2005(2) Crimes 38 (SC)
Supreme Court of India
(From Gauhati High Court)
Arijit Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
State of Nagaland —Appellant
versus
Lipok AO & Ors. —Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 484 of 2005
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4612 of 2003)
Decided on 1-4-2005

Important point
Expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Limitation Act should be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay.

Headnote:Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 378(3)—Limitation Act, 1963 —Section 5—Application for grant of leave and application for condonation of delay of 57 days—High Court refused to condone the delay holding that merely because Additional Advocate General did not file appeal in spite of instructions did not constitute sufficient cause—Appeal—Respondent-accused comprising escort party of a State Cabinet Minister had opened fire on occupants of a car and after investigation were charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 302, 307, 326/34 IPC—Trial Court acquitted all accused giving benefit of doubt—State appeal and delay condonation application—Proof of sufficient cause was a condition precedent for exercise of extraordinary restriction vested in Court—Expression “sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay—Delay of 57 days ­deserved to be condoned.

       Held : The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the ­discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (AIR 1998 SC 3222) it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. (Para 10)

       It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. (Para 17)

       When the factual background is considered in the light of legal principles as noted above the inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 57 days deserved condonation. Therefore, the order of the High Court refusing to condone the delay is set aside. (Para 19)

       Result : Appeal allowed.