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1987 Supreme(Pat) 46

PATNA HIGH COURT
S.S.Sandhawalia, S.Shamsul Hasan and Ram Nandan Prasad JJ.
Surnarain Singh
Versus
State Of Bihar
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 158 of 1986 ; 192 of 1986 ; 193 of 1986 ; 236 of 1986 ; 250 of 1986 ;
Decided On : MARCH 02, 1987

The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offenses, including capital crimes punishable with death.

Headnote:

The Court held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offenses, including capital crimes punishable with death. The Court also held that a broad time frame for the original trials of capital offenses can be spelt out by precedent and that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in the investigation and original trials of pending cases for capital offenses punishable with death would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21. The Court further held that as regards the investigation and original trials of capital offenses in future, a time-frame of five years appears to be more than reasonable and that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of five years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in investigation and original trials for capital offenses registered hereinafter would plainly attract the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners were charged with murder and other offenses arising from a 1973 incident. The trial was delayed for various reasons, including the default of the prosecution and the accused. The petitioners filed a writ petition in the High Court, alleging that the delay in the trial violated their right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The High Court referred the matter to a Full Bench.

Finding of the Court:

The Full Bench held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offenses, including capital crimes punishable with death. The Court also held that a broad time frame for the original trials of capital offenses can be spelt out by precedent and that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in the investigation and original trials of pending cases for capital offenses punishable with death would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21. The Court further held that as regards the investigation and original trials of capital offenses in future, a time-frame of five years appears to be more than reasonable and that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of five years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in investigation and original trials for capital offenses registered hereinafter would plainly attract the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21.

Issues: 1. Whether the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether the right to a speedy trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offenses, including capital crimes punishable with death? 3. Whether a broad time frame for the original trials of capital offenses can be spelt out by precedent? 4. Whether a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in the investigation and original trials of pending cases for capital offenses punishable with death would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. The right to a speedy trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offenses, including capital crimes punishable with death. 3. A broad time frame for the original trials of capital offenses can be spelt out by precedent. 4. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in the investigation and original trials of pending cases for capital offenses punishable with death would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21.

Final Decision: The Court held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offenses, including capital crimes punishable with death. The Court also held that a broad time frame for the original trials of capital offenses can be spelt out by precedent and that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in the investigation and original trials of pending cases for capital offenses punishable with death would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21. The Court further held that as regards the investigation and original trials of capital offenses in future, a time-frame of five years appears to be more than reasonable and that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of five years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reasons) in investigation and original trials for capital offenses registered hereinafter would plainly attract the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21.

Judgment

S.S.Sandhwalia, J.

1. Is capital crime punishable with death, a class apart by itself, and thus beyond the majestic sweep of the constitutional right to speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution? Can a broad time frame for the original trials of capital offences be indicatively spelt out by precedent? Does the principle and ratio of Madheshwardhari Singh and Anr. V/s. State of Bihar -- extend to capital crimes as well? These indeed are the significant issues which have yet again necessitated this reference to the Full Bench in these five connected criminal writ jurisdiction cases.

2. In Madheshwardhari Singhs case (supra) as a prologue thereto it was said:

This judgment is now a part of the trilogy, beginning with the Division Bench case of The State of Bihar V/s. Ram Daras, AIR 1985 CrLJ 584 and expanded in the subsequent Full Bench decision in State of Bihar V/s. Maksudan Singh -- . it is, perhaps, illustrative of the poets hope of freedom slowly broadening down from precedent.

This judgment becomes another integral part in the series of the said trilogy and hopefully may prove as the epilogue in this context.

3 The terra firma for the factual matrix giving rise to the issues aforesaid may be noticed briefly from Rameshwar Prasad Singh and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar, Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 192 of 1986. Nearly thirteen years and nine months ago en the 9th of April, 1973, a case Under Sections 148, 149, 452, 382/307 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and other officers under the Indian Arms Act was registered against the petitioners at Maharajganj Police Station. Subsequently the victim of the crime, Nand kumar Singh, succumbed to his injuries and the charge Under Sec.307 was converted to one of murder Under Sec.302 of the Indian Penal Code as well. The petitioners soon after the incident were either arrested or surrendered to police custody and after investigation the charge sheet was submitted on the 25th of May, 1974 and the case was committed to the Court of Session on the 15th of July, 1974. Thereafter it would seem that the trial of the petitioners was stalled entirely by the default of the prosecution and, perhaps, because of its tardy pace some of the petitioners were granted bail after having suffered incarce ration for more than two years. It was not till seven years after the occurrence that the case was then transferred to the Court of the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, on the 3rd of June, 1980 and more than two years later on the 30th of September, 1982 charges Under Sections 302 and 396 of the Indian Penal Code were framed against the petitioners. The examination of witnesses commenced before the then Additional Sessions Judge Shri B.D. Jha on the 15th of October, 1982, but on his transfer on the 11th of August, 1983 the case was transferred to the Court of the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Ram Avtar Singh. It is not in dispute that before him over a period of two years the prosecution chose to produce only four witnesses. Thereafter it sought and secured as many as 90 adjournments for the production of other prosecution witnesses including that of Investigating Officer. A forceful grievance has been made that because of the non-production of the Investigating Officer and the inordinate delay and adjournments secured by the prosecution the petitioners were throughout gravely prejudiced in their defence by the absence of the Senior Advocate engaged by them who inevitably could not remain present for nearly a hundred adjournments, granted therefor. It was not till, the 7th of February, 1985 that the Investigating Officer was examined and because of the absence of Senior Counsel a prayer had to be made that his cross-examination be deferred. However, this request was rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

4. Inevitably the petitioners for the first time were compelled to make resort to the High Court by way of Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1574 of 1985 on





































































































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