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2006 Supreme(Cal) 661

High Court Of Calcutta
Dilip Kumar Seth And Maharaj Sinha, JJ.
FALAKATA INDUSTRIES LTD. - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF WEST BENGAL - Respondent
W. P. L. R. T. 180 Of 2002
Decided On : 10/06/2006

Advocates Appeared:
A.DHAR, ASLIOKE BHOWMICK, D.K.Jain, Dilip Kumar Dhar, INDRAJIT SEN, Jahar Lal De, PULAK RANJAN MONDAL, PULAK RANJAU MONDAL, S.BASU, SACHASIS JANA, SAKTI NATH MUKHERJI, SITARAM BHOWMICK, SOUMEN DASGUPTA, SOUMIK MUKHERJEE, SUDHANGSHU SIL, TAPAS KUMAR MUKHORJEE, ZIAUL ISLAM,

The provisions of the WBEA Act being transitional, the right emanated from WBEA Act was subject to the reforms to be brought about under the WBLR Act.

Headnote:

The West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (1949 Act) recognized a non-agricultural tenancy on certain conditions conferring particular rights within the scope and ambit of the said Act. The land held under the lease for the purpose of rice mill, according to Mr. Mukherjee, created a non-agricultural tenancy within the meaning of the 1949 Act and as such he was entitled to retain the same within the meaning of section 6 (1) (c) of the WBEA Act provided it did not exceed the ceiling. Admittedly, the quantum of land held by the lessee in the present case was within the ceiling under section 6 (1) (c) of the WBEA act. By reason of sections 4 and 5 of the WBEA Act all estates and rights of every intermediary stood vested in the State with effect from 15th of April, 1955. By reason of section 5 of the WBEA Act, in consequences of such vesting the non-agricultural tenants were to be treated as holding the non- agricultural tenancy directly under the State.

Fact of the Case:

The writ petitioner/lessee was evicted on account of breach of these grounds. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the lessee could not be evicted on this ground even assuming that there was breach of Clause 12. Inasmuch as simple breach of conditions contained in Clause 12 would not attract the mischief of Clause 18 unless such breach renders the demised land unfit for use for the purpose of the tenancy. According to him, only a godown of the rice mill was let out by the lessee to the Jute Corporation of India. Neither the whole premises nor the land was let out. This cannot render the demised land unfit for use for the purpose of tenancy. Inasmuch as the rice mill still can be operated. Therefore according to him, Clause 18 could not come into play.

Finding of the Court:

The West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (1949 Act) recognized a non-agricultural tenancy on certain conditions conferring particular rights within the scope and ambit of the said Act. The land held under the lease for the purpose of rice mill, according to Mr. Mukherjee, created a non-agricultural tenancy within the meaning of the 1949 Act and as such he was entitled to retain the same within the meaning of section 6 (1) (c) of the WBEA Act provided it did not exceed the ceiling. Admittedly, the quantum of land held by the lessee in the present case was within the ceiling under section 6 (1) (c) of the WBEA act. By reason of sections 4 and 5 of the WBEA Act all estates and rights of every intermediary stood vested in the State with effect from 15th of April, 1955. By reason of section 5 of the WBEA Act, in consequences of such vesting the non-agricultural tenants were to be treated as holding the non- agricultural tenancy directly under the State.

Issues: Whether the eviction of the lessee/writ petitioner was grounded on Clauses 12 and 18 respectively of the terms of the lease is an action within the provisions of the TP Act. Therefore, the learned Tribunal could not have assumed jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: The provisions of the WBEA Act being transitional, the right emanated from WBEA Act was subject to the reforms to be brought about under the WBLR Act. However, there may be question of conflict in regard to this situation. Inasmuch as the provisions of the WBLR Act would not be applicable in respect of a non-agricultural tenancy governed by the 1949 Act until 1974 and then again with the amendment of the 1949 Act by the 1974 amendment, the provisions of the WBLR Act was borrowed only to a limited extent for the purpose of the 1949 Act as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. In any event we need not dilate on this question because of the subsequent development and the changes brought about in the law governing the subject, on the strength whereof the present position is to be adjudicated.

Final Decision: In these circumstances, the writ petition succeeds. The order dated 29th of August, 2000 of the learned Tribunal is hereby quashed. Let a Writ of certiorari be issued accordingly.

D. K. SETH, J.

( 1 ) THESE three writ petitions were heard analogously since all these three writ petitions involve certain common principles of law. Though the facts are different, though the questions that arise out of these common principles are different, yet there are certain communions of identity within the question to be answered. Therefore, though we have heard the common principles together in respect of the three writ petitions, but in effect we have heard the three writ petitions simultaneously one after the other.

1]. The learned Counsel for the respective parties had also addressed the Court accordingly. We, therefore, propose to dispose of these three matters by a common judgment dealing with the common principles in the judgment in Falakata Industries Ltd. and Anr. (W. P. L. R. T. No. 348 of 2005 ). But we have dealt with the three cases on the basis of the respective facts involving different questions of law applicable to such respective facts, emanating from the common principles of law, separately one after the other with reference to the common principles dealt with in Falakata industries Ltd. as hereafter.

( 2 ) VERY interesting points have been raised in course of hearing of this writ petition arising out of a decision by the West Bengal Land Reforms and tenancy Tribunal dismissing the application made before it on the ground of limitation in a judgment consisting of 56 pages. The question of limitation was not addressed by Mr. Mukherjee on the ground that on the face of the record, it appears that there was no limitation at all that the order which was challenged before the Land Tribunal was not within the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal and the application made before it was due to wrong advice and on account of a decision of this Court where initially the matter was sought to be moved through a writ petition, but the points could not be raised before the learned Single Judge to impress upon him that this case was outside the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal and could have been decided by this Court. In any event the same question which was involved in the said writ petition having been directed by an order passed in the said writ petition to be agitated before the Land Tribunal and the same having been taken to the Land Tribunal, even assuming that the Land Tribunal had jurisdiction, then also the writ petitioner was entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act, since the application whereof had not been excluded in a proceeding initiated before it. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the writ petition stands on its own strength and the action under challenge pertains to an action under the Transfer of Property Act (TP Act) and not under any of the provisions of the specified Acts within the meaning of section 2 (r) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (1997 Act ).

1]. Mr. Soumen Dasgupta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the panchayat, to whom the land was sought to be handed over for the purpose of construction of a Bus Terminus, took a preliminary objection as to the hearing of this writ petition before this Bench comprising of one of us (Hon'ble d. K. Seth, J.) having occasion to deal with the matter at one stage, namely in disposing of the second writ petition. Admittedly, the second writ petition was dealt with by one of us (Hon'ble D. K. Seth, J.) sitting singly, holding that the dispute could not be entertained in the writ petition before this court without being routed through the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in view of sections 6 and 7 of the 1997 Act due to which the jurisdiction of this Court ceased and that too before a Division Bench by reason of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125.

( 3 ) THIS preliminary objection does not seem to be of any substance in view of the provisions contained in section 38 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam civil Courts Act, 1887 (1887 Act ). Section 38 (2) of the 1887 Act prohi

























































































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