Soumen Sen, J.

The judgment debtor is the applicant.

1. The judgment debtor has filed this application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the executability of a decree passed by the appellate court on 22nd August, 2013.

2. The appellate court granted a decree for specific performance which the arbitrator as well as the trial court had declined.

3. The arbitrator although had arrived at a finding that the claimant/decree-holder is ready and willing to perform its obligation and would be otherwise entitled to specific performance of the development agreement but had declined to exercise discretion in favour of the claimant/decree-holder. In an application for setting aside of the award, the trial court declined to interfere with the award and upheld the discretion exercised by the arbitrator. However, the appellate court interfered with the award and the relevant portion of the order of the appellate court reads:-

“On a close look to the decisions cited at the at the bar and discussed above, we feel, in a contract of the like nature, once the arbitrator was satisfied the developer was entitled to specific performance the relief could not be denied on the grounds mentioned therein. The arbitrator categorically held, the developer was ready and willing to perform their obligation. They had the capacity to do so. The sentimental or emotional reason cannot create any impediment in performing the same. The arbitrator talked about non-cooperation on the part of the owner. Mr. Deb rightly contended in case owner would not demolish the developer would demolish the same with the Court’s supervision. We fully agree with Mr. Bachawat, on the plea of Natural Justice, the arbitrator should not have allowed the developer to submit a chart at the fag end of the arbitration. In any event, the arbitrator recorded, she did not rely on the said chart. ON the top of it, at the time of hearing, Mr. Deb categorically made it clear. The developer was not interested in pecuniary damage. Hence, such issue would be academic.

While giving reply, Mr. Bachawat relied upon Yeshwantrao ganpatrao (Supra), the paragraph relied on by him quoted (Supra) would not be of any assistance to us. The Division Bench observed, the Court considering the award could not travel beyond the award. It had no jurisdiction to attach list to its decree that was not attached to the original award. We fail to appreciate. The developer approached the arbitrator with the principal prayer for specific performance of the agreement dated January 28, 1989. If we look to page-215 (Volume-III) we would find the same appearing in the statement of claim. The learned arbitrator declined to grant such relief, learned Judge while considering the award also declined. The Court of appeal being an extension of the original proceeding would certainly be competent to examine the award as to whether the arbitrator committed any illegality in not granting the said relief. The scope of judicial scrutiny on this score is limited however, it would not be right to say, this Court would not be competent to consider such prayer. We reject the contention of Mr. Bachawat on that score.

On the scope of the Court's power to set aside the award under the old law we are of the view, once the arbitrator considered the issue, applied her mind, analyze the evidence and came to final conclusion, the developer was not at fault such definite finding would not be available for judicial scrutiny. It could neither be called as perverse nor devoid of cogent evidence. The Court, while considering an application for setting aside of the award, is not entitled to substitute their own reasoning. The Court could only interfere when the award was a product of miscarriage of Justice shocking the conscience of the Court. Such is not the case here.”

4. The order of the appellate court was unsuccessfully challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The special leave petition preferred by the judgment-debto