Ashwani Kumar Singh, J.

These criminal appeals raise a common preliminary issue and as such the issue is being decided by a common order.

2. Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 591 of 2016 has been filed under Section 14-A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (Act No. 1 of 2016) (hereinafter referred to as "the Amendment Act, 2015") by the appellants challenging the order dated 26.07.2016 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum - Special Judge, Muzaffarpur in G.R. Case No. 103 of 2016, arising out of Paroo P.S. Case No. 156 of 2016, registered under certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the SC & ST Act, 1989') whereby the prayer for bail of the appellants has been rejected.

3. Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 625 of 2016 has been filed under Section 14-A(2) of the Amendment Act, 2015 by which the appellant has challenged the order dated 01.08.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge-cum-1st Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari in B.P. No. 1008 of 2016, arising out of certain offences under the Indian Penal Code and the SC & ST Act, 1989 whereby the bail petition of the appellant has been rejected.

4. The main thrust of the preliminary argument of the appellants revolves around the literal interpretation of the provisions prescribed under Section 14-A(1) and (2) of the Amendment Act, 2015 introduced in the SC & ST Act, 1989, with effect from 26th January, 2016.

5. It is the contention of the appellants that an order made in a proceeding arising out of an application for grant of bail is not a judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding. A judgment would mean any decision which finally terminates a criminal proceeding pending before a Court. Further, the order in question is neither a final order nor imposes a sentence. Therefore, in view of the provision prescribed under Section 14-A(1) of the Amendment Act, 2015, an appeal would not be permissible against an order granting or refusing bail by a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, as such an order is an "interlocutory order".

6. The appellants have drawn the attention of the Court to the provisions prescribed under Section 14-A(1) and (2) of the Amendment Act, 2015. It is contended that the provision of subsection (2) of Section 14-A of the Amendment Act, 2015 does not affect adversely as to the maintainability of an application moved under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") against an order granting or refusing bail by a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court. The expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail" used in Section 14-A(2) would only mean that the aggrieved party would be entitled to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court even without obtaining leave from the High Court under certain circumstances where an appeal would be maintainable. In other words, the contention is that by no stretch of imagination the above expression can be given a meaning that it has ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain an application for bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. It has been contended that unless there is ouster of jurisdiction by an express provision or by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. would remain intact.

7. It is next contended by the appellants that had there been an intention of the legislature to prohibit an application under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. in relation to any case involving arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under the Act, it would have made identical provision