IMPORTANT POINT
Double Jeopardy – An order passed in violation of a constitutional guarantee and fundamental right along with law of land on prohibition of a person being tried twice for same offence while conviction or acquittal remains in force, would upend all that follows after passing of order.

JUDGMENT

B.R. Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.—The Appeal arises out of a judgment dated 28.01.2025 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Sangareddy in S.C.No.182 of 2012 sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment for an offence punishable under section 302 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and rigorous imprisonment for 6 months for the offence under section 379 of the IPC. The appellant was the Accused No.2 before the Trial Court.

2. The Appeal was admitted on 06.03.2025. The Trial Court Records were called for and are before us.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/A.2 prays for setting aside of the impugned judgment on a preliminary ground that the impugned judgment warrants interference.

4. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the preliminary issue of whether the impugned judgment warrants interference.

5. It is necessary to set out the factual background of the matter to appreciate the preliminary issue.

Background

6. The appellant/A.2 along with A.1 were earlier tried by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Medak at Sangareddy in Sessions Case No.182 of 2012, for offences under sections 302 and 379 of the I.P.C. By a judgment dated 16.07.2012, the appellant/A.2 was acquitted of both the charges under sections 302 and 379 of the I.P.C but was convicted for the offence under section 411 I.P.C. for dishonestly receiving stolen property. The appellant was accordingly sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and to undergo simple imprisonment for three months in default of payment of fine. The judgment dated 16.07.2012 forms part of the Records.

7. The appellant/A.2 preferred Criminal Appeal No.737 of 2012 aggrieved by the judgment dated 16.07.2012. The Criminal Appeal was heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court and by a judgment dated 28.06.2024 the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for deciding the matter afresh with regard to the offences under sections 302 and 379 of the I.P.C. The appellant was directed to be put on notice.

8. On remand, the Trial Court, by the impugned judgment dated 28.01.2025 convicted the appellant/A.2 and A.1 for the offences under sections 302 and 379 of the I.P.C. based on the same evidence which was led in 2012. The judgment dated 28.01.2025 forms the subject matter of the present Appeal. A.2 is the appellant before us.

Decision

9. The issue before us is whether the decision of the learned Single Judge attracts section 300 (1) of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or in the alternative, section 337(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) i.e., the bar on trying a person two times for the same offence after the person is either convicted or acquitted of such offence.

10. Section 300(1) of the Cr.P.C, section 337(1) of the BNSS and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India are set out below:

Section 300(1) of the Cr.P.C:

“300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.—(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made, against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.

Section 337 (1) of the BNSS:

“337. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.—(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him migh