MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
G.S. Ahluwalia, J.
Ramu Singh Tomar and Anr. —Applicants
versus
Smt. Bhuri Bai —Respondent
M. Cr. C. No.5884 of 2013
Decided on 15.2.2017

IMPORTANT POINT
Monetary relief is different from maintenance, therefore, it cannot be said that in view of Section 20(1)(d) of The Act, 2005 merely because it has been mentioned that the monetary relief would not be limited to maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force, therefore, the monetary relief on monthly basis should be treated as personal obligation of husband.

Headnote:(i) Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Sections 2(a), 2(q) and 20—Order granting Rs.2000/- p.m. by way of monetary relief in favour of aggrieved person, wife of applicant No.2 and Rs. 100 p.m. each to both of her sons—Applicant No.1 was the Elder Brother-in-law of respondent and contention was that he was not liable to pay maintenance to aggrieved person or her two sons as duty to maintain them was only of husband, applicant No.2—Whether monetary relief on monthly basis could be termed as maintenance in its strict sense as provided under Section 125 Cr.P.C. or monetary relief was other than the maintenance—Monetary relief if different from maintenance and thus monetary relief on monthly basis could not be treated as personal obligation of husband alone—Applicant No.1 falling in definition of ‘respondent’ could not absolve himself from liability under order impugned.

       Held: Now if the provision of Section 20(1)(d) of The Act, 2005 is read, then it would mean, that the intention of the Legislature was not to make the provision of Monetary Relief, limited to the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force.

       In order to appreciate the submission made by the Counsel for the applicants, it would be necessary to find out that whether the monetary relief on monthly basis can be termed as maintenance in its strict sense, as provided under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act or any other law in force or Monetary relief is other than the maintenance. It is true that in view of the specific provisions of law as provided under different statutes, the duty to maintain wife is on the husband and it is a personal obligation. However, in The Act, 2005, the words “Wife”, “Husband”, have not been used. In the Act, 2005, the words “Aggrieved Person”, “Domestic relationship”, and “respondent” have been used.

       Section 2(a) defines “aggrieved person” which reads as under:

        “(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.”

        Section 2(f) defines “domestic relationship” which reads as under:

        “(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;”

       Section 2(q) defines “respondent”.

       Thus, it is clear that The Act, 2005 nowhere deals with the relationship of Husband and Wife but it deals with “Aggrieved person”, “Domestic Relationship” and “respondent”. Section 20(1)(d) of The Act, 2005 provides that the monetary relief would be other than the maintenance as awarded under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or under any other law for the time being in force. Thus, in fact the provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or provisions of any other law for the time being in force have been excluded expressly. Since, the word “Husband” has not been used, and the word “respondent” has been used, therefore, all the persons who are covered by the definition of “respondent” would be liable to maintain monetary relief, including the maintenance. (Paras 29 to 33)

       Thus, it is clear that monetary relief is different from maintenance, therefore, it cannot be said that in view of Section 20(1)(d) of The Act, 2005 merely because it has been mentioned that the monetary relief would not be limited to maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force, therefore, the monetary relief on monthly basis should be treated as personal obligation of husband. In fact monetary relief is awarded to an aggrieved person to meet expenses incurred and losses suffered by her as a result of the domestic violence. Therefore, the use of word “respondent” in Section 20 cannot be given restricted meaning for the purposes of grant of monetary relief on monthly basis. The submission made by the Counsel for the applicants cannot be accepted that as the context otherwise provides, therefore, a restricted meaning should be given to the word “respondent” and the word “respondent” should be restricted to “Husband” only. As the word “respondent” has been used in Section 20 of The Act, 2005, therefore, it contains the same meaning which is given in Section 2(q) of The Act, 2005 and thus, the applicant no.1 is also liable to pay monthly monetary relief, as granted by the Appellate Court. (Paras 25 and 35)

       (ii) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Section 12—Application seeking various reliefs including monetary relief against husband and other respondents—Order awarding monetary relief in favour of aggrieved person against respondents—During pendency of proceedings respondent, father-in-law of applicant, had expired but his name was not deleted—Whether order impugned was vitiated being against dead person also ? No.

       Held: So far as the next contention of the Counsel for the applicants that since, Nathu Singh had died during the pendency of the appeal and since, his name was not deleted therefore, the entire order is vitiated as the same has also been passed against a dead person, cannot be accepted. It is true that Nathu Singh had expired during the pendency of the appeal, but merely because his name was not deleted would not vitiate the entire order and at the most it can be said that the said order will not be operative against the dead person. (Para 36)

       Result: Petition dismissed.