The court affirmed that tenants' failure to cultivate leased land justified termination under the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, and the doctrine of frustration does not apply to land leases.

JUDGMENT :

S.G. Mehare, J.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of parties.

2. Since in both petitions the common issue was involved and the respondent is common; hence, taken up for disposal together.

3. In Writ Petition No.13268 of 2018, the petitioner has impugned the order of the learned Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad passed in Case No.17/B/2016/Ahmednagar dated 24.09.2018. In Writ Petition No.13265 of 2018 has impugned the order of the Hon'ble Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad in Case No.16/B/2016/Ahmednagar dated 24.09.2018. The petitioners in both cases were tenant and respondent no.1 was the landlord.

4. The facts in Writ Petition No.13268 of 2018 were that the father of respondent no.1 had leased the suit land by registered lease deed dated 16.09.1967 for 16 years on yearly lease of Rs.60 p.a. The land was leased for cultivating the sugarcane. It was a contractual lease. Since the petitioners/tenants failed to cultivate the land and violated the terms of lease deed, the respondent issued him a notice of determining the lease under Section 14 of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ('Act of 1948' for short) on 17.12.2005. The petitioner replied the notice and denied the reasons for determining the tenancy. Respondent no.1 filed the proceeding before the tenancy Tahsildar under Section 29 of the Act of 1948. On 08.03.2011, the Tahsildar dismissed his case. Respondent no.1 has preferred the tenancy appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Sub-Divisional Officer allowed his appeal and directed the petitioners to handover the possession of the suit land. Against the said order, the petitioner had preferred the revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The learned Member dismissed the revision and maintained the order of Sub-Divisional Officer.

5. The facts of Writ Petition No.13265 of 2018 were that the vendor of respondent no.1 had leased the agreement on 16.09.1967 in the name of deceased Madhavrao for 16 years at the rent of Rs.60 p.a. However, deceased Madhavrao did not cultivate the land leased for sugarcane. Therefore, by notice dated 17.12.2005, respondent no.1 determined the tenancy. Then he preferred an application before the Tahsildar under Section 29 of the Act of 1948. The Tahsildar dismissed the petition. Then the Sub-Divisional Officer allowed the appeal. Against that appeal, revision preferred by the petitioner was dismissed.

6. The another argument in both cases for the petitioners were that they could not cultivate the land as the lands were situated out of town and there was no sufficient water to cultivate the sugarcane. The landlord/respondent no.1 has also a land adjoining to the suit land. He also could not cultivate the land. The notice was barred by limitation. It was not issued from the date of the approval of the right to terminate the tenancy. Therefore, there was no direct compliance of Section 14(1)(a)(iv) of the Act of 1948. In view of the notification dated 14.02.1958 issued under Section 43-A (3) of the Act of 1948, no lease of land should be terminated on the ground that the period fixed by the agreement has been expired. The application under Section 29(2) of the Act of 1948 was not in prescribed form. Therefore, it was liable to be dismissed. He also argued that the Sub-Divisional Officer as well as the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal did not consider the material admissions of respondent no.1 which proves that it was beyond the control of the petitioners to cultivate the land and it was not a deliberate failure on their part. The petitioners were not at fault in not cultivating the land. There was no water to cultivate the sugarcane. Respondent no.1 failed to provide the water to cultivate the land as per the agreement. He prayed to allow both petitions.

7. Per contra, learned counsel Mr. Bhandari for respondent no.1 has argued that the learned counsel for the petitioners has misinterpreted Section 29