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1966 Supreme(Pat) 97

PATNA HIGH COURT
G.N.Prasad, J.
Union Of India
Versus
Binod Behari Singh
Civil Revision No. 8 of 1966 ;
Decided On : AUGUST 23, 1966

The court has jurisdiction to permit amendment of pleading to be made after the expiry of the period of limitation in appropriate cases falling within the two conditions laid down in the case of Harish Chandra, AIR 1957 SC 444.

Headnote:

ARBITRATION ACT - AMENDMENT OF OBJECTION PETITION - LIMITATION - COURT'S JURISDICTION - PRINCIPLES GOVERNING AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS - APPLICATION TO PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARBITRATION ACT.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, the Union of India, entered into a goods handling contract with the opposite party in December 1957. Disputes arose, and the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator made an award in favor of the opposite party. The petitioner filed an objection petition challenging the award on various grounds. Subsequently, the petitioner filed two amendment petitions seeking to add additional grounds of attack against the award. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge rejected the amendment petitions, holding that they were filed beyond the 30-day limitation period and that allowing them would be tantamount to giving the petitioner an opportunity to raise fresh grounds of objections beyond the limitation period.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge erred in rejecting the amendment petitions solely on the ground that they were filed beyond the limitation period. The court held that the learned Judge should have considered whether the proposed amendments were of such a character that by allowing them beyond the period of thirty days would work injustice to the other side or would have the effect of taking away some legal right which has accrued to the opposite party by lapse of time.

Issues: 1. Whether the learned Additional Subordinate Judge erred in rejecting the amendment petitions solely on the ground that they were filed beyond the limitation period? 2. Whether the court has jurisdiction to permit amendment of pleading to be made after the expiry of the period of limitation in appropriate cases falling within the two conditions laid down in the case of Harish Chandra, AIR 1957 SC 444?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge erred in rejecting the amendment petitions solely on the ground that they were filed beyond the limitation period. The court held that the learned Judge should have considered whether the proposed amendments were of such a character that by allowing them beyond the period of thirty days would work injustice to the other side or would have the effect of taking away some legal right which has accrued to the opposite party by lapse of time. 2. The court held that it has jurisdiction to permit amendment of pleading to be made after the expiry of the period of limitation in appropriate cases falling within the two conditions laid down in the case of Harish Chandra, AIR 1957 SC 444.

Final Decision: The court set aside the order of the learned Judge and sent the case back to him with a direction to deal with the two amendment petitions on their merits in the light of the observations made above.

Judgment

G.N.Prasad, J.

1. The petitioner, the Union of India as owner of Eastern Railway Administration, had entered into a goods handling contract with the opposite party in December, 1957. The contract contained an arbitration clause, and certain disputes having arisen between the parties, they were referred to the arbitration of the Deputy General Manager of the Railway. In due course, the arbitrator made an award, whereby the opposite party was found to be entitled to receive from the petitioner a sum of Rs. 82,100 in full satisfaction of his dues under the contract. The award which was given on 26-2-1965 was filed in Court on 25-5-1965, and the notice contemplated by Sec.14(2) of the Arbitration Act was served upon the petitioners lawyer on 28-6-1965. Within thirty days thereof, viz., on 24-7-1965, the petitioner filed an objection to the award challenging the same as vitiated on various grounds, such as misconduct, or having been made beyond the scope of the reference to arbitration.

Subsequently, two applications were filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking amendment of its original objection petition dated 24-7-1965. The first amendment petition was filed on 23-9-1965, praying for the insertion of certain additional grounds of attack against the award. The second application was filed on 6-11-1965 for the insertion of some more grounds. Both the applications for amendment were opposed on behalf of the opposite party. Ultimately, after hearing the parties and considering the amendment petitions, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge rejected the amendment petitions by his order dated 27-11-1965. It is that order which is sought to be assailed by the petitioner in this civil revision application.

2. At this stage, it would be proper to state the precise grounds which have weighed with the learned Judge for refusing the two amendment petitions. In paragraph 3 of his order the learned Judge has observed that having gone through the amendment petitions, there can be no doubt that they raised fresh grounds of objection which were sought to be added to the grounds already mentioned in the original objection petition dated 24-7-1965. Secondly, the learned Judge referred to the provisions contained in Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and held that the objection petition filed by the petitioner on 24-7-1965 was governed by the thirty days limitation period provided by the said Article of the Limitation Act, the computation being made from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. Since however, both the amendment petitions have been filed beyond the period of thirty days mentioned above, the learned Judge felt that to allow the amendment petitions would be tantamount to giving the petitioner an opportunity to raise fresh grounds of objections beyond the period of limitation. The learned Judge, therefore, concluded:

"As the amendment petitions seeking to add fresh grounds of objections have been filed beyond thirty days from the notice of filing of the award, I would hold that the prayer of the opposite party to amend the original petition of objection is not fit to be allowed."

3. So far as the applicability of Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 , is concerned, there can be no dispute, having regard to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Seonarain Lal V/s. Prabhu Chand, AIR 1958 Pat 252. There, it was clearly laid down that an objection to an award which has been filed in Court in accordance with the provisions of Sec.14 of the Arbitration Act must be preferred within the period of thirty days prescribed by Article 158 of the Limitation Act of 1908, which was the provision corresponding to Article 119(b) of the present Limitation Act. In other words, the objection could be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. Therefore, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the two amendment petiti














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