Heard Mr. S. B. K. Manglam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Rajesh Kumar Verma, learned SC-27 for the State.

2. The present writ application has been filed against the order dated 4th March, 2013 passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Rohtas at Sasaram (respondent no. 4) by which the petitioner has been called upon to submit Bank guarantee of Rs. 2 lakhs of any Nationalized Bank for release of his Tipper (Dumper) bearing registration no. BR 24 G 2213.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the authority refused to release the said vehicle, he moved before the High Court earlier in C.W.J.C. No. 712 of 2013 in which by order dated 30th January, 2013 a direction was issued to the Divisional Forest Officer/concerned authority to consider the application of the petitioner for release of the vehicle in light of the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 10 Supreme Court Cases 283. Learned counsel submits that pursuant to the same the authority had passed the order by which Rs. 2 lakhs, by way of Bank guarantee, has been sought to be furnished. This, according to him, is beyond jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside as according to him Section 53 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), which is the power given to the authority for release of property, only requires the owner to execute a bond for the production of the property so released, if and when so required. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on an unreported decision in C.W.J.C. No. 13001 of 2010 (Bhupal Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.) in which by order dated 30th November, 2010 a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that under Section 53 of the Act, the authority cannot ask for a Bank guarantee as the statutory provision requires a bond as security for production of the released vehicle during the proceedings. It is also his submission that while considering the application for release the authority could not have travelled beyond the provisions set out in Section 53 of the Act while allowing release of the vehicle. He, therefore, submits that the mere reference in the order of the High Court earlier to the case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai (supra) would not mean that the authority can ask for Bank guarantee.

4. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, contested the writ application and has taken a stand that in view of the earlier order of the Court dated 30th January, 2013, the authority was directed to consider the application of the petitioner for release of the vehicle in light of the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai (supra). He specifically relies on paragraph no. 17 which is quoted here-in-below:

“17. In our view, whatever be the situation, it is of no use to keep such seized vehicles at the police stations for a long period. It is for the Magistrate to pass appropriate orders immediately by taking appropriate bond and guarantee as well as security for return of the said vehicles, if required at any point of time. This can be done pending hearing of applications for return of such vehicles.”

5. He accordingly submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court has given discretion to the authority to pass appropriate orders taking appropriate bond and guarantee as well as security for return of the said vehicle, if required at any point of time. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the order impugned cannot be faulted. Learned counsel further submits that if contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then it would amount to reviewing and going behind the order dated 30th January, 2013. The authority had only acted in accordance with the observation of the High Court earlier and had imposed the condition of furnishing of Bank guarantee which cannot be construed as and equated to the authority on its own exercising its jurisd