SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
9th December 1964
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI AND R.S. BACHAWAT, JJ.
Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Appellants
Versus
P. N. Sharma and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Senior Advocate, (M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s- J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Appellants; Mr. J. P. Goyal, Advocate, for Respondent No. 1, M/s. Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, Advocates, for Respondent No. 2.
A tribunal, within the context of the legal document, is an adjudicating authority that is vested with the judicial powers of the State and is constituted by the State to decide disputes between parties. The key attributes of a tribunal include being an authority other than a regular court, but still possessing the capacity to determine rights and obligations in a conclusive manner based on judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The fundamental criterion for identifying a body as a tribunal under the relevant constitutional provision is that it must be invested with the judicial powers of the State, either by statute or statutory rule, and must act judicially or quasi-judicially in resolving disputes. The presence of certain procedural trappings of a court, such as the authority to determine disputes in a formal manner, the power to examine evidence, and the obligation to act fairly and objectively, are relevant but not solely determinative. The core requirement is that the authority exercises the judicial power conferred upon it by the State for resolving disputes impartially and conclusively (!) (!) (!) .
In summary, a tribunal is a body created by the State with the authority to adjudicate disputes, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and is distinguished from purely administrative or executive bodies by its exercise of the State’s inherent judicial power (!) (!) (!) .
Judgment
GAJANDRADADKAR, C.J.I. (With Hidayatullah, Shah and Sikri, JJ.) : The principal point of law which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether respondent No. 2, the State of Punjab, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6 (6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952 (hereinafter called the Rules ) is a Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution. The appellant, the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur, challenges the validity of the appellate order passed by respondent No. 2 on July 4, 1962 under the provision of the said Rule, directing the appellant to reinstate its Welfare Officer, P. N. Sharma - respondent No. 1. At the hearing of this appeal, a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Goyal on behalf of respondent No. 1 that special leave should not have been granted to the appellant, because the appeal is incompetent inasmuch as respondent No. 2 against whose appellate decision the appellant purports to have preferred the present appeal is not a tribunal under Art. 136(1). If the preliminary objection fails, then it would become necessary to consider the appellant s contention that the impugned appellate order is invalid and erroneous and must be set aside.
2. The appellant is a company with its Head Office in Bombay and it runs 14 cement factories, 2 collieries and one fire-brick works in 8 States of the Union of India. One such Cement Works is the Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur, within the territorial limits of respondent No. 2. Under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (No. 63 of 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) read with the provisions of the Rules, the appellant was required to appoint one Welfare Officer and to notify his appointment and qualification to the "Chief Inspector of Factories. Respondent No. 1 was appointed such a Welfare Officer. The letter of appointment issued to him on March 2, 1956, stated that he would be liable to be transferred from one unit of the appellant to another and that his services could be terminated by the Appellant by one month s notice or with one month s pay in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1 was first posted at Lakheri Cement Works, Lakheri in Rajasthan, where he joined duty on March 14, 1956.Thereafter, he was transferred from one place to another according to the requirements of service and the working of the appellant s factories. On June 26, 1960, he was posted at the Bhupendra Cement Works. He was working at these Works until September 26, 1961, when his services were terminated. it appears that the appellant transferred respondent No. 1 from Bhupendra Cement Works to Kymore Works which is near Katni in Madhya Pradesh, but apparently, respondent No. 1 was not prepared to go to Kymore Works, and after long and protracted correspondence between the parties, the appellant wrote to him on September 26, 1961, that since he had not proceeded to Kymore on transfer as directed, he had ceased to be in the employment of the appellant; and his name had been struck off from the Company s rolls.
3. Respondent No. 1 then filed an appeal before respondent No. 2 as the appellate authority under R.6(6) of the Rules. On receiving notice of the said appeal, the appellant filed its written statement and disputed the validity of the grievance made by respondent No. 1 in respect of the termination of his services. Respondent No. 2 then passed the impugned order on July 4, 1962. This order was issued in the name of the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by R. 6 (6) of the Rules, and it directed that the Governor of Punjab was pleased to reinstate respondent No. 1 as Labour Welfare Officer in the service of the appellant. "However", says the order, "nothing in this order shall be construed to prevent the management from taking action against Mr. P. N. Sharma in accordance with the provisions of the Rules for such acts and commissions on his part as may hav
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