The statutory bar imposed by section 15 of the Public Premises Act, which prohibits courts from entertaining any suit or proceeding related to the eviction of unauthorized occupants of public premises, precludes the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction to transfer such eviction proceedings to itself under clause 13 of the Letters Patent or section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Ronojit Kumar Mtira, J.:

1. This application was made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent and section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the transfer to this Court certain eviction proceedings being E.O./146/ 1995 (L.I.C. of India vs. S.N. Bhalotia & Ors.) pending at present before the Estate Officer. It has also been prayed in the petition that the eviction proceedings upon being transferred to this Court be heard analogously with the Suit No......... of 1995 (L.I.C. of India vs. S.N. Bhalotia) which at present was pending before this Court. The petitioner had obtained an ex parte ad interim order on June 23, 1999 and the proceedings before the Estate Officer had been stayed. Parties had filed their affidavits in accordance with the Court's direction in that respect.

2. In order to decide the contentions of the parties and the prepositions of law put forward by counsels on their behalf I found it essential to refer to the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner was a lessee, under the respondent No.1 Life Insurance Corporation of India, hereinafter referred to as LIC, of the second floor of the Oriental Building being premises Nos. 2 & 3 Clive Row, Calcutta. According to the respondent, the lease had expired but the petitioner continued to remain in possession. It had also been alleged that the petitioner had "assigned or transferred or sublet or otherwise inducted the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 above named" in the subject premises. The petitioner has denied the allegations in its affidavit in reply, and alleged that the tenancy was "governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956". In these circumstances, the LIC had instituted a suit before this Court against the petitioner in 1995 and the prayers in the plaint included, appointment of a receiver for the preservation of the subject premises and a permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from inducting any tenant in the premises. By an order dated January 31,1995 the LIC obtained an ad interim relief, in an interlocutory application made by it in the suit, and this Court appointed a receiver who was to "make an inventory of the sub-tenants in the said demised premises and submit a report to this Court. He will also see that no other third person is inducted in the said premises." By a further order dated February 8, 1995 the receiver was directed by Court "to circulate to the parties" the report of the receiver. That application of the respondent and also an application made by the petitioner were disposed of by this Court by an order dated April 26, 1995 directig status quo as regards possession was to continue as on that date. The respondent did not file any affidavit. In the presence of counsels for the parties by an order dated April 28, 1995 the Court further directed that "the order dated 26th April, 1995 will not prevent the Life Insurance Corporation of India to initiate appropriate proceeding for eviction in accordance with law if it is so advised."

3. The Estate Officer issued a notice dated September 9, 1995 under section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Public Premises Act, and the petitioner had received it. The Estate Officer issued a further notice dated November 14, 1995, intimating the petitioner that proceedings under the Act had been initiated and that hearing would take place on December 2, 1995. The petitioner made an application before the Estate Officer for dismissal of the proceedings and by an order dated March 7, 1997 the Estate Officer found that it was open to the Estate Officer to proceed with the eviction proceedings.

The petitioner preferred a revisional application before this Court, which was pending hearing as on date. A further application had been made by the petitioner challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to hear such proceedings and by an order dated December 22, 1997 the Estate Officer dismissed the application. Th