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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.
In the matter between Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority – Appellant
Versus
Mumbai Metro One Pvt. Ltd. – Respondent
Interim Application (L) No. 22009 of 2024, Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 427 of 2024
Decided On : 24-10-2024

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : J.P. Sen, Kunal Vaishnav, Prachi Garg, Prerna Verma, Sayli Dolas, Mahek Shah, Manav Jain
For the Respondents: Darius J. Khambata, Prateek Seksaria, Anjali Chandurkar, D.J. Kakalia, Bhavna Jaipuria, Paresh Patkar, Vidhi Shah, Dhishan Kukreja, Rohit Agarwal, Kartik Hede, Mulla & Mulla Craigie Blunt & Caroe, Mahadev, Arvind B.

The limitation period for challenging an arbitral award commences upon receipt of a signed order, not an unsigned draft, emphasizing strict adherence to statutory timelines.

Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 33(1), 34(3), and 12(4) - Limitation for filing a petition to set aside an arbitral award - The court condoned a 14-day delay in filing a petition under Section 34, determining that the limitation period commenced from the date of receipt of a signed order, not an unsigned draft. (Paras 1, 3, 29)

(B) Limitation - The court emphasized that the statutory period for challenging an arbitral award is strictly construed, and the time for filing a petition begins upon receipt of the signed order. (Paras 9, 10, 29)

(C) E-filing - The court ruled that procedural defects in e-filing do not render a petition non est if they are curable. (Paras 24, 29)

Facts of the case:
The applicant sought to condone a 14-day delay in filing a petition to set aside an arbitral award, arguing that the limitation period began upon receipt of a signed order, while the respondent contended it began upon disposal of an application under Section 33.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the unsigned order did not constitute a final disposal, and the signed order received later triggered the limitation period.

Issues: The primary issue was whether an application under Section 33 could be considered disposed of based on an unsigned order.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that for an order under Section 33 to be final, it must be signed and delivered to the parties, thus determining the limitation period for filing a petition.

Result: The Interim Application is allowed, condoning the delay.

ORDER :

1. The present Interim Application seeks condonation of delay of a period of 14 days in filing the captioned Commercial Arbitration Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).

2. Mr. Sen, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicant submitted that the arbitration proceedings between the Applicant and the Respondent culminated in the passing of an Arbitral Award dated 29th August 2023 (“Arbitral Award”) after which both, the Applicant and Respondent filed Applications under Section 33(1) [Correction and interpretation of award; additional award: (1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties: (a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award; (b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award] of the Arbitration Act inter alia requesting the Tribunal to carry out corrections in Arbitral Award. He submitted that on 27th February 2024 the Applicant received an email from its advocates to which was attached a word file of the unsigned order (“the said Order”) passed on the said Application.

3. He submitted that it was only at 5:30 pm on 11th March 2024 that the Applicant received a signed copy of the said Order and thus, as per Section 34(3) [Application for setting aside arbitral award: ....... (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal] read with Section 12(4) [Exclusion of time in legal proceedings: ....... (4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded] of the Limitation Act 1963 (“Limitation Act”), the Applicant’s time to challenge the Arbitral Award commenced from 12th March 2024.

4. Mr. Sen then fairly submitted that the captioned Commercial Arbitration Petition was filed in haste, primarily for two reasons (i) that the Parties were engaged in making serious attempts to settle the matter and (ii) that the Applicants’ previous advocates, had taken a discharge in the matter after the Award was passed. He also pointed out that the record before the Tribunal was extremely voluminous and the Arbitral Award itself ran into 991 pages. It was thus, he submitted that there was some delay in approaching the Court. He however submitted that the Applicant had at all times acted diligently and with due dispatch and thus the delay was not occasioned because of any inadvertence on the part of the Applicant. Mr. Sen then submitted that in the event, the delay was not condoned, the Applicant would suffer grave loss, harm, and injury whereas no prejudice would be caused to the Respondent if the delay was condoned. It was thus, he submitted that the balance of convenience, lay entirely in favour of the Applicant.

5. The Application was opposed by Mr. Khambata Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent who submitted that Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act provided for two specific trigger dates for limitation to commence for challenging an Arbitral Award. The first was from the date on which the party seeking to challenge the Award had received the Arbitral Award and the second where an Application had been made under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act from the date on which such Application had been disposed of. Mr. Khambata submitted that in the present case, the Application filed under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act had been dis

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