PATNA HIGH COURT
Madan Mohan Prasad and Shivanugrah Narain JJ.
Ram Lochan Mishra
Versus
Jibeshwar Jha
Criminal Revision No. 421 of 1976 ;
Decided On : SEPTEMBER 1, 1976
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE - Section 144 - Section 145 - BIHAR PANCHAYAT RAJ ACT - Section 64 - Conversion of proceeding under Section 64 into one under Section 145 - Validity - Jurisdiction of Magistrate - Agent claiming possession on behalf of principal - Whether a proper party - Interpretation of words "person concerned" in Section 145.
Fact of the Case:
A proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was converted into one under Section 145 of the CrPC by the Magistrate. The petitioners challenged the conversion on various grounds, including the lack of jurisdiction of the Magistrate to convert the proceeding, the pendency of a title suit in respect of the same property, and the improper joinder of parties.
Finding of the Court:
1. The Magistrate had jurisdiction to convert the proceeding under Section 64 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act (BPRA) into one under Section 145 of the CrPC, as the order of conversion was an independent order passed under Section 145(1) of the CrPC and not an order purporting to be under Section 64 of the BPRA. 2. The pendency of a title suit in respect of the same property did not render the impugned order bad in law, as the question of possession as between the parties to the present dispute was not the question agitated in the title suit. 3. The agent claiming possession on behalf of the principal was a proper party to the proceeding under Section 145 of the CrPC, as the words "person concerned" in Section 145 must be given a liberal and wide interpretation, and an agent in actual possession of the land on behalf of his master can be deemed to be a person concerned within the meaning of the section.
Issues: 1. Whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to convert the proceeding under Section 64 of the BPRA into one under Section 145 of the CrPC? 2. Whether the pendency of a title suit in respect of the same property rendered the impugned order bad in law? 3. Whether the agent claiming possession on behalf of the principal was a proper party to the proceeding under Section 145 of the CrPC?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Magistrate's order converting the proceeding under Section 64 of the BPRA into one under Section 145 of the CrPC was an independent order passed under Section 145(1) of the CrPC, and not an order purporting to be under Section 64 of the BPRA. Therefore, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to convert the proceeding. 2. The question of possession as between the parties to the present dispute was not the question agitated in the title suit. Therefore, the pendency of the title suit did not render the impugned order bad in law. 3. The words "person concerned" in Section 145 of the CrPC must be given a liberal and wide interpretation. An agent in actual possession of the land on behalf of his master can be deemed to be a person concerned within the meaning of the section. Therefore, the agent claiming possession on behalf of the principal was a proper party to the proceeding under Section 145 of the CrPC.
Final Decision: The petition challenging the conversion of the proceeding under Section 144 of the CrPC into one under Section 145 of the CrPC was dismissed.
MADAN MOHAN PRASAD, J.
1. This is an application for the purpose of quashing an order by which a proceeding under S.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has been converted into one under S.145 thereof.
2. It appears that one Bishnu Jha, a member of the Executive. Committee of the Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj Keoti made a report to the Sarpanch of an apprehension of breach of peace arising out of a dispute in respect of certain lands between the petitioners and the opposite party, as a result of which the Sarpanch made an enquiry on the 11th of February, 1976 and finding that there was apprehension of breach of peace, acting under S.64 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, directed the petitioners to abstain from going over the disputed lands until the 25th of February, 1976 on which date they were asked to appear before the Subdivsional Magistrate. The Sarpanch made a report to the Magistrate stating the aforesaid facts and further recommending that a proceeding under S.144 of the Code be drawn up. The Subdivisional Magistrate, thereupon, on the 25th of February, 1976 started a proceeding under S.144. Subsequently by the impugned order he converted the proceeding into one under S.145 of the Code.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended as follows: Firstly, that the proceeding under S.144 itself was illegal inasmuch as the Magistrate had to pass an order either confirming the order passed by the Sarpanch or discharging the notice in view of sub-s. (2) of Sec.64 of the Act and he could not have, therefore, passed any third kind of an order, namely, starting a proceeding under S.144 of the Code, Secondly, that a title suit bearing No.8 of 1976 in the court of the Subordinate Judge was pending in respect of the same property and for that reason the impugned order is bad in law. Thirdly, that in the present case, the person contesting and who alone had filed written statement on behalf of the second party, is an agent of one Mahanth Shyam Narain Das who has not filed any separate written statement of his own, and in view of the law that an agent cannot be declared to be in possession on behalf of the master and the proceeding, in the absence of the principal, being bad in law, the present order cannot be sustained. Fourthly, that there being already a preventive order passed by the Sarpanch under S.64 of the Act, it was not open to the Magistrate to take action under S.144 of the Code which, in effect, is no different from the order under S.64 of the Act. Lastly, it has been urged that the report which was the basis of the order under S.64 of the Act ceased to have any validity after the expiry of thirty days, the duration during which an order under S.64 of the Act is effective, and could not form the basis of the present order under S.145 (1) of the Code.
4. I would take up the first point first. Sec. 64 of the Act is as follows
"64. Criminal powers of Sarpanch.- (1) Whenever the Sarpanch has reason to believe that a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquillity is imminent and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, he may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the prescribed manner, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take action with respect to a certain property in his possession or his management.
(2) As soon as the Sarpanch has issued an order under sub-s. (1) he shall submit the proceedings of the case to the Subdivisional Magistrate who may either confirm the order or discharge the notice after hearing the parties to the dispute,if they so desire.
(3) An order passed under sub-s. (1) shall remain in force for thirty days."
On the basis of sub-section (2) and a decision of a learned Single Judge B.P. Jha J. in Madan Singh V/s. Ram Gopal (1974 BBCJ 70) it has been urged that the Magistrate could not pass the order under S.144; all that he could do was eith
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