AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, J.

I.A. No. 4169 of 2018

Having heard the learned Advocate General as well as the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner, we find sufficient cause having been shown to condone the delay in filing of the appeal.

2. The delay condonation application is allowed and the delay in filing of the appeal is condoned. The appeal shall be treated to be within time.

L.P.A. No. 758 of 2018

3. Heard learned Advocate General for the appellant-State and Sri Pramod Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner.

4. At the very outset, we may point out that against the same very impugned judgment, L.P.A. No. 459 of 2018 (State of Bihar and others vs. Manish Kumar) has been filed and is connected with this appeal where, upon a consideration of the materials on record, a Division Bench on 2nd August, 2018 stayed the operation of the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.

5. In the wake of the aforesaid interim order and in the background of the grounds raised, this Court was also pleased to issue notices upon which learned counsel has appeared and resisted this appeal.

6. Learned Advocate General, Sri Lalit Kishore, while advancing his submissions has laid emphasis on the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge while interpreting the provisions of Section 14(1)(b)(i)(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, where the learned Single Judge has held that since the aforesaid section does not incorporate within itself the ground of imminent danger or actual threat perception as a ground of refusal, therefore, a licensing authority cannot refuse to grant a license on such a ground declaring the person to be unfit. Learned Advocate General has taken exception to this interpretation contending that this universal direction, as contained in the judgment, is trenching upon the discretion to be exercised by the licensing authority who can, after examining the police report and such other materials that may be available before him, proceed to refuse to grant license inasmuch as the grant of the permission to possess a fire arms license does not partake the nature of a fundamental right inasmuch as a person does not have any such right of carrying fire arms. He submits that since the law is regulated under the Arms Act, 1959, in that view of the matter, the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge would impinge upon the power to be exercised by the licensing authority while making an assessment with regard to the genuineness of a request for grant of a license. The contention, therefore, is that the omnibus declaration made by the learned Single Judge takes away the discretionary power vested in the licensing authority as conferred by the statute by reading into it such words which necessarily take away the discretion of the licensing authority to refuse a license even if an applicant has been unable to place any material on record to justify the grant of such license. He, however, contends that the genuineness or otherwise of the purpose of license, if it exists, the same has to be taken into consideration for grant of a license and, for that, the licensing authority will have to take into consideration the materials on record, including the police report as also the purpose for which the license has been sought by the applicant.

7. As noted above, a Division Bench of this Court had stayed the operation of the judgment and order impugned herein. It appears that after the judgment was delivered by the learned Single Judge on 11th August, 2015, the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred under the 1959 Act and in supersession of the Arms Rules, 1962 promulgated the Arms Rules, 2016 that came to be published in the gazette on 15th July, 2016.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner would submit that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error inasmuch as the Rules of 2016 came later on and as on the date when the judgment was delivered, the learned Single Judge w