The Maintenance Tribunal has the power and jurisdiction to declare the transfer of property by a senior citizen as void under the circumstances specified in Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007.

JUDGMENT

M.S.SONAK, J.

1. Heard Mr. S.R. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S.S. Sanyal with Mrs. Shibha Thakare, learned counsel for respondent No.1, Mr. Atharva Manohar, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr. T.A. Mirza, learned counsel for the respondent No.6-State.

2. The challenge in this petition is to the judgment and order dated 8/2/2021 made under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (in short, "said Act") declining the relief of maintenance and cancellation of gift deed dated 1/8/2019 executed by the petitioner in favor of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein.

3. At the very outset Mr. Atharva Manohar, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy of instituting an appeal under Sec. 16 of the said Act against the impugned order dated 8/2/2021 and, therefore, this petition may not be entertained. He referred to the provisions of the said Act, including in particular provisions in Sections 16 and 23 of the said Act to submit that the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy. He relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ranjana Rajkumar Makharia vs. Mayadevi Subhkaran Makharia and others, 2020(3) Mh.L.J. 587 in support of his submissions.

4. Mr. S.S. Sanyal, learned counsel for respondent No.1 as well as Mr. T.A. Mirza, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.6 supported the submission of Mr. Manohar, learned counsel for respondent No.1, and submitted that the petitioner may be relegated to avail the alternate remedy under the said Act rather than entertain this petition. Mr. T.A. Mirza learned Additional Public Prosecutor pointed out that the District Collector of Nagpur has been designated as the Appellate Tribunal in terms of Sections 15 and 16 of the said Act and, therefore, this is not some case where the Appellate Tribunal is yet to be constituted or is otherwise not functioning on account of any vacancies or such other reasons.

5. Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that as against the impugned order particularly to the extent the impugned order denies the petitioner the relief of cancellation of gift deed dated 1.8.2019, no appeal will lie to the appellate Tribunal. Elaborating on this aspect, Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Sec. 2(j) of the said Act defines "Tribunal" to mean the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act. He pointed out that Sec. 7 of the said Act provides for the constitution of a Maintenance Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding upon the order for maintenance under Sec. 5 and for no other purposes. He submitted that on the conjoint reading of provision in Sec. 16(1) and its proviso, it is apparent that both the Maintenance Tribunal as well as Appellate Tribunal are empowered to go into the issue of maintenance alone and not the issue as to whether the transfer of property by a senior citizen is void. He submitted that Chapter V of the said Act is a complete Code and, therefore, for the protection of life and property of senior citizen Authorities have been provided under Sec. 22 of the said Act and these Authorities do not include either the Maintenance Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. He submitted that only the District Magistrate or his delegate will have the power to declare the transfer of property made by a senior citizen void under certain circumstances. He submitted that since the impugned order at least to the extent of declining to cancel the gift deed dated 1.8.2019 as void is made by the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) as the delegate of the District Magistrate, there is no question of relegating the petitioner to the non-existence remedy of an appeal before the District Magistrate. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioner has no other alternate or efficacious remedy available to him other than institut