The present application has been filed on behalf of the petitioners praying for initiation of a contempt proceeding against the Respondents for alleged non-compliance of the order dated 13.04.2007 passed in CWJC No. 6519 of 2004, which was disposed of with certain directions as enumerated therein.

2. At the very outset itself, learned counsel for the opposite parties has raised a preliminary objection, on the basis of the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter the ‘Contempt Act’) that the contempt petition is not maintainable as it is barred by limitation. He submits that such bar of limitation under the said provision is absolute and inflexible, as it does not also permit condonation of delay.

3. In response to the aforesaid objection, learned counsel for the petitioners had sought time and thereafter filed I.A. No. 8639 of 2013 for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 (hereinafter the “Limitation Act”) in filing the contempt petition. It has also been submitted that this Court would be well within jurisdiction in condoning such delay.

4. For ready reference, the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt Act are reproduced below :—

“20. Limitation for actions for contempt- No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

5. On a plain reading of the above provision, it is clear that the Court is precluded from initiating proceedings for contempt beyond the limitation period of one year from the date when the contempt is said to have been committed. The provision in terms does not provide for any exceptions or relaxations in that regard. It would thus appear that the provision of Section 20 is mandatory and automatically operates in the matter of civil contempt where a party approaches the Court for initiation of contempt proceedings by filing a petition alleging willful disobedience or violation of its order beyond the prescribed period of one year.

6. It is relevant to advert to the backdrop in which Section 20 of the Contempt Act itself came to be enacted. The Sanyal Committee observed in its Report at paragraph-8 of Chapter-X, in the context of the desirability of prescribing a period of limitation through enactment, that if the period had to be fixed by statute the same would necessarily have to be very short and provision would also have to be made for condoning delay in suitable cases. It was felt on the whole that instead of making any hard and fast rule on the subject, the matter be continued to be governed by the discretion of the Courts as before. The Joint Select Committee of Parliament on contempt of Courts (Bhargawa Committee) examined the report of the Sanyal Committee, and opined on the question of limitation that the contempt proceedings by their very nature should be initiated and dealt with as early as possible and hence considered it necessary and desirable that a period of limitation should be specified in respect of action for contempt. This became the reason for introducing Section 20 of the Act. In other words, the object behind introduction of Section 20 was the early consideration of actions for contempt and not to brook delay in that regard.

7. It is equally relevant to note that the vires of Section 20 of the Act has been tested by various Courts and held to be constitutionally valid, as appears from the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Arthur Branwell Company Ltd. Vs. Indian Fibres Ltd. [1993 (2) CLJ 182]; the Karnataka High Court in High Court of Karnataka in Vs. Y.K. Subbanna [1990 Cri.L.J. 1159]; and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Ratnamanikyam Vs. K.S.R. Sarma [1988 (2) ALT 644].

8. In Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian & Ors [(2001) 7 SCC 549], while the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the Contempt Act was not called in question, the Hon'ble Apex Court examined the inter