This appeal brings into issue the following substantial question of law :

"Whether Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the plaintiff, the respondent No.1 herein, for declaration and injunction?"

2. The respondent No.1 instituted Regular Civil Suit No.626/1995 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nanded for declaration that he continued to be in service of the defendants i.e. the appellants herein from 12/6/1989 till the completion of the training; and that the refusal of the appellants to allow him to join the service after the completion of the training is illegal, null and void; and for further mandate that the appellants be directed to allow him to join or resume the services as Assistant Teacher in the school. According to the respondent No.1, he joined the appellant No.1's school run by appellant No.2 Dnyanvikas Shikshan Sanstha against a clear vacancy as Assistant Teacher; and in due course, was sent for training for the degree in Education on 1/1/1994, and when he reported back on completion of his training on 21/11/1994, the appellants did not allow him to join his duty. It is in these circumstances, the respondent No.1 was compelled to institute the aforesaid suit. The appellants resisted the suit with written statement (Exhibit 20) and raised the material question as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

3. Learned advocate for the appellants submitted that the respondent No.1 had tendered his resignation on 17/12/1994 in writing without reporting back to the school on 21/11/1994, and the same came to be accepted in the management committee's meeting on 22/12/1994. According to him, the appellant No.1 is a private school within the meaning of Section 2(20) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and, therefore, it was open for the respondent No.1 to have preferred an appeal to the School Tribunal constituted under Section 8 of the said Act for redressal of his grievances and not rushed to the Civil Court, the jurisdiction of which is ousted by Section 9 of the said Act. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the following judgments :

(i) Satyawadi Ganpatrao Pimple & ors. Vs. Aruna Ganpatrao Narwade & anr. (2000(2) Mh.L.J. 322))

(ii) St. Ulai High School & anr. Vs. Shri Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh & anr. (2007 (2) ALL MR 1))

(iii) Dadasaheb Kisan Jagdale Vs. Principal, NMV High School & anr. (2008(2) Mh.L.J. 235))

4. Learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 submitted that Section 9 of the said Act does not operate as bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, there being no implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by virtue of the said provision. According to him, the respondent No.1 had sought declaration regarding the status and not for challenging any of the orders enumerated in Section 9 of the said Act. Thus, according to him, the respondent No.1 had instituted lis to enforce his right under the common law and not under the said Act thereby leaving it to the discretion of the respondent No.1 to choose his remedy for relief. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the following judgments :

i) Dhulabhai etc. Vs. state of M.P. Etc. (AIR 1969 SC 78(1))

ii) The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke & ors. (AIR 1975 SC 2238(1))

iii) Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Union of India (AIR 1988 SC 752).

iv) Rasta Peth Education Society, Pune Vs. Pethkar Udhao Bhimashankar (1994(1) Mh.L.J. 725)

5. Admittedly, the appellants are running a private school within the meaning of the said Act and as such, Section 9 of the said Act is worth consideration for examining the issue involved. Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 reads as under :

"9. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force any employee in a private school