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2025 Supreme(Ori) 78

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
HARISH TANDON, CJ, MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.
M/s. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
M/s. Tarini Prasad Mohanty - Respondent
W.A. No. 629 of 2025
Decided On : 12-08-2025

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellants : Debal Kumar Banerji, S.K. Padhi, Vasant Rajasekaran, Dhananjaya Mishra, Tarun Patnaik, Harshavardhan Korada, Aishwarya Ray
For the Respondents: Gopal Krishna Jain, Soumik Spandan Tripathy, S. Priyadarshini, P. Pradhan, P.P. Das

The High Court's intervention in arbitral matters under Articles 226 and 227 is limited to jurisdictional issues, without infringing upon the final authority of the arbitral tribunal.

Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16 - Judicial review of arbitral proceedings - The High Court exercised jurisdiction to review the arbitral tribunal's order regarding sequencing and implications of agreements without impounding a document deemed insufficiently stamped. The tribunal decided that the agreement was not a conveyance but an agreement for sale, thus not requiring stamp duty as per its interpretation. The Single Bench's intervention contradicted guidelines established by constitutional and statutory provisions and previous rulings. (Paras 1-26)

(B) Jurisdiction - Nature of Writ Jurisdiction - Judicial restraint is essential in interference with arbitrary affairs, focusing solely on inherent jurisdiction and ignoring merits neither litigation access nor judicial fabric may be disturbed. (Paras 19-24)

Facts of the case:
Dispute initiated over an arbitration agreement where the respondent questioned the validity of an insufficiently stamped document in a pending arbitral proceeding. A Single Bench concluded on jurisdictional grounds, countermanding the arbitral decision on the nature of agreements.

Findings of Court:
The Single Bench's decision to set aside the arbitral tribunal's order and interfere with the trial exceeded jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the nature of the agreement warranted stamp duty and the extent of judicial intervention under Articles 226 and 227.

Ratio Decidendi: The High Court's role in reviewing arbitral decisions is generally limited; it must refrain from intervening in arbitral processes unless a clear lack of jurisdiction is demonstrated.

Result: Appeal allowed; Single Bench's judgment set aside.

Table of Content
1. facts of the arbitration agreement and proceedings. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5)
2. arguments regarding the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. (Para 6 , 8 , 18 , 19)
3. court's reasoning on arbitral proceedings and jurisdiction. (Para 7 , 9 , 10 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 20)
4. judicial standards for intervention in arbitral decisions. (Para 11 , 16 , 21 , 23)
5. court's final decision and order. (Para 26)

JUDGMENT :

HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. A piquant situation has arisen in the instant appeal on the scope of a judicial review exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in relation to an arbitral proceeding. The order passed by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short "the Act") is assailed by the respondent herein under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and the Single Bench interfered with the said order from which the present appeal arises. The matter is still pending before the arbitral tribunal who is yet to adjudicate the disputes raised by the respective parties and, therefore, it is suffice to say that the Court should refrain from making any observation which would impact the decision to be taken by the arbitral tribunal at the time of passing the award.

2. The undisputed facts discerned from the record, which in our opinion, would suffice for the purpose of adjudicating and/or determining the points urged in the instant appeal by the respective parties, are adumbrated hereinafter. Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, one of the parties to the instant appeal approached the High Court under Section 11 (6) of the said Act for appointment of an arbitrator as the parties could not arrive at the consensus on the name of the arbitrator. The application under Section 11 (6) of the Act was allowed naming the arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes raised in relation to a transaction. In other words, the parties were relegated to arbitral tribunal for determination of the disputes so raised and it would not be incorrect to record that parties submitted to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal. The statement of claim was filed by the appellant and the arbitral tribunal permitted the respondent to file his pleading which was filed in the nature of a counter claim. The defence to the counter claim was also filed by the respective parties.

3. At this stage, an application under Section 16 of the said Act is taken by the respondent raising an issue that the agreement, which is insufficiently stamped, cannot be received in evidence or acted upon by the appellant unless the said document is duly impounded. According to the respondent, the nature of the agreement as it would appear from the terms and conditions embodied therein would lead to inescapable conclusion that it is, in effect, a sale agreement and not an agreement for sale. Having contended so, the reference to Article 23 of the Indian STAMP ACT , 1899 was pressed in action which requires the stamping on the said document having a character of a conveyance. It is further contended that the tenet and the purport of the said document cannot be construed as an agreement or memorandum of an agreement under Article 5 of the Indian STAMP ACT , 1899.

4. On the other hand, the appellant took a plea that at the time of execution of the said agreement, no title to the goods was passed as the respondent did not have the subsisting title over the same which renders the said agreement distinct from the sale agreement. Undeniably, the agreement was executed on 12.02.2004 between the parties wherein the appellant was granted an exclusive right to purchase the excavated iron ore on the commencement of a mining operation.

5. Three subsequent agreements were entered into by and between the parties following the said parent agreement and last of such agreement saw the light of the day on 09.01.2011. The mining lease deed was executed in favour of the respondent on 17.11.2009 for a period of 20

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