Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, CJI., P.N. BHAGWATI, R.S. SARKARIA, A.C. GUPTA AND N.L. UNTWALIA, JJ.*
Bachan Singh, appellant
Versus
State of Punjab, respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979 and Writ Petns. Nos. 564, 165, 179, 168, 434, 89; S. L. P. (Cri) No. 1732 of 1979; Writ Petns. Nos. 754, 756, 976
Decided on 9-5-1980.
WITH
Mal Singh, Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and others, Respondents.
WITH
Sunil Batra, Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and others, Respondents.
WITH
Nathu Singh and others, Petitioners
Versus
Union of India and another, Respondents.
WITH
Kartar Singh and another, Petitioners
Versus
Delhi Administration, Respondent.
WITH
Sher Singh and another, Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and another, Respondents.
WITH
Sunil Batra, Petitioner
Versus
Delhi Administration, Respondent.
WITH
Mal Singh, Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana, Respondent.
WITH
Nirpal Singh, Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana, respondent.
WITH
Jagmohan Singh, Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana, respondent.
AND
Ujagar Singh and another, Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and other, Respondents.
* In this case, the Judges of the SC differ in there views. The majority view is taken by Y.V. Chandrachud, C. J., R. S. Sarkaria, A. C. Gupta and N.L. Untawalia, JJ. and the minority by P. N. Bhagwati, j. The judgements are printed in the order in which they are given in the certified copy-Ed.
Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 14, 19 and 21 Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 354 (3) - Impose Extreme Penalty Of Death - Appeal Against Conviction - He Had Served Out Life Sentence - Extremely Heinous And Inhuman - Imposing Death Sentence - Appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of appellant in Criminal Appeal contended that in view of ratio courts below were not competent to impose extreme penalty of death on appellant - It was submitted that neither circumstance that appellant was previously convicted for murder and committed these murders after he had served out life sentence in earlier case nor fact that these three murders were extremely heinous and inhuman constitutes a "special reason" for imposing death sentence within meaning of Section 354 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 - Reliance for this argument was placed which according to counsel was no facts very similar if not identical to that case – Held, Court have had advantage of reading careful judgment prepared by my learned brother but court find myself unable to agree with conclusions reached by him - court view that Section 302 of Indian Penal Code in so far as it provides for imposition of death penalty as an alternative to life sentence is ultra vires and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution since it does not provide any legislative guidelines as to when life should be permitted to be extinguished by imposition of death sentence - Order Accordingly.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
The legal challenge concerns the constitutional validity of the death penalty for murder as prescribed in Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentencing procedure outlined in Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (!) (!) .
The case arose from a conviction of the appellant for murder, where the question was whether the circumstances justified the imposition of the death penalty, and whether the procedure for sentencing was constitutionally valid (!) (!) .
It was argued that the provisions allowing for the death penalty, particularly when it is an alternative to life imprisonment, lack sufficient legislative guidelines and therefore violate the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution (!) (!) .
The court examined the historical legislative intent and the constitutional provisions relating to the right to life and personal liberty, emphasizing that the death penalty is recognized within the framework of the Indian Constitution and the legal system (!) (!) .
The Court held that the death penalty for murder, as provided in Section 302, does not violate Article 19, since it does not constitute an activity protected as a fundamental right, and the law is a reasonable restriction in the interest of public order and morality (!) (!) .
The Court also found that the death penalty does not violate Article 21, as it is imposed following a procedure established by law that is fair, just, and reasonable, and the law incorporates safeguards such as judicial discretion and appellate review (!) (!) .
The Court recognized that the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, including those relating to the death penalty, are consistent with international commitments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows for the death penalty under certain conditions (!) (!) .
Regarding the sentencing procedure, the Court concluded that Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires the recording of "special reasons" for imposing the death penalty, provides a necessary safeguard against arbitrary sentencing and aligns with the legislative intent that death should be reserved for the most exceptional cases (!) (!) .
The Court emphasized that the discretion exercised by judges in sentencing is to be guided by principles of judicial prudence, well-recognized legal standards, and the broad legislative policy, rather than rigid standards or exhaustive enumeration of aggravating and mitigating factors (!) (!) .
