The main legal point established in the judgment is the criteria for impleadment of third parties in specific performance suits, emphasizing the distinction between necessary and proper parties and clarifying that a third party purchaser claiming under the vendor of the plaintiff can be joined, but a third party claiming independently or adversely to the vendor cannot be joined.

1. By this Chamber Summons the Plaintiff seeks impleadment of a third party and amendment of the plaint so as to incorporate averments and prayers against the party.

2. The suit is for specific performance of an agreement for sale of immovable property, being a plot of land at Santacruz in Mumbai, together with a building standing thereon (“suit property”). The Plaintiff is an agreement purchaser and developer of the suit property, whilst the Defendant is a cooperative housing society which owns the suit property and is claimed to be the vendor of the Plaintiff. The agreement is said to have been contained in what is described as 'offer letter dated 25 December 2009' between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and concluded on 31 March 2010. It is the case of the Plaintiff firm that at the hearing of its application for interim reliefs, it learnt about a redevelopment agreement entered into by the Defendant with the Respondent herein on 8 November 2012. The Plaintiff submits that this agreement has been entered into with a mala fide intention and is only an attempt to defeat and delay the rights and claims of the Plaintiff forming part of the present suit. The Plaintiff proposes to challenge the redevelopment agreement as being null and void and of no effect on the Plaintiff's rights. The present Chamber Summons accordingly prays for impleadment of the Respondent so as to claim appropriate reliefs against it.

3. The Chamber Summons is opposed both by the Defendant and the Respondent on the ground that the Respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper property to the suit. It is submitted that the Respondent not being a party to the suit agreement for sale and having acquired an independent right to the suit property under a separate contract with the Defendant, is not concerned with the dispute as between the Plaintiff and the Defendant under the suit agreement for sale. It is submitted that if this Chamber Summons is allowed, it would completely alter the nature and character of the suit, namely, from a specific performance suit to a suit for a declaration in respect of rights of a third party.

4. Dr. Saraf and Mr. Jain, learned Counsel for the Respondent and the Defendant, respectively, rely on several judgments to buttress their submissions. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Bharat Karsondas Thakkar Vs. Kiran Construction Co. (AIR 2008 SC 2134), learned Counsel submit that in a specific performance suit, a stranger to the agreement for sale cannot be added as a party. It is submitted that the only parties that can be added to a specific performance suit are parties to the agreement (Sec.15(a) of the Specific Relief Act) and persons claiming under them by a subsequent title (Sec. 19 of the Specific Relief Act); the scope of a specific performance suit could not be enlarged to convert the same into a suit for title and possession. Learned Counsel also rely on judgments of the Supreme Court in Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733), Ramesh Chandra Pattnaik Vs. Pushpendra Kumari (2008) 10 SCC 708) Vidur Impex And Traders Pvt Ltd. Vs. Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 8 SCC 384), Anil Kumar Singh Vs. Shivnath Mishra (1995) 3 SCC 147). Learned Counsel also cite Division Bench decisions of our Court in Yusuf Mohammed Lakdawala Vs. Sudhakar K. Bokhade & Richie Rich Resorts Ltd. (Appeal No.460/08 in Ch.Summons No.56/08 in S.No.1248/07), Gurucharansigh Nathasingh Chawla Vs. Raja Constructions Co. (Appeal No.138/97 Ch.Summons No.239/96 in S.1711/94)and Shri Swastik Developers Vs. Saket Kumar Jain (2014(2) Mh.L.J. 968), in support. Besides these judgments, learned Counsel rely on several decisions of learned Single Judges of our Court, where subsequent transferees or agreement purchasers were not allowed to be joined as parties to specific performance suits.

5. Some of the decisions of learned Single Judges of our Court may suggest a dichotomy as noted by D.G. Karnik, J in Mahendra J. Velinkikar Vs. Vaishali Sh