1957 Supreme(Cal) 121

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
LAHIRI, GUHA RAY
PULIN BEHARY SHAW - Appellant
Versus
MISS LILA DEY - Respondent
Letters Patent Appeal 1  Of  1956
Decided On : JUNE 10, 1957

Under the Rent Control Act, 1950, the tenant had a statutory right to remain on the demised premises even after the determination of his contractual tenancy, and the payment and acceptance of rent after the determination of the contractual tenancy could be attributed either to the contractual tenancy or to the statutory tenancy brought into existence by Section 12 (1) of the Act.

Headnote:

RENT CONTROL ACT, 1950 - SECTION 12 (1) - SECTION 14 (3) - SECTION 109 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - SECTION 50 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - Waiver of Notice to Quit - Deposit of Rent - Reasonable Requirement - Default - Interpretation of Statutory Provisions.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, a monthly tenant, was sued for ejectment by the plaintiff, who had purchased the interest of her brother and served a notice of attornment and a notice to quit. The appellant claimed protection under the Rent Control Act, 1950, alleging that the plaintiff did not reasonably require the room for her own occupation or for building a staircase, and that he was not a defaulter within the meaning of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiff did not reasonably require the room, that the appellant was not a defaulter, and that the plaintiff had waived the notice to quit by accepting rent from the appellant after the expiry of the notice period. The decision was reversed on appeal by a Special Bench of the Court of Small Causes, and the decision of the Special Bench was affirmed on second appeal. The appellant brought this appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Issues: 1. Whether the appellant was a defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to Section 14 (3) read with Section 12 (1) Proviso (i) of the Rent Control Act, 1950? 2. Whether the notice to quit had been proved? 3. Whether the plaintiff had waived the notice to quit by accepting rent from the appellant after the expiry of the notice period?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The appellant was not a defaulter within the meaning of the proviso to Section 14 (3) read with Section 12 (1) Proviso (i) of the Rent Control Act, 1950, because he had deposited the entire rent from Chaitra 1356 to Kartik 1357 in the office of the Rent Controller in the name of the plaintiff's brother, Amulya Ranjan, who had sold his interest to the plaintiff and who had also sent a notice of attornment to the appellant. The deposit was held to be invalid by the Special Bench and also by P. N. Mookerjee, J. because it was not in the name of the plaintiff but in the name of her brother, Amulya Ranjan. However, the appellant had a good reason for not believing that Amulya Ranjan had transferred his interest to the plaintiff, as Amulya Ranjan was holding himself out as the landlord of the appellant till 21-9-1950, the date on which he withdrew the deposit in the Rent Controller's office for the months of Bhadra, Aswin, and Kartik, 1357. 2. The notice to quit was not proved, as the plaintiff had accepted rent from the appellant after the expiry of the notice period. 3. The plaintiff had waived the notice to quit by accepting rent from the appellant after the expiry of the notice period. However, the payment and acceptance of rent after the determination of the contractual tenancy did not unequivocally lead to the conclusion that the contractual tenancy had revived and could not by itself prove waiver of notice to quit, which was equivalent to the revival of the contractual tenancy. Under the Rent Control Act, 1950, the tenant had a statutory right to remain on the demised premises even after the determination of his contractual tenancy, and the payment and acceptance of rent after the determination of the contractual tenancy could be attributed either to the contractual tenancy or to the statutory tenancy brought into existence by Section 12 (1) of the Act.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree in the Second Appeal and also the judgment and decree of the Special Bench of the Court of Small Causes were set aside, and the decree of the 6th Bench was restored, though for different reasons. The plaintiff was made liable for all costs incurred by the appellant in all the courts below.