IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
MANGESH S. PATIL, SHAILESH P. BRAHME, JJ.
Ganesh, s/o. Kachru Sonawane (Sonne) and Anr. – Petitioners
Versus
Khushalrao, s/o. Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. – Respondents
Writ Petition No. 9745 Of 2011 With Civil Application No.1615 Of 2020 With Writ Petition No. 2755 Of 2023 With Writ Petition No. 289 Of 2018
Decided On : 05-12-2023
Limitation - Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act - Section 98 - No period of limitation is applicable for preferring application under Section 98 of the Act - The court held that it is not permissible to read a reasonable time of limitation into the Section.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners were dispossessed in 1978 and filed an application seeking possession under Section 98 of the Act in 2002. The Revenue Tribunal allowed the appeal, stating that the application was beyond three years. The Single Judge partly allowed the writ petition, and the Supreme Court requested the High Court to refer the issue to the larger bench.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that no period of limitation is applicable for preferring an application under Section 98 of the Act and it is not permissible to read a reasonable time of limitation into the Section.
Issues: The main issue was whether any period of limitation is applicable for preferring an application under Section 98 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that in the absence of any specific limitation provided by the Legislature, the only thing that the Tribunal has to do is to permit the application to be made irrespective of the passage of time. The court also emphasized the literal interpretation of the statute and disapproved the proposition that it should be construed as a reasonable period.
Final Decision: The court disposed of the reference by stating that no period of limitation is applicable for preferring an application under Section 98 of the Act and directed the matter to be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal in accordance with the law.
JUDGMENT :
(Shailesh P. Brahme J.) :
Rule.
2. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard, finally with the consent of parties.
3. We are called upon to answer an issue referred to us which is as follows :
“Whether any period of limitation is applicable for preferring an application under Section 98 of Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as Act )?”
4. The issue under the reference is emanating from the proceedings under Section 98 of the Act, initiated by the petitioners in Writ Petition No.9745/2011. The petitioners were dispossessed in the year 1978 whereas the application seeking possession was filed on 22.03.2002 before the Deputy Collector. It was allowed. Being aggrieved, Appeal No.38/A/2003 was preferred before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The appeal was allowed by the Tribunal on 31.03.2010 holding that the application seeking possession under Section 98 submitted by the petitioners was beyond three years. Petitioners should have filed application within reasonable period of three years.
5. Against the decision of Revenue Tribunal, Writ Petition No.9745/2011 was preferred by the petitioners which was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated 21.06.2018. Against that Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Supreme Court. By order dated 14.12.2018, the Supreme Court requested High Court to refer the issue to the larger bench. That is how the present issue is framed and referred to for consideration.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has made following submissions :
(i) The issue which is referred to, has already been dealt with by direct pronouncement in the matters of Laxman Shankar Bandgar, Mesaji Laxman Ubare, Kisan Sayaji Shelke, Hasan Bin Salam. It has been consistently held that no period of limitation has been provided for invoking powers under Section 98 of the Act.
(ii) As there is already decision rendered by the Division Bench (R.M. Borde and V.K. Jadhav JJ.) in the matter of Hasan Bin Salam Vs. Madhavrao Ranganathrao Shinde covering the issue under reference the contrary decision rendered in the matter by Single Judge, is not a good law.
(iii) The scheme of the Act and the objects sought to be achieved by Section 98 of the Act are required to be considered for deciding the issue.
(iv) The period of limitation has consciously been excluded. It is not permissible to read any reasonable period for invoking powers under Section 98.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to following judgments :
(i) Laxman Shankar Bandgar (died through LRs.) Vs. Venkat s/o Rama Bandgar (died through LRs.) in WP No.623/2021.
(ii) Mesaji Laxman Ubare Vs. Dr. Ramchandra Laxminarayan and Others, WP No.473/2000.
(iii) Limbaji Shankar Munde Vs. Bhaurao Baliram Munde, 2010(3) Mh.L.J. 138.
(iv) Kisan Sayaji Shelke Vs. Madhukar Mohan Deshpande and Others, 2010(12) LJSOFT 97
(v) Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and Others
(vi) Hasan Bin Salam Salam Bin Abdul Habib Vs. Madhavrao Ranganathrao Shinde, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4617.
(vii) Radhu Gokul Gawali and Others Vs. Mohan Kishan Gawali and Others, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 503.
(viii) Ram Chand Vs. Union of India and Others, (1994)1 SCC 44.
(ix) Ranganath Vishnu Mulluck Vs. Vithoba Rama Rahane.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondents made the following submissions:
(i) The authority under the Act has to exercise powers within a reasonable period though the limitation has not been provided under Section 98. The reasonable period has been interpreted by the Supreme Court from time to time which is normally of three years.
(ii) The persons occupying land cannot be kept waiting endlessly. There has to be certainty and conclusiveness to the proceeding and therefore any application under Section 98 beyond three years cannot be entertained.
(iii) Considering the nature of the statue and its scheme, the application has to be filed within a reasonable period.
9. The learned Counsel for the responden
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Ram Chand Vs. Union of India and Others
Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra AIR 1974 SC 480
Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and Others (1997)6 SCC 73
Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim MANU/SC/1261/1997 : (1997) 6 SCC 71
Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade v. Nivrutti Krishna Bilare MANU/MH/0166/2001 : (2001) 2 BOMLR 664
J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. MANU/SC/0235/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 1405
Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers MANU/SC/0335/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 2434
AI
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