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2010(3) Crimes 192 (Raj.)
RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
R.S. Chauhan, J.
Satish Chandra Kaushik —Petitioner
versus
State of Rajasthan —Respondent
Criminal Writ Petition No. 3147 of 1994
Decided on 24.3.2009
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner:Mr. R.L. Agarwal, Advocate.
For the State: Mr. Krishan Verma, Addl. GA.
IMPORTANT POINT
Grant of sanction under Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act is an executive act and the validity thereof cannot be decided in the light of principles applied to quasi judicial orders.
Headnote:Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Section 19—Sanction for prosecution—Challenged on plea that Lokayukta had conducted inquiry and nothing adverse was reported against petitioner—Report of Lokayukta revealed that Lokayukta had received complaint against four persons which did not relate to petitioner—Even if there were passing reference to fact that petitioner was a member of inspection team and even if report was silent about role played by petitioner, such silence could not be interpreted in favour of petitioner—Sanction could not be said to be vitiated merely that it did not mention report of Lokayukta. (Para 9)
(ii) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Section 19—Sanction for prosecution—Tests to be applied while dealing with validity of sanction order—Scope of judicial review.
Held: In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11SCC 600: the Supreme Court had held that the grant of sanction is an executive act and the validity thereof cannot be decided in the light of principles applied to quasi judicial orders. There are four tests to be applied while dealing with validity of sanction order firstly, the sanction order has been passed by the Competent Authority; Secondly, all the relevant evidence, both against and in favour of the accused, should be placed before the Sanctioning Authority; Thirdly, the Sanctioning Authority should have applied its mind to conclude that the accused should be prosecuted; Fourthly, the application of mind should be objective and impartial and not at the behest of any other authority. In case, after going through all the relevant evidence, a prima facie case is made out against the accused, the Sanctioning Authority can grant sanction for prosecution. (Refer to Navjot Sandhu (supra); C.S. Krishnamurthi v. State of Karnataka (2005) 4 SCC 81 (Anti Corruption Branch) Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Dr.R.C. Anand (2004) 4 SCC 615: Shankerbhai Laljibhai Rot v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 13 SCC 487)
The scope of judicial review of a sanction order is a limited one. While examining the validity of a sanction order, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should apply the four tests mentioned above. It is not for the High Court, under writ jurisdiction or under its inherent power, to meticulously examine the evidence of prosecution and the evidence produced by accused, through affidavits and documentary evidence. For, the High Court should not interfere at the very inception of the trial. At a premature stage the High Court cannot weigh the evidence and adjudicate upon the guilt of accused. Weighing of evidence, and the decision with regard to guilt or innocence of accused, is the function of the trial Court and not of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction or under the inherent power. (Refer to State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, IAS. 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222; State of M.P. v. Dr. Krishna Chandra Saksena (1996)11 SCC 439).
Keeping the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in mind and perusing the sanction order dated 21-4-1994, this Court finds that the Sanctioning Authority has considered the evidence, which was submitted before it and has objectively applied his mind in order to grant the sanction for prosecution. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the sanction order has been passed validly and legally by the Sanctioning Authority. (Paras 14 to 16)
ORDER
R.S. Chauhan. J.—Aggrieved by the sanction order for prosecution—order dated 21-4-1994 —the petitioner has challenged the same by way of this writ petition.
2. The brief fact or the case are that in 1961, the petitioner was appointed as a Junior Engineer in the Irrigation Department. Subsequently he joined the military transport services. But in December 1966 he came back to the Irrigation Department as an Assistant Engineer. In 1979 he was promoted to the Post of Executive Engineer. In 1982, he was posted as a Liaison and Procurement Officer in the Rajasthan Canal Project which was later on re-named as Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana. He was posted in Delhi from 1982 to 1987. The petitioner claims that in 1993 he learnt that a FIR was lodged under the provisions at Prevention of Corruption Act, at Bikaner, relating to purchase of some material which was made in the year 1984 from M/s. Manju Shri Enterprises, Bikaner. According to the petitioner he was not named in the FIR. He further claims that with regard to the said purchase the Lokayukta had conducted an inquiry. In the report of the Lokayukta, dated 2.6.1989 nothing adverse was recorded against him. However notwithstanding the report of the Lokayukta vide order dated 21.4.1924 the Sanctioning Authority passed an order for the prosecution of the petitioner for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and for offences under Sections 420, 467, 471, 120-B of, IPC. Hence this writ petition before this Court.
3. Mr. R.L. Agarwal the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before this Court: firstly in the report of the Lokayukta dated 2-6-1989 no finding was given with regard to any illegality or irregularity committed by the petitioner. Moreover according to the reply submitted by the State the said report was placed before the Sanctioning Authority. However notwithstanding the said report of the Lokayukta the Sanctioning Authority has passed the impugned order. Relying upon the case of Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.1 the learned counsel has argued that the report of the Lokayukta should not have been brushed aside. In fact weightage should have been given to the said report. Since the Sanctioning Authority has ignored the report of the Lokayukta, the sanctioning order is unsustainable. Secondly all the material collected during the investigation was not placed before the Sanctioning Authority. Therefore, the sanction order is unsustainable. In order to buttress this contention the learned counsel has relied upon the case of State of Karnataka v. Ameer Jan.2
4. On the other hand, Mr. Krishan Verma the learned Additional Government Advocate has contended that according to order dated 22-9-1984 the Additional Chief Engineer (Mechanical). RCP, Bikaner had directed the petitioner to inspect hose pipes purchased from M/s. Manju Shri Enterprises, Bikaner. The said inspection was to be carried out along with Shri Ram Swaroop, Executive Engineer, RCP Central Stores Division, Bikaner. The said inspection was, indeed, carried out by the petitioner and Mr. Ram Swaroop as is evident from the Inspection Report (Anx. 3). However, subsequently it was discovered that the hose pipes selected by the petitioner and Ram Swaroop did not conform to the established standards. It was also discovered that although the pipes did not conform to the said standards, yet the petitioner along with Ram Swaroop, had recommended that the pipes be bought. It is only on the basis of their recommendation that the pipes were bought by the Government and the amount was paid to M/s. Manju Shri Enterprises, Bikaner.
5. Secondly, a complaint was made to the Lokayukta against four persons only, namely Ram Swaroop Kumawat, S.P. Saxena, M.I. Khilji and A.M. Sharma. Therefore no complaint was made against the present petitioner. Hence, there was no occasion for the Lokayukta to express his opini
