Restrictions imposed on the quantity of paddy to be husked under Paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949, were not unreasonable and did not violate the appellants' fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(G) of the Constitution of India.

LAHIRI, J. :- In these five appeals the appellants challenge the validity of Para. 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949. The appellants are owners of Rice Mills in Baraset Sub-Division in the District of 24 Perganas and carry on the business of husking paddy. By an order, dated 12-10-1950, the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, Alipore, granted permits to the appellants restricting the quantity of paddy to be husked by them and by another order, dated 7-12-1950, he directed that the husking mill owners would be authorised to husk half of their previously permitted quantities upto 14-12-1950, and that no husking mill should be run after that date without obtaining further orders.

2. The appellants applied under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and obtained Rules upon the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, Alipore, requiring him to revoke his order, dated 7-12-1950, and to forbear from giving effect to the said order and also to show cause why a writ in the nature of a Mandamus should not issue directing the Assistant Regional Controller not to impose any restriction as regards the quantity of paddy to be husked by the appellants.

3. Bose, J., who heard the Rules set aside the order of the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, dated 7-12-1950, holding that the said order was illegal and gave liberty to the appellants to apply for fresh licenses and directed the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement to deal with the applications according to law. Bose J., however, refused to issue the writ in the nature of a Mandamus directing the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement not to impose any restriction upon the quantity of paddy to be husked by the appellants and it is against that part of the judgment that the appellants have filed the present appeals.

4. Mr. Das, appearing in support of these appeals, has argued that restrictions on the quantity of paddy to be husked are imposed under Paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949 and that this paragraph is invalid, inasmuch as it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the appellants fundamental right guaranteed by Art.19(1)(G) of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the imposition of these restrictions would render the running of the appellants rice mills uneconomical and it is also argued that the power conferred by Paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949, may be abused. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Das upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of - Chintamon Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118.

5. Before dealing with the merits of the arguments of Mr. Das, it is necessary to point out that by Memo No.19121(75) AP/VIT-244(51), dated December 27, 1951, issued by the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, it was directed that from that date onwards no permits for husking paddy would be necessary. Mr. Das himself placed this notification before us and in view of the fact that no permits are now necessary for husking paddy it must be held that the appellants have at present no grievance in respect of their fundamental rights.

6. Mr. Das has argued that so long as Paragraph 15 is there, there is a potential threat to the exercise of the appellants fundamental rights. In an application under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, we are not required to grant a declaration in favour of the applicant unless that declaration is necessary for the exercise of the applicants rights. In the well known case of - Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 at pp.52-53, Mukherjea, J., made the following observations with regard to Art.32 of the Constitution of India :

"To make out a case under this Article it is incumbent upon the petitioner to establish not merely that the law complained of is beyond the competence of the particular legislature ...... but that it affects or invades his fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitutio