1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The challenge in this petition is to the judgments and decrees dated 18th August 1989 and 11th July 1994 made by the Civil Judge Junior Division, Wai (Trial Court) and the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Satara (Appeal Court) dismissing the petitioners (landlords') Civil Suit No. 18 of 1979 seeking the eviction of the respondents (tenants) from the suit premises by resort to the provisions in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Said Act).

3. Mr. Menezes, the learned counsel for the petitioners, at the outset, made it clear that the petitioners– landlord now press for eviction of the respondents from the suit premises only on the following two grounds, even though, several other grounds had also been raised before the Trial Court and the Appeal Court. The two grounds now being pressed are as follows:

(a) The acquisition of alternate suitable premises by respondent – tenant (section 13 (1) (l) of the said Act);

(b) Reasonable and bona fide requirement of the petitioners– landlords (sec.13 (1) (g) of the said Act).

4. Mr. Menezes submits that there is overwhelming material on record to establish that the respondents – tenants have acquired suitable alternate residential and commercial premises in and around the same locality in which the suit premises are situated. He refers to the various Hotels, Canteens, Paan Shops, Lodges, Khanawals and other businesses which the respondents-tenant operate through such alternate and suitable premises acquired by them. He also refers to certain residential premises in which the respondents and their family members reside. On basis of this material as also some additional material which the petitioners seek to produce by resort to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Mr. Menezes submits that the ground of acquisition of alternate suitable premises by the respondents tenants was made out and the findings recorded by the two Courts that such ground was not made out suffer from perversity. Mr. Menezes submits that the relevant evidence in this regard has not even been looked into by the two Courts and the impugned judgments and orders are based on surmises and conjectures. Mr. Menezes submits that failure to even look into the relevant material on record or base findings on mere surmises and conjectures are good grounds to warrant interference with the impugned judgments and orders. Mr. Menezes therefore, submits that eviction of the respondents was required to be ordered on the ground contemplated by section 13 (1) (l) of the said Act.

5. Mr. Menezes submits that there is overwhelming evidence on record to establish the ground of reasonable and bonafide requirement. He submits that the two Courts, on the basis of irrelevancies, surmises and conjectures have completely glossed over this overwhelming evidence on record. He submits that there is clear failure to read the true and correct “objects clause” of the Petitioner-trust. Based upon misreading of this clause, the two Courts have wrongly held that the Petitioner-trust cannot even commence a school for religious instruction or cannot admit students from other Mohallas. He submit that these findings are ex-facie contrary to the evidence on record and therefore suffer from perversity.

6. Mr. Menezes submits that the approach and reasoning of the two Courts is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in matters of bonafide requirement. He submits that findings like students may not be interested in joining Petitioner school in this modern age where emphasis is on academics or that the Petitioners lack financial means to commence a school are nothing but surmises and conjectures. Such reasoning is clearly in the arena of irrelevancies as well.

7. Mr. Menezes submits that the findings on the issue of comparative hardships are also vitiated by perversity. There is ample evidence on record to establish that