SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R. B. Misra and C. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.
T. V. Vatheeswaran - Petitioner
versus
The State of Tamil Nadu - Respondent
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No.
1276 of 1978 and W. P. (Cri.) No. 17 of 1982
Decided on 16-2-1983
Held Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. They sustain, strengthen and nourish each other. They are available to prisoners as well as free man. Prison wells do not keep out Fundamental Rights. A person under sentence of death may also claim Fundamental Rights. The fait of Article 21, as, explained, is that any procedure which deprives a person of his life or liberty must be just, fair and reasonable: Just, fair and reasonable procedure implies a right to the legal services where he cannot avail them. It implies a right to a speedy trial. It implies humane, conditions of detention, preventive or punitive. ‘Procedure established by Law' does not end with the pronouncement of sentence; it includes the carrying out of sentence. That is as far as we have gone so far. It seems to us but a short step, but a step in the right direction, to hold that prolonged detention to await the execution of a sentence of death is an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure and the only way to undo the wrong is to quash the sentence of death. (Para 20)
What may be considered, prolonged delay so as to attract the constitutional protection of Article 21 against he execution of a sentence of death is a ticklish question. (para 21)
While we entirely agree with Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman about the demumanising effect of prolonged delay after the sentence of death, we enter a, little caveat, but only that we may go further. We think that the cause of the delay, the time necessary for appeal and consideration or repreive or some other cause for which the accused himself may be responsible it would not alter the dehumanising character of the delay. (para 11)
1983 (1) Crimes 178 (P. C.) relied on.
Consequently by held Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve, we think that delay exceeding, two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. We, therefore, accept the special leave-petition, allow the appeal as also the Writ Petition and quash the sentence of death. In the place of the sentence of death, we substitute the sentence of imprisonment for life. (Para 22)
JUDGMENT
Chinnappa Reddy, J. - A prisoner condemned to death over eight years ago claims that it is not lawful to hang him now. Let us put the worst against him first. He was the principal accused in the case and, so to say, the arch-villian of a villanious piece. He was the brain behind a cruel conspiracy to impersonate Customs Officers, pretend to question unsuspecting visitors to the city of Madras, abduct them on the pretext of inter-n gating them, administer sleeping pills to the unsuspecting victims steal their cash and jewels and finally murder them. The plan was ingeniously friendish and the appellant was the architect. There is no question that the learned Sessions Judge very rightly sentenced him to death. But that was in January, 1975. Since then he has been kept in solitary confinement, quite contrary to our ruling in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration.1 Before that he was a prisoner under remand' for two years. So, the prisoner claims that to take away his life after keeping him in jail for ten years, eight of which in illegal solitary confinement, is a gross violation of the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Let us examine his claim. First let us get rid of the cobwebs of prejudice. Sure, the murders were wicked and diabolic. The appellant and his friends shows no mercy to their victims. Why should any mercy be shown to them? But gently, we must remind ourselves it is not Shylock's pound of flesh that we seek, nor a" chilling of the human spirit. It is justice to the killer too and not justice un tempered by mercy that we dispense. Of course, we cannot refuse to pass the sentence of death where the circumstances cry for it. But, the question is whether in a case where after the sentence of death is given, the accused person is made to undergo inhuman and degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to suffer the most excruciating agony and anguish, it is not open to a court of appeal or a court exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceedings, to take note of the circumstances when it is brought to its notice and give relief were necessary?
2. Before adverting to the constitutional implications of prolonged delay in the execution of a sentence of death, let us refer to the judicial attitude towards such delay in India and elsewhere.
3. In Piaradusadh v. Emperor2, the Federal Court of India took into consideration the circumstances that the appellant had been awaiting the execution of the death sentence for over a year to after the sentence to one of transportation for life.
4. In Ediga Annamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh3, Krishna Iyer and Sarkaria, JJ. observed that "the brooding horror of hanging' which has been haunting the prisoner in her condemned cell for over two years" had an 'ameliorative impact' and was 'a factor of humane significance in the sentencing context."
5. In State of U. P. v. Lalla Singh4, Gupta and Kailasam JJ. were dealing with a case of gruesome murder of three persons, the head of one of whom was severed. The learned Judges, while of the view that the Sessions Judge was perfectly in order in imposing the sentence of death, thought that as the offences had been committed more than six years ago, the ends of justice did not require the sentence of death to be confirmed.
6. In Bhagwan Baux Singh v. State of U. P.5 the sentence of death was committed to imprisonment for life by Murtaza Fazal Ali and Kailasam JJ., having particular regard to the fact that the sentence of death had been imposed more than two and a half years ago.
7. In Sadhu Singh v. State of U. P.6, Sarkaria, Sen, JJ. and one of us (Chinnappa Reddy,
J.) took into account the circumstance that the appellant was under spectre of the sentence of death for over three years and seven months to alter the sentence of death to one of imprisonment for life.
8. In State of U.P. v. Sahai,7 Murtaza Fazal Ali, Baharul Islam and Varadarajan,
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