Acquittal in a criminal case does not bar an employer from proceeding with departmental proceedings against an employee, as the nature and scope of the two proceedings are different, and the standard of proof required in each is distinct.

Sambuddha Chakrabarti

1. IN an earlier appeal filed by the present appellant a Division Bench of our Court had remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge after framing the issues to be decided by the Trial Court. The points so framed were:

1) Whether after acquittal in a criminal case the writ petitioner is entitled to pray for quashing of the departmental proceedings; and

2) Whether the bank authorities are debarred from proceeding with the said proceeding.

2. AFTER remand the matter went back to the learned Single Judge and His Lordship by an elaborate judgment and order, dated July 27, 2011 had dismissed the writ petition answering both the questions formulated by the Division Bench in the negative.

This judgment and order of the learned Single Judge has been impugned in the present appeal.

3. THIS case unfortunately has a chequered career, perhaps largely due to different stands taken by the appellant himself in different proceedings.

4. SHORT of all details the facts necessary for the disposal of the present appeal may be taken note of. In the year 1978 the appellant was appointed as a subordinate staff of the United Commercial Bank (UCO Bank), i.e., the respondent no. 1 herein. In 1982 the Manager of the concerned branch of the Bank lodged a complaint with the police station regarding fraudulent withdrawal of Rs. 23,000/- from a certain account. This complaint was treated as a First Information Report. The police started investigating into the matter and the appellant and some other persons were arrested and a case was started against the appellant under Sections 468/471/420/120B of the Indian Penal Code. On September 14, 1982 the appellant was placed under suspension under the provisions of the first Bipartite Settlement. On July 31, 2000 the Bank had issued a charge-sheet to the appellant and decided to conduct an enquiry against him and appointed an Enquiry Officer.

The appellant filed his first writ petition before this Court challenging the decision of the respondent Bank to issue the charge-sheet about 18 years after the alleged occurrence when the criminal case was still pending against him.

5. THAT writ petition was disposed of by an order dated April 4, 2003 by a learned Single Judge staying all further proceedings of the departmental enquiry till the disposal of the criminal case. The concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate before whom the criminal case was pending was directed to positively conclude the proceeding within six months from the date of the order. The learned Single Judge further directed the respondents authorities to pay all subsistence allowances to the appellant within two months from the date of the communication of that order. While disposing of this petition His Lordship made it clear that after dismissal of the criminal case the respondents authorities would be free to proceed with the departmental proceedings in accordance with law.

6. BY a judgment and order dated January 13, 2004 the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly, had acquitted the appellant on the grounds to which we shall make reference later.

It is worth mentioning that at the instance of a defaulcated holder of an account another criminal case was pending against the appellant in the Court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, 3rd Court Srerampore, Hooghly. The said case was quashed by this Court by a judgment and order dated December 15, 2005 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. AFTER the dismissal of the first criminal case by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly the Enquiry Officer for the departmental enquiry which had already been commenced served a notice, dated May 3, 2004, to hold the next hearing of the departmental proceedings on May 19, 2004 at the time and place as mentioned therein. It is this notice which has been impugned by the appellant in the writ petition being W.P. No. 8965(W) of 2004 from which the present appeal has arisen.

8. IN the writ petition the appellant had