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1965 Supreme(Cal) 194

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
H. K. Bose, B. C. Mitra
RAGHU SINGH - Appellant
Versus
BURRAKUR COAL CO. LTD. - Respondent
A. F. O. O.  331  Of  1958
Decided On : AUGUST 12, 1965

Advocates Appeared:
AMULYA KUMAR MUKHERJEE, P.GINWALLA, P.N.Biswas

An Industrial Tribunal is a judicial body and must observe the principles of natural justice and the rules of evidence as laid down in the Evidence Act.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - SECTION 33A - INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL - EVIDENCE ACT - APPLICABILITY - JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS - NATURAL JUSTICE - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE - VICITIMISATION - SECTION 33 - INTERPRETATION - NON-PAYMENT OF WAGES - ALTERATION OF SERVICE CONDITIONS - PUNISHMENT.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, a piece-rated trammer, was absent from work for a period of time due to an assault. Upon his return, he was denied work by the company, which claimed that his employment had automatically terminated due to his absence without leave. The appellant filed a complaint with the Industrial Tribunal alleging that the company had contravened Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act by refusing to allow him to work and wrongfully dismissing him without the permission of the Tribunal.

Finding of the Court:

The Industrial Tribunal found that the appellant had been assaulted and that the company's refusal to allow him to resume work was a case of victimisation. The Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. However, the High Court quashed the decisions of both tribunals, holding that they had erred in law by relying on inadmissible evidence and by failing to observe the principles of natural justice.

Issues: 1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in law by relying on inadmissible evidence and by failing to observe the principles of natural justice. 2. Whether the appellant's absence from work without leave amounted to a contravention of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 3. Whether the company's refusal to allow the appellant to resume work amounted to victimisation.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in law by relying on inadmissible evidence and by failing to observe the principles of natural justice. The Evidence Act applies to judicial proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal, and the tribunals failed to follow the rules of evidence as laid down in the Act. The tribunals also relied on an alleged discussion between the Tribunal and the Manager, which was not part of the record of proceedings and was therefore inadmissible. 2. The appellant's absence from work without leave did not amount to a contravention of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mere non-payment of wages is not an alteration of the conditions of service nor does it amount to punishment within the meaning of Section 33. 3. The company's refusal to allow the appellant to resume work did not amount to victimisation. There was no legal evidence to support the finding of victimisation, and the alleged discussion between the Tribunal and the Manager was inadmissible.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The decisions of the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal were quashed.

BOSE, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from an order of Sinha, J. dated 20th August 1957 made in a writ petition quashing the decisions of an Industrial Tribunal and of the Appellate Tribunal.

( 2 ) THE respondent No. 1 Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. which is incorporated under the Indian Companies Act carries on inter alia the business of coal mining. One of the collieries belonging to the Company is known as Loyabad Colliery and the appellant was a workman employed at the said Colliery as a piece-rated trammer.

( 3 ) IN June 1953 proceedings in connection with an industrial dispute between the Company and its workmen were pending before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad, Sri L. P. Dave. On 16th September 1953 the appellant filed a complaint before the said Tribunal under Section 33a of the Industrial Disputes Act alleging that the respondent Company had constravened Section 33 of the Act by refusing to allow him to work and had thus wrongfully dismissed him without the permission of the said Tribunal. In this complaint the appellant alleged that he had been absent from his work from 14th June, 1953 until 21st June 1953 by reason of having been assaulted on the 14th June 1953 and having consequently been in hospital until 20th June 1953. He further alleged that he had applied to the company's Manager to be allowed to resume his duties on 22nd June 1953, but he was not allowed to do so.

( 4 ) THE Company's case before the Tribunal was that no application had been made to the Manager on the 22nd June 1953 or at all and as the appellant was absent from his work without leave, his employment had automatically terminated under the Standing Order governing such employment.

( 5 ) AT the hearing before the Tribunal evidence was adduced by both parties and the appellant in his evidence made a different case and alleged that he had been twice assaulted--once on 12th June 1953 and again on 14th June 1953 and in these assaluts the Company's men took part. The Tribunal upon hearing the parties made an Award directing that the appellant should be reinstated with back pay from 22nd June 1953. This Award was published in the Gazette of India dated 6th February 1954. In dealing with the merits of the case the Tribunal arrived inter alia at the following findings: (a) The appellant was assaulted on 12th June 1953 and also on 14th June 1953. But the Tribunal was not satisfied that the assault on 12th June took place in the verandah of the Manager's office nor that it was made by the Company's men. The assault on 14th June was also not made with the connivance of the Company's men and in the opinion of the Tribunal these allegations were an after-thought and could not be believed. In coming to this conclusion the Tribunal relied on the letter of the Assistant Surgeon, Dhanbad, and the certificate enclosed therewith showing that the appellant was sent to the hospital from the Jogta Police Station on 13th June 1953 for some injuries. These injuries were three bruises and were simple. He was admitted to the hospital on 14-6-53 and was discharged on 20-6-53. (b) The appellant must have seen the Manager on 22nd June 1953 and given him an application along with the Medical Certificate and asked for permission to resume duty. In coming to this conclusion the Tribunal relied on the oral evidence of the Manager and also on a copy of a letter written by the appellant to the Conciliation Officer, Dhanbad on 30th June 1953 which copy together with an acknowledgment receipt given by the office of the Conciliation Officer had been sent by the Trade Union representing the appellant, to the Tribunal. (c) Under the relevant Standing Order mere absence from duty without leave does not amount to automatic termination of employment. The absence from duty was not without satisfactory cause nor could it be said that it was an absence for more than 10 days and so it did not amount to misconduct. (d) The reason for refusing the appellant to resume his dut



























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