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2026 Supreme(Cal) 15

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
OM NARAYAN RAI, J.
The Asia Health Care Development Private Limited – Appellant
Versus
State of West Bengal and Others – Respondents
WPA No. 17068 of 2025
Decided On : 18-05-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellants : Kumar Jyoti Tewari, Amrit Sinha, Aniruddha Tewari, Samriddhi Nayak
For the Respondents: Sakya Sen, Sunil Gupta, Pallavi Chatterjee, Supratim Dhar, Debottam Das

A show-cause notice in quasi-judicial proceedings is subject to judicial review if it exhibits pre-determination or external dictation. Furthermore, the existence of parallel arbitral proceedings regarding contractual disputes does not inherently bar statutory authorities from exercising powers under special land eviction legislation.

Headnote:(A) West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962 - Sections 2, 3 and 4 - Writ jurisdiction - Challenge to show-cause notice - Exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 is permissible where a notice suffers from patent lack of jurisdiction, reflects non-application of mind, or is issued with a pre-determined or premeditated approach - Justice must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done - A show-cause notice issued under the influence of, or at the dictate of, a superior administrative authority, rather than through independent application of mind by the quasi-judicial officer, is liable to be set aside to ensure fair procedure. (Paras 8, 18, 23)

(B) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 8, 9, 11 and 36 - Arbitrability of disputes - Pendency of arbitral proceedings does not per se oust the jurisdiction of statutory authorities to initiate or continue eviction proceedings in respect of public land once the underlying lease has expired by efflux of time or has been validly terminated - The two statutory mechanisms serve distinct purposes; an arbitration clause cannot be used to foreclose the operation of a special statute intended for the expeditious recovery of public land. (Paras 32, 34, 35)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner occupied property under a lease from a local authority. Following the termination of the lease and subsequent disputes, several legal proceedings were initiated across different forums. A show-cause notice for eviction was issued to the petitioner under a special statute governing unauthorized occupancy of public land. The petitioner challenged this notice, alleging that it was drafted with a pre-judged mind due to external influence from a higher administrative office and that the proceedings were barred by the ongoing arbitration regarding the property rights.

Findings of Court:
The court observed that the show-cause notice explicitly reflected a pre-determined opinion, contrary to the neutral intent of the statutory form. Furthermore, the court found evidence that the adjudicating authority acted under the instructions of a superior official, thereby violating the requirement of impartiality in quasi-judicial functions. The court held that while the show-cause notice was vulnerable due to the influenced mindset, it did not find evidence of personal bias. The arbitration proceedings did not preclude the statutory authority from exercising its power to initiate eviction upon the expiry of the lease agreement.

Issues: The primary issues were whether a show-cause notice can be challenged in writ jurisdiction for premeditation and whether the initiation of eviction proceedings under a special statute is barred by the existence of a prior arbitration agreement.

Ratio Decidendi: A show-cause notice in a quasi-judicial proceeding is vulnerable to challenge if it demonstrates a lack of open-mindedness or results from external dictation, as this violates the principles of natural justice. However, an arbitral reference relating to contractual disputes does not displace the statutory duty of authorities to recover public land in the interest of the public when the lease stands determined by expiry or termination.

Result: The impugned show-cause notice is set aside, with liberty granted to the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings strictly in accordance with law and fair procedure.

Table of Content
1. factual context of the dispute and nature of eviction proceedings. (Para 1 , 2)
2. core contentions regarding jurisdictional limits and procedural bias. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6)
3. show-cause notices reflecting a pre-determined or influenced mind are invalid. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26)
4. arbitration proceedings do not automatically stay statutory public land recovery processes. (Para 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35)
5. institutional bias requires personal interest; performance of duty is insufficient to sustain bias charges. (Para 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44)
6. invalid proceedings may be set aside with liberty to commence fresh, fair proceedings. (Para 45 , 46 , 47 , 48)

JUDGMENT :

OM NARAYAN RAI, J.

1. This writ petition assails the initiation of proceedings under the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962 (hereafter “the 1962 Act”) and an order dated July 22, 2025 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Berhampore Sadar, Murshidabad (hereafter “respondent no.5”) by exercising the power vested in the respondent no.5 under Section 3 (1) of the 1962 Act.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

2. The relevant facts leading to the institution of the writ petition may be noticed first:-

a. On July 09, 2004 an agreement (hereafter “lease agreement”) was entered into by and between the petitioner and the Murshidabad Zilla Parishad (hereafter the respondent no. 2) for a period of 21 years whereby a Diagnostic cum Medical Centre along with land described in the First Schedule thereof, the plant, machineries, fixtures, fittings and other installations had been let out on monthly rental basis by the respondent no.2 to the petitioner.

b. On March 03, 2005 a supplementary agreement was also executed between the parties whereby certain terms and conditions of the lease agreement were altered and modified.

c. It is the petitioner’s case that upon taking possession of the said property, the petitioner invested substantial sums and introduced several facilities including installation of high-tech machines.

d. During the covid-19 pandemic, the petitioner paid rent for the month of January 2020 on March 20, 2020 and by a letter dated March 27, 2020, the petitioner requested the Additional Executive Officer, Murshidabad Zilla Parishad (hereafter respondent no.3) to condone the delay in making payment of monthly lease rent on the basis of the directives issued by the Government of India during the covid period.

e. On January 10, 2022, the petitioner received a demand notice under Memo No. 113/1/MZP from the respondent no.3 whereby the petitioner was directed to pay the annual lease rent.

f. On the very next day i.e. on January 11, 2022, the respondent no.3 issued another notice being Memo No. 122/MZP thereby terminating the lease agreement by invoking Clause 26 thereof, due failure of payment of rent for a consecutive period of four months. By the said letter, the petitioner was directed to hand over peaceful vacant possession of the property within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt thereof.

g. The petitioner replied to the said termination notice by a letter dated February 08, 2022 asserting that the petitioner had already deposited the annual rent in the bank account of the respondent no.2 for the financial year 2022-2023.

h. Thereafter, by a letter dated March 12, 2022, the petitioner requested the respondent no.3 to enter into a fresh agreement with the petitioner for a fresh tenure of at least 20 years subject to renewal with mutual consent. However, no step was taken by any of the respondents in such direction.

i. The petitioner assailed the said letter of termination before this Court by way of a writ petition being WPA No. 26321 of 2022, however, the same was ultimately withdrawn on August 16, 2024.

j. In the meantime, the petitioner received another letter dated September 28, 2022 from the respondent no.3 asserting

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