Chandra Shekhar Jha, J.—Heard Mr. Diwakar Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Matloob Rab, learned A.P.P. for the State.

2. The present quashing petition has been filed to quash the order dated 26.02.2016 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai in connection with Barauni P.S. Case No. 344 of 2014 corresponding to G.R. No. 3595/2014, whereby and whereunder cognizance of the offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (in short the ‘I.P.C.’) and Section 3/4/5/6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1956”) was taken by learned Magistrate.

3. The brief facts of the case is that the informant, who was the Sub-Inspector, posted at Zero Mile Police Station, has alleged that while he was on patrolling duty alongwith other police personnel, reached near Bihar Nagar Parishad foreign liquor shop No. 24 and started search of the vehicle, where on search of one Car bearing Registration No. BR09P-3462, he saw three persons and a lady were present inside the car and doing illicit act/behaviour. They were apprehended by the police and, on query, they disclosed their name and address. The informant further alleged that the accused persons were committing illicit behaviour with a lady by locking themselves in a car, which constitutes a criminal offence under the provisions of Section 3/4/5/6 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. He alleged that due to non-availability of independent witness, Home Guard personnels were made the witness of the occurrence. Thereafter, on search of the accused persons, mobiles and cash of Rs. 11,000/- etc. were found and seized. The informant also seized the car and produced the arrested persons for taking action under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4/5/6 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case. It is submitted by learned counsel that the lady co-accused, was not known to this petitioner, as she took lift for a short destination which was given by the owner of the vehicle i.e. co-accused Raj Kumar Poddar. It is pointed out that no doubt the conveyance in the present case, the alleged car may be said as ‘brothel’ in view of Section 2(a) of the Immoral Traffic Act, and if it is so, then the petitioner maximum can be said as a customer because he is not the owner of the vehicle in question. It is submitted that there were three other persons inside the vehicle beside this petitioner, where there is no specific allegation available against the petitioner as to involve in any indecent act or activities which can be said as ‘immoral’. It is further pointed out by learned counsel that the cash belongs to the owner of the vehicle where nothing specifically surfaced during investigation as it was paid for fulfilling sexual lust as alleged. It is further submitted by learned counsel that the facts of the case is nowhere convincing as to make out a prima-facie case under Section 3/4/5/6 of the Immoral Traffic Act, as alleged, and as such continuance of the proceeding would only amount to misusing the process of court of law, as mere presence of a person in brothel does not constitute any offence.

5. Learned counsel further submitted that the mandatory provision of Section 15 of the Immoral Traffic Act regarding search of the premises not appears to be followed in the present case. It is further pointed out that compliance of Section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short the ‘Cr.P.C.’) also appears not followed regarding search and, on this ground alone, this criminal prosecution is liable to be quashed against the petitioner.

6. Learned counsel further relied upon the report of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court titled as Dinesh Tiwari @ Dhirendra Kumar Tiwari vs. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Home Civil Sectt. Lko. and another (Neutral Citation No.