The Regional Transport Authority (RTA) has the power to fix or alter timetables for stage carriage permits, but it must follow the principles of natural justice and give an opportunity of being heard to the persons likely to be affected by the decision.

( 1 ) THE question involved in this appeal is with regard to the fixation of time-table after the permit had been granted long back. In order to appreciate the dispute that arose in this case, it is necessary to look into the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder. Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (referred to as the "said Act"), provides the power of the authority to grant stage carriage permits. Sub-section (2) provides that the Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a stage carriage of a specified description and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely :-" (IV) that copies of the time-table of the stage carriage approved by the Regional Transport Authority shall be exhibited on the vehicles and at specified stands and halts on the route or within the area;"

( 2 ) CLAUSE (xxii) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 72 of the said Act provides the power of the Transport Authority to vary the conditions of the permit and that it can only be done after giving notice of not less than one month and by giving notice of one month, the transport authority may vary the conditions of the permit or attach to the permit further conditions.

( 3 ) SO far as the provisions of the said Act is concerned there is no other provision for fixation or alteration of time-tables.

( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, in the instant case, for change of the time-table and / or against the alteration of the time-table, the parties have moved this Court, obtained the directions and certain actions have been taken by the Regional Transport Authority, but while doing so, the Regional Transport Authority had not observed the provisions of the law.

( 5 ) IT is well-settled principle that even if the authority is directed to exercise any of the statutory powers, in the event, the authorities concerned which are required to discharge the powers and functions of the law, are bound to follow the provisions and procedures laid down by the law. The various High Courts have taken various views in this matter.

( 6 ) THE Division Bench of the Patna High Court, in the case of M/s. Rajput Transport Co. v. Nand Kishore, reported in AIR 1973 Patna 373, had taken the view that the conditions in cl. (iii) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 48 which is in pari materia with the provisions of S. 72 (2) (iii) of the present Act, is only for the purpose of the exhibition of the copies of the time-table as approved by the Regional Transport Authority. It does not confer any power in the R. T. A. to change the time-table 7 from time to time. Such a power cannot also be spelt out from S. 48 (3) (iv) of the old Act.

( 7 ) THE view of the Rajasthan High Court, in the case of Malikram v. Regional Transport Authority reported in AIR 1956 Raj 142 (FB), is that the Transport Authority is not under a duty to fix the time-table so as to allow every stage carriage holding a permit on a particular route to run thereon daily and the fixing of a time-table and allowing the stage carriages to run by rotation is not in contravention of Rule 90 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951.

( 8 ) THE view of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Muneshwar Pandey v. R. T. A. reported in AIR 1977 Patna 211, was that the provisions of the Act had not expressly mentioned passing of provisional orders fixing time-table. In this regard, it must be held that the authorities concerned are empowered to make interim arrangements for the period that he is not in a position to make final order, and that it was further observed that the provisional order fixing a provisional time-table could not be modified. In this case, the earlier Division Bench judgment, reported in AIR 1973 Patna 373, was considered too, but the earlier judgment did not consider the difference between the final order and the provisional order with r