1. Termination of Welfare Officer's services under appointment terms — Appeal to State Government for reinstatement — Challenge to appellate order under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )
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1964 Supreme(SC) 331
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
9th December 1964
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI AND R.S. BACHAWAT, JJ.
Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Appellants
Versus
P. N. Sharma and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Senior Advocate, (M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s- J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Appellants; Mr. J. P. Goyal, Advocate, for Respondent No. 1, M/s. Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, Advocates, for Respondent No. 2.
Advocates:
Gopal Singh, J.B.DADACHAN, J.P.GOYAL, M.C.SETALVAD, O.C.MATHUR, R.N.SACH, Ravindra Narayan
Gopal Singh, J.B.DADACHAN, J.P.GOYAL, M.C.SETALVAD, O.C.MATHUR, R.N.SACH, Ravindra Narayan
A body is a 'tribunal' under Article 136(1) if constituted by the State and invested with its inherent judicial power to adjudicate disputes, regardless of 'trappings of a court'. Furthermore, contractual discharge is distinct from punitive termination.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 136(1) - Factories Act, 1948 - Section 49 - Service Rules - Rule 6 - Definition of 'Tribunal' - A body is a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1) if it is constituted by the State and invested with the State's inherent judicial power to adjudicate disputes between parties, as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions (Paras 9, 19, 30) - The presence of 'trappings of a court' may assist in the determination but is not an essential attribute for an authority to be classified as a tribunal (Paras 22, 42).
(B) Service Law - Termination of service - Distinction between discharge and punishment - Termination of services carried out strictly in accordance with the terms of appointment, such as by providing salary in lieu of notice, constitutes a discharge and not a punitive termination (Paras 37, 38).
Facts of the case:
An employee appointed as a welfare officer was terminated by the employer by providing one month's salary in lieu of notice, following the employee's refusal to comply with a transfer order. The employee appealed to the state government under the service rules, which subsequently ordered reinstatement. The employer challenged the validity of this appellate order before the Supreme Court.
Findings of Court:
The state government, while exercising appellate jurisdiction under the service rules to determine the rights of the parties, acts as a tribunal under Article 136(1). However, since the termination was a bona fide discharge under the contract of employment and not a punishment, the appeal filed by the employee was incompetent and the resulting order of reinstatement was without jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether the state government exercising appellate jurisdiction under the service rules is a tribunal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution, and whether a termination of service based on contractual terms of appointment amounts to a punishment.
Ratio Decidendi: The essential test for a 'tribunal' under Article 136(1) is that the body must be constituted by the State and invested with judicial power to determine disputes between parties; the absence of formal court procedures or 'trappings' does not disqualify it. Additionally, a termination of service that is a simple discharge under the terms of employment is not a punishment and therefore cannot be appealed under rules specifically providing for appeals against punitive actions.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Judgement Key Points
A tribunal, within the context of the legal document, is an adjudicating authority that is vested with the judicial powers of the State and is constituted by the State to decide disputes between parties. The key attributes of a tribunal include being an authority other than a regular court, but still possessing the capacity to determine rights and obligations in a conclusive manner based on judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The fundamental criterion for identifying a body as a tribunal under the relevant constitutional provision is that it must be invested with the judicial powers of the State, either by statute or statutory rule, and must act judicially or quasi-judicially in resolving disputes. The presence of certain procedural trappings of a court, such as the authority to determine disputes in a formal manner, the power to examine evidence, and the obligation to act fairly and objectively, are relevant but not solely determinative. The core requirement is that the authority exercises the judicial power conferred upon it by the State for resolving disputes impartially and conclusively (!) (!) (!) .
In summary, a tribunal is a body created by the State with the authority to adjudicate disputes, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and is distinguished from purely administrative or executive bodies by its exercise of the State’s inherent judicial power (!) (!) (!) .
