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1981 Supreme(Cal) 205

High Court Of Calcutta
B. N. Maitra
GOPAL CHANDRA NASKAR - Appellant
Versus
HIRANYA PROVA MOULICK - Respondent
C. R.  439  Of  1979
Decided On : 06/15/1981

Advocates Appeared:
ANATH NATH MONDAL, ASUTOSH GANGULY, Susil Kumar Sikdar, Tarak Nath Roy

The death of a judgment-debtor during the pendency of execution proceedings does not abate the proceedings, and an application for substitution of the legal heirs of the judgment-debtor is not barred by limitation if the execution proceedings were pending when the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force.

Headnote:

EXECUTION OF DECREE - Abatement of execution proceedings - Death of judgment-debtor - Application for substitution - Limitation - Order 22, Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Fact of the Case:

The judgment-debtor died during the pendency of execution proceedings. The decree-holders filed an application for substitution of the legal heirs of the judgment-debtor more than 12 years after his death. The judgment-debtors objected to the substitution application on the ground that it was barred by limitation.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the execution proceedings did not abate upon the death of the judgment-debtor, as per Order 22, Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The court further held that the application for substitution was not barred by limitation, as the execution proceedings were pending when the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force, and were thus saved by Section 31 of the Act.

Issues: 1. Whether the execution proceedings abated upon the death of the judgment-debtor? 2. Whether the application for substitution was barred by limitation?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Order 22, Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provides that the abatement provisions contained in Rules 3 and 4 do not apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order. 2. Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that any execution proceeding which was pending when the Act came into force would not be affected by the provisions of the Act.

Final Decision: The court discharged the revision application filed by the judgment-debtors, holding that the execution proceedings did not abate upon the death of the judgment-debtor and that the application for substitution was not barred by limitation.

B. N. MAITRA, J.

( 1 ) WHEN the execution proceedings were pending, the applicants, who are heirs of the judgment-debtors, filed a Misc. Case under Section 47 of the Civil P. C. The objection was twofold. It was alleged that previously the execution case was dismissed for default. No prayer was made by the decree-holders to vacate that order or to restore the execution case to file. The Court suo motu vacated the order and restored the execution case to its original number. So an illegal order was passed. Secondly, the judgment-debtor died on the 21st January, 1966. whereas the application for substitution was filed by the decree-holders on the 15th May, 1978. So the allegation was that the execution case became time-barred. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected both the contentions. Hence this revisional application.

( 2 ) IN this Court also those two objections have been pressed. It has been first stated that the order-sheet shows that on the 2nd September, 1967. decree-holders were directed to show cause why the execution case would not be struck off because no steps had been taken. So the case was fixed on the 20th Sep. , 1967. for orders. On that date the decree-holders took no steps or showed no cause. So the execution case was struck off. It has been contended that since the execution case was struck off, it was the duty of the decree-holders to file an application under Section 151 of the Civil P. C. The well-known case of Mulraj v. Murti in has been cited. Secondly, it has been stated that the judgment-debtor died on the 21st January, 1466. But the application for substitution was put in as late as the 15th May, 1978. Reference has been made to the Patna decision, reported in (1921) 62 Ind Cas 52, to show that the application for substitution has to be submitted within a reasonable time. Where the judgment-debtor dies, the decree-holder should get at least six months within which to bring the legal heirs on record, on the analogy of Article 177 of the Schedule I of the Limitation Act of 1908. Reference has also been made to the well-known Special Beach decision of Asmat Ali v. Mujahar Ali in (1948) 52 Cal WN 64 : (AIR 1948 Cal 48) to show that since there is no period of limitation within which a non-notified co-sharer of a holding is to file an application for pre-emption under Section 26-F of the Bengal Tenancy Act, such application has to be filed within 3 years. But in this case the application for substitution was filed more than 3 years after the judgment-debtor died. Reference has also been made to the case of Kerala S. E. Board in to show that Article 137 of the Limitation Act of 1963 applies to any petition or application filed "under any Act". Since the application for substitution was not filed within 3 years of the judgment-debtor's death, the Court will have no hesitation in stating that when the application for substitution was filed on the 15th May, 1978, the execution case became time-barred.

( 3 ) THE learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has referred to Article 136 of the new Limitation Act and stated that the period of limitation is 12 years.

( 4 ) SO the first question arises, whether the Court acted illegally in vacating the order by which the execution case had been struck off. In the case of Ali Mondal v. Kazi Golam, it has been stated that the Court can correct its own mistake. In that case the note in the daily cause list was not specific or clear and so the judgment-debtor could not take suitable steps. In view of such vague entry in the cause list, the trial Court did not allow the judgment-debtor to be prejudiced in any way by an omission made on the part of the Court. The order of the Munsif dismissing the case for non-prosecution was held to be the direct result of a mistake made by some officer of the Court and so the Court could grant relief to the judgment-debtor and correct its mistake under the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil P. C. In the Bench case






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