The main legal point established is that the notices issued under Section 49a of the WBLR act were unlawful and violated the principles of natural justice.

JUDGMENT

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. - The subject-matter of the present writ petitions is identical. The respondent-authority, being the concerned Block Land & Land Reforms Officer (BL&LRO), Sadar, Berhampore, Murshidabad, issued notices captioned under Section 49a of the West Bengal Land Reforms act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the WBLR act') alleging that the writ petitioners have made unauthorised constructions on government land. In the said notices, the respective petitioners were directed to 'remove' (indicating, in all probability, 'vacate') the place and restore the original nature of the land within seven (07) days after receipt of the respective notices; the petitioner were threatened with legal action otherwise.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the respondent-authority acted palpably without jurisdiction in violating the procedure laid down in Section 3 of the Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) act, 1962 (for short, 'the 1962 act'), which lays down the modalities for issuance of notice against unauthorised occupants of public land to show cause against order for eviction.

3. Learned counsel submits that admittedly, the lands-in-question in all the writ petitions are 'public lands' and, as such, rigours of the 1962 act squarely apply.

4. It is further submitted that although the WBLR act is a 'specified act' as contemplated in the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal act, 1997 (for the sake of brevity, 'the 1997 act'), the present impugned action of the authority concerned is not encompassed by the jurisdiction of the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal (for short, 'the Tribunal') within the ambit of the 1997 act.

5. Learned Counsel cites a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in Vhandardaha Beel Matswajibi Samabay Samity Limited and another Vs. State of West Bengal and others, reported at (2014) 1 CHN (Cal) 544, in support of the proposition that the Tribunal is of limited jurisdiction and acts under a special statute, deriving its powers to so act within the four corners of that statute. In the said case, the Division Bench interfered under article 226 of the Constitution of India on the premise that the bar stipulated in the 1997 act was not applicable, since the notice impugned therein was not issued in accordance with the provisions of the specified act but was an administrative action.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-authority submits that, since the WBLR act is a 'specified act', the bar of jurisdiction as envisaged in Section 8 of the 1997 act is squarely applicable to the writ petitions.

7. It is further argued that the notices, self-evidently, were issued under Section 49-a of the WBLR act, which is a specified act. as such, a challenge to the said notices would lie only before the Tribunal and not before a Single Judge of the High Court.

8. It is, thus, contended that the writ petitions ought to be dismissed in limine.

9. Even otherwise, learned counsel for the respondent-authority submits, there was no infirmity or illegality in the impugned notices insofar as those were issued within the four corners of Section 49-a of the WBLR act. as such, there arises no occasion for interference with the said notices by this court at this juncture.

10. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioners argues that Section 49-a envisages a penalty of imprisonment up to one year and/or fine up to Rs.2,000/- and does not contemplate eviction. Hence, no such notice asking the petitioners to show cause could have been issued under Section 49-a of the WBLR act at all. at best, it is argued that a proceeding could be drawn up against the petitioners, if the authority so felt, within the contemplation of Section 49 of the WBLR act. Even then, hearing had to be afforded to the respective writ petitioners under Section 49(2) of the WBLR act, which has not been done in the present case.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners refutes the contentions of the res