AIR 2010 Cal 172,
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Ashim Kumar Banerjee and Kalidas Mukherjee, JJ.
Bhilai Wires Limited – Appellant
Vs.
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. – Respondent
APO No. 26 of 2005 and A.P. No. 1 of 2001
Decided On: 29.06.2010
ARBITRATION - Old-New Law Controversy - Limitation - Interest - Applicability of New Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Whether the commencement of arbitration proceedings under the new law is permissible when the request for arbitration was made prior to the repeal of the old law - Whether the subsequent purchase orders issued under a parent agreement constitute separate contracts - Whether interest can be awarded when the principal claim is disputed - Interpretation of relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant and respondent entered into an agreement dated December 5, 1985, for the supply of wire required for telecommunication purposes. The appellant contended that the agreement was a parent agreement under which different purchase orders were issued, including one on December 5, 1985, followed by three others dated September 1, 1986, May 27, 1987, and March 7, 1988. The respondent, however, contended that all four purchase orders were distinct and would constitute a separate agreement and had no connection with the first agreement dated December 5, 1985. Disputes arose when the appellant demanded additional sums as compensation for the purchase of steel from the open market and interest on delayed payment. The appellant invoked the arbitration clause in the agreement and demanded arbitration in terms of the agreement. The respondent initially denied the claim and refused to refer the dispute to arbitration. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, which directed the respondent to appoint an arbitrator and refer the dispute for adjudication. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the single Judge's order and granted liberty to the appellant to move the arbitration Court. The appellant filed an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the High Court, which directed the Chief General Manager, Telecommunication Department, either to adjudicate the dispute as an arbitrator or to nominate any other person to act as an arbitrator in terms of the Arbitration Agreement. The arbitrator published a reasoned award in favor of the appellant. The respondent filed an application for setting aside the award before the High Court, which set aside the award.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that: 1. The Division Bench order granting liberty to the appellant to move under the old arbitration law should be construed as a liberty to approach the arbitration Court in accordance with the new law, as the old law had been repealed and the new law had come into effect. 2. The subsequent purchase orders issued under the parent agreement did not constitute separate contracts, and the last payment received on August 13, 1991, was the relevant date for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation for the entire claim made by the appellant under the agreement dated December 5, 1985. 3. The arbitrator did not commit any error in awarding interest on the principal claim, but the rate and mode of interest awarded were excessive and should be modified.
Issues: 1. Whether the commencement of arbitration proceedings under the new law is permissible when the request for arbitration was made prior to the repeal of the old law? 2. Whether the subsequent purchase orders issued under a parent agreement constitute separate contracts? 3. Whether interest can be awarded when the principal claim is disputed?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. When the request for arbitration was made prior to the repeal of the old law, the old law would continue to prevail until the proceeding attained finality, and the relevant date for this purpose would be the date when the request for arbitration was made by one party to the other. However, the parties may agree to be bound by the new law by agreement, which may be express, implied, or manifested by their conduct. 2. Subsequent purchase orders issued under a parent agreement do not constitute separate contracts if they are issued as a follow-up action in relation to the parent order, and the parties, by their conduct, understood the parent order as a single contract. 3. Interest can be awarded on the principal claim when the arbitrator, after considering the rival contentions, comes to a finding that the appellant was entitled to the principal claim.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed in part. The order of the learned single Judge setting aside the award was set aside. The award dated September 26, 2000, was upheld as modified to the extent that the principal sum awarded therein would carry interest for Rs. 67,62,366/- in full and final settlement of the interest claim.
Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J.
1. FACTS:
1. On perusal of the pleadings as well as documents disclosed in the proceedings before the arbitrator as well as before the learned Single Judge and included in paper book it appears that the parties agreed to have a business transaction under which the appellant would supply to the respondent wire required for telecommunication purpose. The facts reveal that the respondent issued a purchase order on December 5, 1985 as would appear from page 55 onwards of the paper book. The appellant contended before us that the agreement dated December 5, 1985 was the parent agreement under which different purchase orders were issued being one on December 5, 1985 followed by three others dated September 1, 1986, May 27, 1987 and March 7, 1988 respectively. The respondent, however, contended that all those four purchase orders were distinct and would constitute a separate agreement and had no connection with the first agreement dated December 5, 1985. Under the contract the main raw material being the steel was to be arranged by the respondent from various steel plants belonging to the Central Government. Facts remain that such arrangement could not be done and there had been some difficulty on the part of the parties to work on such terms being manufacture of the wires out of the steel to be supplied by SAIL. It was the case of the appellant that they had to purchase steel from open market resulting in substantial involvement of financial resource which could not be anticipated. According to the appellant, it was an additional burden upon them. Supplies were made by the appellant from time to time. Payments were made by the respondent from time to time. Last of such payment was made on August 13, 1991. The respondent contended, it was related to the third agreement/purchase order dated May 27, 1987 whereas the appellant contended that there was only one parent agreement under which the payments were made from time to time, last of which was received by them on August 13, 1991.
2. Dispute arose when the appellant demanded additional sums as and by way of compensation on two counts-
i) reimbursement of the additional sums which they incurred by purchasing steel from open market in view of the respondent's inability to supply the same through SAIL.
ii) interest on delayed payment.
3. In the backdrop as discussed above, the appellant vide letter dated February 1, 1994 appearing at page 228-231 of the paper book invoked the arbitration clause contained in the agreement and demanded arbitration in terms of the agreement. Plain reading of the said letter reveals that the appellant claimed a sum of Rs. 13.32 crores approximately, out of which Rs. 92 lakhs approximately was claimed on account of excess cost incurred by them on purchase of wire rods from market and the balance towards interest and damages suffered by them. The respondent initially vide letter dated February 17, 1994 appearing at page 233 informed the appellant that the said letter was "under examination'. Vide letter dated May6 20, 1994 appearing at pages 234-238 the respondents denied the claim and refused to refer the dispute to arbitration.
4. Being aggrieved by the said reply of the respondent the appellant filed a writ petition before the learned single Judge of this Court on January 11, 1995 inter alia praying for a direction upon the respondents to consider the claim of the appellant. The learned single Judge vide judgment and order, December 12, 1995 appearing at page 435 asked the respondent to appoint an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause and refer the dispute for adjudication. Being aggrieved by the said order the respondent preferred an appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench vide judgment and order dated February 19, 1997 appearing at pages 436-441 set aside the said judgment and order and granted liberty to the appellant to move the arbitration Court. Their Lordships observed, "...it will be open to the forum
Secretary to Government of Orissa and Ors. v. G.C. Roy AIR 1992 SC 732;
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. AIR 1994 SC 860;
Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. 1999 IX SCC 334 : AIR 1999 SC 3923;
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Anr. AIR 1987 SC 2316
Shapoor Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1236;
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.