JUDGMENT :

SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J.

1. The Estate Officer of the Kolkata Port Trust (KoPT) passed an order on December 5, 2005 in Proceeding No. 398 of 2001 directing the petitioner-Company to pay arrear rent of Rs.1,20,00,000/- at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- per month. The said order has been challenged in WPO No. 506/2006.

2. In the same eviction proceeding, the Estate Officer passed an order of eviction on May 15, 2006, which has been assailed in WPO No. 728 of 2006. The said order has been passed by the Estate Officer “subject to decision in” WPO No. 506 of 2006 or order passed by competent court of law.

3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that the eviction proceeding was bad, being without any notice to quit terminating the tenancy of the petitioner.

4. It is argued that the lease of the petitioner expired on June 1, 1985 and by a letter dated August 18, 1986, the KoPT granted a monthly tenancy to the petitioner with effect from June 1, 1985, which has not been determined till date. Hence, the petitioner never was or is an unauthorised occupant, which is a sine qua non for initiation of any proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (in brief “the 1971 Act”). Hence, the Estate Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate or continue any proceeding under the said statute against the petitioner.

5. Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act defines “unauthorised occupation” inter alia, as the occupation of a person after the authority to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined.

6. The purported letter dated September 9, 1999, it is argued, is not a proper notice to quit. It has alleged that due to non-payment of the requisite amount within the stipulated time in terms of the order of the Division Bench, the petitioner was to hand over possession of the premises to the KoPT at 11 a.m. on October 1, 1999. The petitioner argues that violation of an order of the Division Bench might, at the worst, attract contempt but cannot be a ground of eviction within the meaning of the 1971 Act or otherwise.

7. The pre-condition of formation of an opinion under Section 4, it is argued, as envisaged in Smt. Arati Ghosh and Others vs. Satyanarayan Tripathi, AIR 2008 Cal 285 has not been satisfied in the present case.

8. It is argued that the Estate Officer has to form an opinion that the occupant is an unauthorised occupant for proceeding under Section 4.

9. The notice under Section 4 of the 1971 Act dated February 2, 2001 alleged that the petitioner has violated the “fundamental condition for grant of tenancy” failed to pay rental itself after expiry of the lease period on May 31, 1985, that the petitioner is in occupation without any authority under the law and that the petitioner had failed to comply with the Order dated February 9, 1999 passed by a Division Bench of this court. Again, the KoPT alleged in the same notice that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation on and from October 1, 1999.

10. The petitioners argue that the allegation of “violation of the fundamental condition for grant of tenancy” is vague and does not make any sense or is a ground under Section 4 of the 1971 Act.

11. The letter dated August 18, 1996 issued by the KoPT granting monthly tenancy to the petitioner was deliberately suppressed according to the KoPT and was not considered by the Estate Officer, thereby vitiating the entire eviction proceeding against the petitioner.

12. The allegation in the Section 4 notice that the lease of the petitioner expired on May 31, 1985 and, in the same breath, that the petitioner is in unauthorised occupation on and from October 1, 1999, are clearly contradictory to each other.

13. There is also no explanation as to why suddenly the authorised occupation of the petitioner became unauthorised on October 1, 1999.

14. It is further argued by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that the impugned order of eviction is violative of principles of natural justice and suf