IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J.
Everest Advertising (Private), Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Pratik C. Khandhadiya and others - Respondents
O.O.C.J. Writ Petition No. 2018 of 1998
Decided on : 17-03-1999
UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES - PROMOTION - WORKMAN - JURISDICTION - [S. 2(S) INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947] [S. 3(5) MAHARASHTRA RECOGNITION OF TRADE UNIONS AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES ACT, 1971] - Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since the first respondent was not an employee within the meaning of S. 3(5) of the Act.
Fact of the Case:
The first respondent was appointed as an executive in the Audio-Visual Department of the petitioner advertising agency. He was promoted to the position of Group Manager, Audio Visual, with effect from 1st April 1991. His services were terminated with effect from 2nd September 1991. The first respondent filed a complaint before the Labour Court alleging that the termination of his services was illegal and amounted to unfair labour practices. The Labour Court held that the petitioner had engaged in unfair labour practices and directed reinstatement of the first respondent with full back-wages and continuity of service.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court found that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since the first respondent was not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with S. 3(5) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The High Court held that the first respondent was not a workman as on the date of termination of his services, which was the relevant date for determining jurisdiction.
Issues: 1. Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since the first respondent was not an employee within the meaning of S. 3(5) of the Act. 2. Whether the promotion granted to the first respondent on 1st April 1991 was illegal or mala fide.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court is determined by the character of employment as on the date of termination of service. 2. The first respondent was not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as on the date of termination of his services. 3. The Labour Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the impugned order of the Labour Court, and dismissed the complaint.
JUDGMENT :
1. This writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the order of the First Labour Court, Bombay, dated 25 September 1998 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 243 of 1991 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act).
2. The petitioner is an advertising agency. As a part of its work, it carries on the production of Audio-Visuals. The first respondent was appointed in the employment of the petitioner by a letter, dated 11th December 1987, as an executive in the Audio-Visual Department, with effect from 11th January 1988. By an order, dated 30th April 1991, the first respondent was promoted to the position of Group Manager, Audio Visual, with effect from 1st April 1991. Upon his appointment, the monthly emoluments of the first respondent were suitably revised as indicated in the said letter. It may be mentioned here that in the Audio Visual Department, as Group Manager, the first respondent was required to oversee the work of senior film executive, audio visual assistant, billing executive and stenographers. The services of the first respondent were terminated with effect from 2nd September 1991. The first respondent gave an advocate's notice on 9th September 1991 contending that the termination of his services was illegal and called upon the petitioner to reinstate him in service with full back-wages and continuity of service. By its advocates reply, dated 25th September 1991, the petitioner suitably replied the said notice and declined to accede to the demand.
3. The first respondent moved Complaint (ULP) No. 243 of 1991 before the Labour Court invoking items (1)(a), (1)(d) and (1)(f) of Sch. IV of the Act. The thrust of the case made out in the complaint was that while the first respondent was working in the Audio Visual Department, he had to carry out physical work as technician, cameraman and editor for various agencies, in house jobs. He specifically contended that he was doing mainly “manual and technician work” and had no power of an executive and administrative nature. For this reason, the first respondent contended that he was a “employee” within the meaning of S. 3(5) of the Act read with S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, therefore, entitled to protection under labour laws. He alleged that the action of abrupt termination of his service was mala fide and taken as retaliation for a complaint made by him about rifling of his table drawer and taking away of his personal belongings therefrom, including cash amount of Rs. 2000 on the night of 2nd September 1991. He also alleged that because of the said incident, in order to extract revenge on him, he was served on 7th September 1991 a back-dated letter, dated 2 September 1991. It was contended in the complaint that the order of termination of service was illegal and amounted to unfair labour practices under items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d) and (1)(f) of Sch. IV of the Act. The petitioner appeared before the Labour Court and contested the case. In a nutshell, it was the case of the petitioner that on and from 1st April 1991 the first respondent had been promoted to the post of Group Manager of the Audio Visual Department in a managerial category. The petitioner contended that the first respondent was not a workman even when he was working as Senior Manager and, much less so after he was promoted as Group Manager. The petitioner also denied that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since the first respondent was not an employee within the meaning of S. 3(5) of the Act. On merits, the petitioner denied that the termination of the first respondent's service amounted to an unfair labour practice as alleged or at all and prayed for dismissal of the complaint.
4. The Labour Court tried the complaint and recorded elaborate evidence-lead by the parties. By its impugned order, dated 25 September 1998, held that the petition
Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company Ltd. [1979 (2) L.L.N. 72]
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