1986 Supreme(Cal) 463
High Court Of Calcutta
Mitra, J.
Bishnu Banerrjee
Vs.
State
Civil Order No. 3513 of 1986
Decided On : Dec 12, 1986
Advocate Appeared:
Ashoke Kumar Ganguly, Saktinath Mukherjee, Sudhis Das Gupta, Tarun Chattejee
A statutory right can be waived by a person if it is for his benefit and if he does so voluntarily and intentionally.
Headnote:
COMPROMISE DECREE - LAWFUL AGREEMENT - WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT, 1956 - SECTION 17 (2) AND 17 (2A) - WAIVER OF STATUTORY RIGHT - ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT - REVISION JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT - SECTION 115 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Fact of the Case:
In a suit for eviction and recovery of possession of premises, the parties entered into a compromise and filed a petition of compromise in court, admitting the landlord-tenant relationship and the tenant's default in payment of rent. The tenant later objected to the recording of the compromise, claiming that it was not lawful and that he was not aware of his statutory rights under Section 17 (2) and 17 (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which could have provided him protection against eviction. The trial court allowed the tenant's objection and set aside the compromise, but on appeal, the lower appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the suit on the basis of the compromise.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the compromise petition was lawful and that the lower appellate court had rightly recorded it as such. The court found that the tenant had admitted his default in payment of rent, which constituted a ground for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and that the compromise was not contrary to any law or public policy. The court also held that the tenant had waived his statutory right to protection under Section 17 (2) and 17 (2a) of the Act by entering into the compromise and that he was estopped by conduct from challenging the compromise on the ground that he was not aware of his rights.
Issues: 1. Whether the compromise petition was lawful and could be recorded by the court under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the tenant had waived his statutory right to protection under Section 17 (2) and 17 (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, by entering into the compromise? 3. Whether the tenant was estopped by conduct from challenging the compromise on the ground that he was not aware of his rights?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A compromise petition is lawful if it is not contrary to any law or public policy and if it reflects the true intention of the parties. In the present case, the compromise petition admitted the landlord-tenant relationship and the tenant's default in payment of rent, which constituted a ground for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The compromise was therefore not contrary to any law or public policy and was lawful. 2. A statutory right can be waived by a person if it is for his benefit and if he does so voluntarily and intentionally. In the present case, the tenant had the statutory right to protection under Section 17 (2) and 17 (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. However, he waived this right by entering into the compromise, which admitted his default in payment of rent and agreed to vacate the premises. The tenant had ample opportunity to read and understand the compromise petition before he signed it, and he did so voluntarily and intentionally. Therefore, he had waived his statutory right to protection under the Act. 3. Estoppel by conduct arises when a person, by his conduct, leads another person to believe in a certain state of affairs and that person acts upon that belief to his detriment. In the present case, the tenant, by entering into the compromise and admitting his default in payment of rent, led the landlord to believe that he would vacate the premises. The landlord acted upon this belief and filed a suit for eviction. The tenant then challenged the compromise on the ground that he was not aware of his statutory rights. However, the court held that the tenant was estopped by conduct from doing so, as he had misled the landlord by his actions.
Final Decision: The High Court rejected the tenant's revision application and upheld the lower appellate court's decision to record the compromise and decree the suit for eviction.
1. THE plaintiff/opposite party filed Title Suit no. 21 of 1972 in the Fifth Court of the learned Munsif at Alipore, 24-Parganas against the petitioner for eviction and recovery of possession of the entire one storeyed building being portion of premises no. 12a. Hern Chandra Street', Calcutta on the ground of default in making payment of rent since May, 1971. The said suit was contested by the petitioner by filing written statement denying and disputing the material allegation made in the plaint. In the said suit the petitioner also made an application under section 17 (2) read with section 17 (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 19. 56 inter alia, denying and disputing the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Subsequently a petition of compromise was filed signed by both the parties on or about August 6, 1974 in the said suit. In the said petition of compromise it was stated inter alia, that the petitioner had admitted that he was a tenant in respect of the entire 12 A, Hem Chandra Street, Calcutta, that the petitioner also admitted that he was a defaulter in payment of rent since May, 1971; that the opposite party was entitled to get a decree for eviction of the entire premises No. 12 A, Hem Chandra Street, Calcutta, the petitioner would deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the said entire premises No. 12 A, Hem Chandra Street, Calcutta to the opposite party by the last day of the month of March, 1975; that during the continuance of the petitioner's possession under the terms of the said compromise none was to disturb the petitioner in his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said premises and that the opposite party would give up his claim for arrears of rent and damages if the petitioner had complied with the terms of the said compromise. On February 2, 1975 the petitioner filed an objection to the recording of the said compromise questioning inter alia the legality of the terms of the said compromise and prayed that the said compromise should not be recorded and the suit should not be decreed on the basis of the said compromise petition. The petitioner also filed an application for permission to withdraw the said compromise petition inter alia on the ground that no order had yet been passed regarding recording of the said compromise and that the application under section 17 (2)read with section J 7 (2 A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was not disposed of till then and he was not aware of the legal position that if he had complied with the provisions of section 17 (2) and 17 (2a)of the said Act he was to get protection under section 17 (4) thereof and there could be no estoppel against the statute. By an order dated june 9, 1973 the learned Munsif allowed the said application of the petitioner for withdrawal of the compromise petition inter alia, on the ground that the final compromise petition that was filed in court incorporates extraneous matters and the lawfulness of the compromise petition was doubtful and that the said compromise petition did not reflect the free will and consent of the petitioner. Against the said order the opposite party preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 434 of 197 5 and the learned Fifth Additional District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas by his Order dated April 26, 1976 allowed the said appeal setting aside the order of the learned Munsif and remanded the matter to the trial court with the direction to dispose of the said application under Order XXI11 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure afresh after giving the parties opportunity to adduce fresh evidence. Being dissatisfied with the said order of the lower appellate court the petitioner moved a revisional application in this court. and obtained a Civil rule which was disposed of by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chittatosh mookerjee (as His Lordship then was) on January 31, 1976 directing the lower appellate court to decide whether the compromise in question was lawful or not and whether the