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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Y. V Chndrachud, C.J., V.D. Tulzapurkar and A. Vardarajan, JJ.
Sher Singh and others - Petitioners
versus
The State of Punjab - Respondent
Writ Petition Nos. 232, and 233 of 1983
Decided on 24-3-1983

VERY IMPORTANT POINT
Prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence is unquestionably an important consideration for determining whether the sentence should be allowed to be executed. However, the substitution of the death sentence by a sentence of life imprisonment cannot follow by the application of the two years' formula, as a matter of "quod erat demonstrandum."

Headnote:Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Delay in execution of death sentence-Effect - Whether a delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death must be considered sufficient for the setting aside that sentence and substitution by the sentence of life imprisonment? (No) 1983(1) Crimes 704 (S.C.) partly over ruled. Whether death sentence be vacated in the instant case merely for the reason that there has been a long delay in the execution of that sentence? (No) Whether death sentence should not be allowed to be executed in this case? (to be considered later). (Paras 18 to 20, 22 and 24)

       

JUDGMENT

Chandrachud, C.J. - An important question arises' for consideration in these two writ petitions. That question is whether a delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death must be considered sufficient for setting aside that sentence. Learned counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioners relies upon a decision of this Court in T. V. Vatheeswaran v. The State of Tamil Nadu1 and contends that since more than two years have passed since the petitioners were sentenced to death by the Trial Court, they are entitled to demand that the said sentence should be quashed and substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment.

2. The petitioners, Sher Singh and Surjit Singh, and one Kuldip Singh were convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code and were sentenced to death by the learned Sessions Judge, Sangrur, on November 26, 1977. By a judgment dated July 18, 1978 the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reduced the sentence imposed upon Kuldip Singh to life imprisonment but upheld the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners. The High Court also imposed a sentence of fine of Rs. 5000/- on Kuldip Singh and a fine of Rs. 5000/- on each of the petitioners. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1711 of 1978 which was filed by the petitioners against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed by this Court on March 5, 1979. The petitioners then filed a Writ Petition in this Court challenging the validity of section 302 of the Penal Code. That petition was dismissed on January 20, 1981. Review Petition No. 99 of 1981 filed by the petitioners against the dismissal of their S.L.P. was dismissed by this Court on March 27. 1981. The petitioners filed yet another petition under article 32 of the Constitution, this time challenging the validity of section 34 of the Penal Code. That petition was dismissed on August 24, 1981. After failing in these seemingly inexhaustible series of proceedings, the petitioners filed these two writ petitions on March 2. 1983, basing themselves on the decision rendered by Justice Chinnappa Reddy and Justice R.B. Misra on February 16, 1983 in Vatheeswaran.

3. The question which arose for consideration in Vatheeswaran is formulated by Chinnappa Reddy, J., who spoke for the Court, in these terms:

"'But the question is whether in a case where after the sentence of death is given, the accused person is made to undergo in human and degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to suffer the most excruciating agony and anguish, is it not open to a court of appeal or a court exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding, to take note of the circumstance when it is brought to its notice and give relief where necessary 7"

This question arose on the following facts as stated in the judgment of Brother Chinnappa Reddy:

(1) The prisoner was rightly sentenced to death.

(2) He was the 'arch-villain of a villainous piece' and the brain behind a cruel conspiracy to impersonate Customs Officers, pretend to question unsuspecting visitors to the city of Madras, abduct them on the pretext of interrogating them, administer sleeping pills to the unsuspecting victims, steal their cash and jewels and finally murder them. The plan was ingeniously fiendish and the appellant was its architect.

(3) Since January 19, 1975 when the Sessions Judge pronounced the sentence of death, the prisoner was kept in solitary confinement contrary to the decision of this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration2 Before that, he was a 'prisoner under remand' for two years.

4. On these facts, the argument advanced in this Court on behalf of the prisoner was that taking away his life after keeping him in jail for ten years, eight of which were spent In Illegal solitary confinement, is a gross violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.

5. In Vatheeswaran, our learned Brethren have drawn sentence

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