1953 Supreme(Cal) 45

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Sinha
ATULYA KUMAR DE - Appellant
Versus
DIRECTOR OF PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY - Respondent
Civil Rule 3259  Of  1952
Decided On : MARCH 3, 1953

The impugned provisions of the Act and the order did not offend against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution.

Headnote:

The West Bengal Food Grains (Intensive Procurement) Order 1952, and the notices complained of in the petition issued on the petitioners in pursuance thereof, were challenged on the grounds that they were unconstitutional and void. The Court held that the impugned provisions of the Act and the order did not offend against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The Court further held that the provisions of the order relating to a stage when the goods had not yet been acquired, did not offend against the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and the restrictions imposed were not unreasonable restrictions, such as were in the public interest. The Court also held that the prices fixed were not unreasonably low, so as not to amount to a just equivalent in value. The Court further held that the order was not outside the four corners of the Act and that the classification of 'producers', affected by the legislation in question, was a reasonable classification, bearing a just relation to the object sought to be attained. Finally, the Court held that the provisions of the order relating to a stage when the goods had not yet been acquired, did not offend against the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and the restrictions imposed were not unreasonable restrictions, such as were in the public interest.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners, eighteen in number, were owners of lands situate in villages within Police Stations Sadardighi and Nawapara in the District of Murshidabad. They cultivated paddy in these lands with the help of hired labour. They further stated that the yield from these lands was their only source of income, out of which they had to maintain themselves and their dependents.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the impugned provisions of the Act and the order did not offend against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The Court further held that the provisions of the order relating to a stage when the goods had not yet been acquired, did not offend against the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and the restrictions imposed were not unreasonable restrictions, such as were in the public interest. The Court also held that the prices fixed were not unreasonably low, so as not to amount to a just equivalent in value. The Court further held that the order was not outside the four corners of the Act and that the classification of 'producers', affected by the legislation in question, was a reasonable classification, bearing a just relation to the object sought to be attained.

Issues: 1. Whether the impugned provisions of the Act and the order offended against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution? 2. Whether the provisions of the order relating to a stage when the goods had not yet been acquired, offended against the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and the restrictions imposed were unreasonable restrictions, such as were in the public interest? 3. Whether the prices fixed were unreasonably low, so as not to amount to a just equivalent in value? 4. Whether the order was outside the four corners of the Act? 5. Whether the classification of 'producers', affected by the legislation in question, was a reasonable classification, bearing a just relation to the object sought to be attained?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the impugned provisions of the Act and the order did not offend against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution because: * The power to regulate or prohibit production or supply and distribution or trade and commerce in essential commodities may be exercised in a myriad ways. Some may be mere steps to ultimate compulsory acquisition, others having no connection therewith. * Thus, control of prices may be made without acquisition, or as in the instant case, prelude to acquisition, and in aid thereof. Such powers, however, cannot exist in vaccuo. * In so far as the State regulates or prohibits production or supply and distribution or trade and commerce in essential commodities, it must constantly cross the border line and restrict the citizen's right to acquire, hold or dispose of such property or the free practice of his occupation, trade, business or profession. * The question, therefore, is as to whether such restrictions are reasonable and in the interest of the general public, and thus saved by Article 19 (5) or (6). 2. The Court held that the provisions of the order relating to a stage when the goods had not yet been acquired, did not offend against the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) and the restrictions imposed were not unreasonable restrictions, such as were in the public interest because: * The restrictions imposed by the general powers conferred by Section 3 (1) of the Act upon the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 (f) or (g), are reasonable restrictions which are in the public interest. * The method employed in estimating the produce by not calling for a declaration as to the actual produce of the land was not arbitrary or unreasonable. * The scale fixed for consumption of the producer and his dependents was not wholly inadequate. * The power of inspection, seizure, etc. , or the power to prohibit disposal pending acquisition, were all ancillary to the main object of procurement and were not unreasonable or not in the public interest. 3. The Court held that the prices fixed were not unreasonably low, so as not to amount to a just equivalent in value because: * The onus was upon the petitioners to establish that the prices fixed were not just or reasonable compensation. * The petitioners had not given any particulars whatever to show that the prices fixed were unreasonably low. 4. The Court held that the order was not outside the four corners of the Act because: * The power conferred by the Act (read with the notification) upon the State of West Bengal is only in relation to foodstuffs and that paddy is not foodstuff. It is stated that the description of paddy as "rice in the husk" is a colourable attempt to avoid this difficulty. * There is no power conferred by the Act to order the producer to deliver goods at a prescribed destination, as provided for in para 3 (5) of the order. This would come within the general powers in Section 3 (1). * The prohibition contained in the notice in Form "a" whereby the producer is directed not to deal with or dispose of any portion of stock owned or possessed by etc. , is not authorised by any power conferred either by the Act or the Order. But this would certainly be included in the general power under Section 3 (1) as also covered by Clause (e) of Sub-section (2). 5. The Court held that the classification of 'producers', affected by the legislation in question, was a reasonable classification, bearing a just relation to the object sought to be attained because: * The object of procurement from the comparatively larger producers of foodgrains is self-evident If a surplus is to be acquired, a larger producer is more likely to have a surplus than a smaller one. * A more rational basis of legislation cannot be imagined.

Final Decision: The rule was discharged and the interim order vacated.