Point of Law: Doctrine of precedent is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean, it was held, that the court was bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain “propositions wider than the case itself required”. Abiding by such proposition, the judgments cited by both sides in the present case, within the compass of Section 11 of the 1996 Act, are not binding in the present case.

JUDGMENT :

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

1. The short questions which fall for consideration in this case are as follows:

(i) Whether the High Court has the power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution of India over an interlocutory order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal in view of the bar contemplated in Section 5, read with Sections 34 and 37, of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and

(ii) (Subject to the decision rendered on the preceding question,) whether the Arbitral Tribunal refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law in refusing to permit the petitioner to move his application for appointment of handwriting expert at the outset, instead of deciding such issue on merits.

2. At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party raises an objection regarding maintainability of the instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of the specific bar envisaged in Section 5, read with Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Act (“the 1996 Act”, for short). In support of such submission, learned counsel cites the following judgments:

(a) SBP & CO. vs. PATEL ENGINEERING LTD. & ANR. [(2005) 8 SCC 618]

(b) DEEP INDUSTRIES LIMITED vs. ONGC LTD. & ANR. [(2020) 14 SCC 706]

(c) BHAVEN CONSTRUCTION vs. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, SARDAR SAROVAR NARMADA NIGAM LTD. & ANR. [2021 SCC OnLine SC 8]

3. Learned counsel further argues that the scheme of the 1996 Act envisages early disposal of arbitral proceedings, as opposed to matters pending in courts, and thus limits challenge against all interlocutory orders, except those specifically enumerated in Section 37 thereof, at the time of challenging the final award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Hence, Section 5 the 1996 Act has specifically barred judicial intervention except as provided in the said Act itself.

4. Thus, the opposite party argues, this court ought not to exercise its superintending powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party contends that Section 37 of the 1996 Act does not encompass the present impugned order. On the other hand, since no formal application for appointment of handwriting expert could be filed by the petitioner before the tribunal since the tribunal shut out the petitioner from doing so at the very outset on the ground of not having jurisdiction. Hence, there was no scope of remedy for the petitioner either under Section 37 or Section 34 of the 1996 Act.

6. Learned counsel submits that the proceeding, from which the instant challenge arises, Is a statutory arbitration as governed by the National Stock Exchange of India Limited Bye-Laws (for short, “the said Bye-Laws”). A copy of the said Bye-Laws is annexed to the writ petition. Chapter XI of the same deals with “ARBITRATION” and provides for reference to arbitration, which will be governed by the 1996 Act.

7. Clause (4) (a) (ii), sub-clause (b) provides that the Relevant Authority may, from time to time prescribe Regulations for the procedure to be followed by the arbitrator in conducting the arbitral proceedings including, inter alia, terms and conditions subject to which the arbitrator may appoint experts to report on specific issues and the procedure to be followed in arbitral proceedings upon such an appointment.

8. The said Bye-Law, read in conjunction with Section 26 of the 1996 Act, confers ample jurisdiction on the Arbitral Tribunal to appoint experts to report to it on specific issues to be determined by the arbitral tribunal and require a party to give the expert any relevant information or to produce, or to provide access to, any relevant documents, goods or other property for his inspection.

9. In the present dispute, since allegations have been raised before the Tribunal regarding the veracity of signatures and authenticity of certain documents, appointment of an expert is an essential prerequisite to determine such issue. Hence, learned counsel for the opposi