Legal Category Hierarchy
- constitutional law
- administrative law
- labour and industrial law
Table of Contents
2. Whether State Government is a tribunal under Article 136(1) — Validity of rule requiring Labour Commissioner's concurrence — Whether termination of service constitutes punishment under service rules. (Para 1 , 35 )
3. State Government exercising appellate power under statutory rules is a tribunal if invested with judicial power to determine rights of parties in a lis. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 27 , 30 , 33 , 34 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 46 , 47 )
4. An authority is a tribunal under Article 136(1) if constituted by the State and invested with judicial power, regardless of whether it possesses trappings of a court. (Para 9 , 19 , 25 , 30 , 42 )
5. Appeal allowed — Impugned appellate order set aside as passed without jurisdiction. (Para 39 )
6. What constitutes a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1) of the Constitution?
A tribunal is an adjudicating body constituted by the State and invested with judicial functions as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. The presence of trappings of a court may assist in determination but is not an essential attribute. (Para 9 , 19 , 25 , 42 )
7. Is the presence of trappings of a court necessary for an authority to be considered a tribunal?
No. While trappings of a court, such as the power to compel witnesses, can help identify judicial proceedings, the basic test is whether the authority is constituted by the State and invested with the State's inherent judicial power to determine disputes. (Para 24 , 33 , 42 )
8. Does the termination of service under the terms of an appointment letter constitute punishment?
Termination of service exercised as a right under the conditions of service, such as a discharge with notice or pay in lieu, is not a punishment. Only punitive terminations of service fall under rules governing punishments and the requirement for prior concurrence of authorities. (Para 37 , 38 )
9. Can the State Government prescribe the requirement of prior concurrence from a Labour Commissioner for the dismissal of a Welfare Officer?
Yes. The power to prescribe conditions of service under Section 49(2) of the Factories Act is wide enough to include the conditions and safeguards under which an employee's services may be terminated to ensure security of tenure. (Para 36 )
Judgment
GAJANDRADADKAR, C.J.I. (With Hidayatullah, Shah and Sikri, JJ.) : The principal point of law which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether respondent No. 2, the State of Punjab, exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Rule 6 (6) of the PUNJAB WELFARE OFFICERS RECRUITMENT AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE RULES , 1952 (hereinafter called the Rules ) is a Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution. The appellant, the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur, challenges the validity of the appellate order passed by respondent No. 2 on July 4, 1962 under the provision of the said Rule, directing the appellant to reinstate its Welfare Officer, P. N. Sharma - respondent No. 1. At the hearing of this appeal, a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Goyal on behalf of respondent No. 1 that special leave should not have been granted to the appellant, because the appeal is incompetent inasmuch as respondent No. 2 against whose appellate decision the appellant purports to have preferred the present appeal is not a tribunal under Art. 136(1). If the preliminary objection fails, then it would become necessary to consider the appellant s contention that the impugned appellate order is invalid and erroneous and must be set aside.
2. The appellant is a company with its Head Office in Bombay and it runs 14 cement factories, 2 collieries and one fire-brick works in 8 States of the Union of India. One such Cement Works is the Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur, within the territorial limits of respondent No. 2. Under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (No. 63 of 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) read with the provisions of the Rules, the appellant was required to appoint one Welfare Officer and to notify his appointment and qualification to the "Chief Inspector of Factories. Respondent No. 1 was appointed such a Welfare Officer. The letter of appointment issued to him on March 2, 1956, stated that he would be liable to be transferred from one unit of the appellant to another and that his services could be terminated by the Appellant by one month s notice or with one month s pay in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1 was first posted at Lakheri Cement Works, Lakheri in Rajasthan, where he joined duty on March 14, 1956.Thereafter, he was transferred from one place to another according to the requirements of service and the working of the appellant s factories. On June 26, 1960, he was posted at the Bhupendra Cement Works. He was working at these Works until September 26, 1961, when his services were terminated. it appears that the appellant transferred respondent No. 1 from Bhupendra Cement Works to Kymore Works which is near Katni in Madhya Pradesh, but apparently, respondent No. 1 was not prepared to go to Kymore Works, and after long and protracted correspondence between the parties, the appellant wrote to him on September 26, 1961, that since he had not proceeded to Kymore on transfer as directed, he had ceased to be in the employment of the appellant; and his name had been struck off from the Company s rolls.
3. Respondent No. 1 then filed an appeal before respondent No. 2 as the appellate authority under R.6(6) of the Rules. On receiving notice of the said appeal, the appellant filed its written statement and disputed the validity of the grievance made by respondent No. 1 in respect of the termination of his services. Respondent No. 2 then passed the impugned order on July 4, 1962. This order was issued in the name of the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by R. 6 (6) of the Rules, and it directed that the Governor of Punjab was pleased to reinstate respondent No. 1 as Labour Welfare Officer in the service of the appellant. "However", says the order, "nothing in this order shall be construed to prevent the management from taking action against Mr. P. N. Sharma in accordance with the provisions of the Rules for such acts and commissions on his part as may h