The Court reaffirmed that the law’s framing allows for broad discretion, which must be exercised judicially, and that the absence of rigid guidelines does not render the sentencing procedure unconstitutional (!) (!) .
The majority upheld the constitutionality of the law, stating that the legislative policy and judicial safeguards ensure that the death penalty is imposed in the "rarest of rare" cases, and that the procedure is consistent with constitutional requirements (!) (!) .
A minority opinion disagreed, asserting that the law as it stands lacks adequate legislative guidelines and is therefore unconstitutional, advocating for the striking down of the provisions allowing death as an alternative to life imprisonment (!) (!) .
The court ordered that the challenged provisions are valid, and the cases should now proceed on their individual merits, considering the broad principles and guidelines laid down in the judgment (!) (!) .
Overall, the legal framework recognizes the death penalty as constitutionally permissible when applied with judicial discretion, guided by well-founded reasons, and within the bounds of legislative policy aimed at reserving it for the "rarest of rare" cases (!) (!) (!) .
Please let me know if you need further analysis or specific legal advice regarding this case.
JUDGMENT
SARKARIA, J. (for himself and on behalf of Chandrachud, CJI. and A. C. Gupta and N. L. Untwalia, JJ.) (Majority View.) :- This reference to the Constitution Bench raises a question in regard to the constitutional validity of death penalty for murder provided in Section 302, Penal Code, and the sentencing procedure embodied in subsection (3) of S. 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. The reference has arisen in these circumstances: Bachan Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979, was tried and convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for the murders of Desa Singh, Durga Bai and Veeran Bai by the Sessions Judge. The High Court confirmed his death sentence and dismissed his appeal.
3. Bachan Singhs appeal by special leave, came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court (consisting of Sarkaria and Kailasam, JJ.). The only question for consideration in the appeal was, whether the facts found by the courts below would be "special reasons" for awarding the death sentence as required under S. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
4. Shri H. K. Puri, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the appellant, Bachan Singh, in Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979, contended that in view of the ratio of Rajendra Prasad v. State of U. P., (1979) 3 SCR 646, the courts below were not competent to impose the extreme penalty of death on the appellant. It was submitted that neither the circumstance that the appellant was previously convicted for murder and committed these murders after he had served out the life sentence in the earlier case, nor the fact that these three murders were extremely heinous and inhuman, constitutes a "special reason" for imposing the death sentence within the meaning of Section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974. Reliance for this argument was placed on Rajendra Prasad (ibid) which, according to the counsel, was no facts very similar, if not identical, to that case.
5. Kailasam, J. was of opinion that the majority view in Rajendra Prasad taken by V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., who spoke for himself and D. A. Desai, J., was contrary to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCR 542, inter alia, on these aspects:
(i) In Rajendra Prasad, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed:
"The main focus of our judgment is on this poignant gap in human rights jurisprudence within the limits of the Penal Code, impregnated by the Constitution. To put it pithily, a world order voicing the worth of the human person, a cultural legacy charged with compassion, an interpretative liberation from colonial callousness to life and liberty, a concern for social justice as setting the rights of individual justice, interest with the inherited text of the Penal Code to yield the goals desideratied by Preamble and Articles 14, 19 and 21."
6. According to Kailasam, J., the challenge to the award of the death sentence as violative of Arts. 19,14 and 21, was repelled by the Constitution Bench in Jagmohans case:
(ii) In Jagmohans case, the Constitution Bench held:
"The impossibility of laying down standards (in the matter of sentencing) is at the very core of criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment and that this discretion in the matter of sentence is liable to be corrected by superior courts........The exercise of judicial discretion on well recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused."
In Rajendra Prasad, the majority decision characterised the above observations in Jagmohan as "incidental observations without concentration on the sentencing criteria", and said that they are not the ratio of the decision, adding "Judgments are not Bible for every line to be venerated".
(iii) In Rajendra Prasad, the plurality observed:
"It is constitutionally permissible to swing a criminal out of corporal existenc
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
