Delhi and another v. Pooran Mal and Sons and another (1975 (2) SCR 104), it was submitted that extension of the time limit is permissible. Apart from Pooranmals case (supra), reliance was placed on two decisions rendered in relation to proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short the i.-T. Act), to contend that there is scope for extension of time though there was fixed statutory time prescription. The decisions relied on are Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders (1980 (1) SCC 370) and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Calcutta and others (1980 (2) SCC 191 ). It was, however, frankly conceded that in Grindlays case (supra), question of limitation was not necessary to be gone into as the impugned action was taken within the prescribed time limit. It was contended that at the most, this can be considered to be a case of casus omissus, and the defi