The court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review of executive action and upheld the discretion of the government to nominate individuals with special knowledge or experience in municipal administration.

JUDGMENT

M.S. Sonak, J. - The Petitioner, by instituting this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeks the following reliefs:

(a) For striking down the provision in clause (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the City of Panaji Corporation Act, 2003 (C.C.P. Act) to the extent this provision permits persons with "special knowledge or experience in engineering, architecture, archaeology, heritage, etc." to be nominated to the Municipal Corporation;

(b) For quashing notification dated 28.04.2021 and order dated 05.05.2021 nominating respondent nos.5 & 6 as nominated members of the Corporation.

2. The Petitioner, at the outset, submitted that polls were held on 20.03.2021 to constitute the Corporation, and results were declared on 23.03.2021. Respondent no.6 contested the elections but was not elected. On 30.03.2021, the Councillors were sworn in, and even the Mayor was elected. On 01.04.2021, the file for nominating respondents nos.5 & 6 was processed. On 07.04.2021, the Mayor moved a note for the nomination of respondents nos.5 & 6 as Councillors. On 09.04.2021, the Commissioner wrote about the nomination to the Director of Urban Development. Finally, on 28.04.2021, the State issued the impugned notification nominating the respondent nos.5 & 6 as Councillors. Mr. Rodrigues submits that this haste is an indication of non-application of mind.

3. Mr. Rodrigues submits that the impugned notification is ultra vires C.C.P. Act because it refers to nominating respondents nos.5 & 6 as "co-opted Councillors." He submits that there is no provision under the C.C.P. Act for co-option of any Councillors, and in the absence of such provision, the impugned notification is ultra vires and liable to be struck down.

4. Mr. Rodrigues states that Article 243-R(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution makes provision enabling the State legislature to provide for the representation in a Municipality of persons having special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration. He submits that the Constitution does not provide nominating persons with "special knowledge or experience in engineering, architecture, archaeology, heritage, etc.". Section 9(1)(b) of the C.C.P. Act, to the extent it permits the nomination of such persons, travels way beyond the limits imposed by the constitutional provision. He, therefore, submits that Section 9(1) (b), to the extent it travels beyond the constitutional limitation in Article 243-R, is ultra vires, unconstitutional, null, and void. He submits that since the respondent nos.5 & 6 have been nominated under Section 9(1)(b) of the C.C.P. Act, which is ultra vires, their nomination is liable to be quashed and set aside.

5. Mr. Rodrigues submitted that the note dated 07.04.2021 from the Mayor of C.C.P. states that respondent no.5 is an expert in engineering. However, the note does not refer to respondents nos.5 & 6 having special knowledge or experience in municipal administration. He, therefore, submits that their nominations are liable to be quashed since these respondents do not possess the qualifications prescribed in Article 243-R of the Constitution.

6. Mr. Rodrigues submits that no fair and transparent procedure was followed for nominating respondents nos.5 & 6. He submits that there was no advertisement inviting applications, there was no attempt to select the best talent, and the nomination was only to rehabilitate respondents nos.5 & 6 because they were unsuccessful in getting themselves elected through the democratic process. He submits that the nominations are for political considerations, and arbitrariness is involved in the process.

7. Mr. Rodrigues, in the context of the scope of challenge to the appointments made by nomination, submitted that the Government might have been given the discretion to nominate persons who meet minimum criteria, and this Court may not be in a position to sit in judgment over the discretion of the Government. However, he submits that in the present case, since respo