SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1960 Supreme(Cal) 132

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
S. C. Lahiri, R. S. Bachawat
N. R. MUKHERJEE - Appellant
Versus
ARNOLD HARTMAN JUST - Respondent
A. F. O. O.  196  Of  1958
Decided On : JUNE 16, 1960

Advocates Appeared:
A.C.GUPTA, DIPAK SEN, P.B.Burman, P.K.SANYAL, P.P.Ginwalla

The question whether the business of a Chartered Accountant is an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a question of fact and cannot be decided without evidence.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - SECTION 2 (J) - CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT - BUSINESS OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT - WHETHER AN INDUSTRY - DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTION DEPENDS ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE BUSINESS IS CARRIED ON - QUESTION OF FACT - CANNOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT EVIDENCE - WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE INTERIM AWARD OF THE TRIBUNAL ISSUED - TRIBUNAL DIRECTED TO DETERMINE THE QUESTION UPON EVIDENCE.

Fact of the Case:

A dispute arose between the employees and the firm of Chartered Accountants, Messrs. Price Waterhouse Peat and Co. The dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal held that the business of a Chartered Accountant is an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The firm challenged the competency of the Tribunal to adjudicate on the issues.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the question whether the business of a Chartered Accountant is an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be decided without evidence. The court quashed the interim award of the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to determine the question upon evidence.

Issues: 1. Whether the business of a Chartered Accountant is an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act? 2. Whether the Tribunal was competent to adjudicate on the issues referred to it?

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the question whether the business of a Chartered Accountant is an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a question of fact and cannot be decided without evidence. The court also held that the Tribunal was competent to adjudicate on the issues referred to it.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and set aside that part of the judgment of Sinha. J. , which quashes the interim award of the Tribunal dated the 9th May, 1956, and also quashed the interim award of the Tribunal. The court further dismissed the cross-objection filed by the respondent firm and directed that the Tribunal will determine the question whether the activities of the respondent firm constitute an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the light of the observations made in this judgment.

LAHIRI, C. J.

( 1 ) ALTHOUGH we have heard very interesting arguments on the question whether the business of a Chartered Accountant is an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, we find it impossible to decide that question at the present stage. The first two appellants are two of the employees of a firm of Chartered Accountants named Messrs. Price Waterhouse Peat and Co. , and the third appellant is a discharged employee of that firm. The firm of Messrs. Price Waterhouse Peat and Co. represented by Respondents 1, 2 and 3 will be hereinafter described as the firm. A dispute having arisen with regard to the claim for bonus made by the first two appellants and the discharge of the third appellant the Employees' Association of the firm took up the dispute as a collective dispute and at its instance the Government of the State of West Bengal by an order dated July 1, 1955 referred the following issues to the First Industrial Tribunal for adjudication: 1. Whether deduction of bonus granted to Sri N. R. Mukherjee and Sri S. Kanungo (appellants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively) is justified? To what relief are they entitled?

( 2 ) IS the discharge of Prantosh Bakshi (appellant No. 3) justified? What relief is he entitled to? 2. Before the Tribunal the firm filed two written statements challenging the competency of the Tribunal to adjudicate on the issues. In the first written statement the preliminary objection was based on the ground that the firm carries on professional work of Accountants without employment of capital as in trade or industry and consequently the employees of the firm are not workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the second written statement the firm raised an additional objection to the effect that the income of the firm is earned "solely" by the efforts of persons having specialised knowledge depending exclusively on their personal skill and merit. The appellants in their rejoinder stated that besides the work of auditing accounts of various commercial concerns, the firm represents' industrial and commercial concerns before the income-tax authorities and it also acts as Secretaries of different commercial concerns and as Liquidator for companies going into liquidation. The appellants further denied that the income of the firm was earned "solely" by the efforts of the partners of the firm and pleaded that for the diverse undertakings of the firm it maintained a large number of clerical subordinate staff to manage its undertaking and business. Upon the aforesaid pleadings two disputed' questions of fact arose before the Tribunal: (a) Whether the professional income of the firm was earned "solely" by the efforts of the partners of the firm (b) Whether the firm carried on other businesses besides the business of Chartered Accountants.

( 3 ) THE Tribunal without taking any evidence took upon itself the duty of deciding the question whether the business of a Chartered Accountant is an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and answered that issue in the affirmative. Against that order the firm filed an application for an appropriate writ upon the Tribunal for quashing its order and for prohibiting the Tribunal from exercising any jurisdiction over the issues referred to it. In their affidavit-in-opposition in this Court the appellants explained the manner in which the firm carries on its business and stated in paragraph 5 as follows :"audit clerks and qualified assistants are sent to the offices, mills and factories of about nine hundred industrial and commercial concerns for checking their books and records. These audit clerks and qualified assistants check the relevant books and records of the industrial and commercial concerns, vouch these records, prepare draft balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and schedules of assets and liabilities. Where, however, the draft balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and schedules o





Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top