The High Court has inherent powers under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice, even in cases where there is a specific provision in the Code that would otherwise apply.

Raj Kishore Prasad, J.

1. This is an application, under Sec.397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, hereinafter referred to as "the Code", by Baijnath Kurmi and Nagina Dusadh, praying that their sentences of seven years rigorous imprisonment passed separately at two separate trials, be made to run concurrently.

2. This application arises in the following circumstances: As a result of a search on the 18th November, 1957, these petitioners, along with others, with whom we are not concerned here, were put on trial at two separate trials.

3. The first trial, which was for offences under Sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code, was held by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Arrah, who convicted these two petitioners on the 22nd January, 1959, under both the sections and passed a sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment on each of them under Sec.399 of the Indian Penal Code, but passed no separate sentence under Sec. 402 of the Indian Penal Code.

4. The second trial was held by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sasaram, at which these two peti- tioners were put on trial for offences under Sections 19(i) and 20 of the Arms Act At this second trial, the petitioners were convicted on the 23rd February, 1959, under both the above sections, but they were sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment each only under Sec.20 of the Arms Act. This subsequent sentence, not having been made to run concurrently with the previous sentence, under Sec.397(1) of the Code, the two sentences, of seven years rigorous imprisonment, having been passed at two separate trials, are to run one after the other.

5. An appeal against the second conviction under the Arms Act was brought to this court, but, it was summarily dismissed by me on the 19th May 1959.

6. An appeal against the first conviction was also brought to this Court, and, it was dismissed by S.N.P. Singh J., on the 14th July 1960.

7. Before S.N.P. Singh, J., an oral application was made praying that the two sentences may be made to run concurrently under Sec.397(1) of the Code, but his Lordship observed that he would have allowed the prayer, but there was one legal difficulty, in as much as, the appeal before him was against the previous conviction, and, therefore, he could not direct the previous sentence to run concurrently with the subsequent sentence, passed in the Arms Act case, which was subsequently and separately tried.

8. Thereafter the present application wag made by the petitioners in Criminal Appeal 251, of 1959, which had been summarily dismissed by me and which arose out of the second conviction.

9. On the matter being put up before S.N.P. Singh, J., his Lordship ordered the matter to be placed before me, and, consequently, it has now come up before me for consideration.

10. Mr. Keshari Singh, appearing for the petitioners, submitted, in the first place, that Sec.397(1) applied here, and, in the second place, alternatively, that if Sec.397(1) did not apply, then, in that view alone, this Court, having inherent jurisdiction, under Sec. 561A of the Code, to make the order asked for, should, in the circumstances, direct the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. In support of his contention, he relied on a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jainta Kumar Banerjee V/s. The State, AIR 1955 Cal 632.

11. In this case, I directed a notice to be issued to the Advocate-General to appear, as no one was appearing on the 23rd August, 1960, when the matter was put up before me. In pursuance of that notice, Mr. B.D. Singh, Additional Standing Counsel, has appeared to assist the Court. The contention put forward by him, in reply, was (i) that, in view of Sec.369 of the Code, this Court has no jurisdiction to pass the order prayed lor, in that, that would amount to altering the judgment of his Court; (ii) that, on the facts of the present case, inherent powers of this Court under Sec. 561A. also could not be exercised by this Court. He relied, in supp