1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel representing the opposite party no.2 as well learned APP for the State.

2. Petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 30.04.2014 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Vaishali at Hajipur by which he has refused to interfere with the order dated 25.05.2013 passed by learned SDM, Hajipur in Case No. MI-421 of 2013. By the order dated 25.05.2013, the learned SDM converted the proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. to a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. against both parties.

3. From the narration of the facts emerging from the records it appears that on the basis of a police report dated 20th March, 2013, the learned SDM, Vaishali at Hajipur initiated a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. on 25.03.2013 in respect of a land in dispute. Both the parties contested the proceeding by filing show cause and thereafter impugned order has been passed on 25.05.2013 by the learned SDM converting the proceeding under Section 145 Cr.PC.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the order converting the proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is bad in law because it has been passed on 61st day from the date the prohibitory order was passed. He would further submit that since the subject matter in dispute is a residential house, therefore, no proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. could have been initiated. Thus, learned counsel submits that the impugned order dated 25.05.2013 passed by the learned SDM, Hajipur as well as the revisional order dated 30.04.2014 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Vaishali at Hajipur are liable to be set aside.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Maula Bux Ansari & Ors. Vs. Ram Rup Sah @ Ram Swaroop Sah reported in 1983 (31) BLJR 365 (H.C.) and submits that in this case it has been held by the High Court that period of sixty days is prescribed for initiation of a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. from the date on which the prohibitory order was passed and because in this case proceeding has been initiated beyond the period of sixty days, therefore, it is directly hit by the judgment of this Court.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel representing the opposite party no.2 submits that a bare perusal of the provision as contained under Section 144(4) Cr.P.C. would show that no order under this section shall remain in force for more than ‘two months’ (emphasis supplied) from the making thereof. Therefore, the real question for consideration in the case is as to whether the word ‘two months’ would mean sixty days or it should be two months as per the British calendar. Learned counsel submits that so far as the judgment of the Patna High Court is concerned there is no quarrel with the propositions laid down in the said judgment. It is pointed out that in the said case the real issue in controversy was as to what will be taken as date of initiation of a second proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C., whether the date of application or the date on which prohibitory order was passed? The said judgment does not address the issue raised herein. Thus, the said judgment is not on the issue involved in the present case.

7. Learned counsel relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of Chhatar Singh & Ors. Vs. Subash Chandra Panda reported in 1994 II OLR 639 where this issue had fallen for consideration. The discussions made in paragraph 3 of the said judgment has been read out by learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and the same being worth consideration and has a persuasive value for this Court, are being quoted hereunder for a ready reference:-

“The expression of the word “month” has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. Therefore, the problem has surfaced. Clause (35) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines “month” to mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar. Section 49 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, “IPC”) also throws some light on