The court has the power under Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to adjourn proceedings for a period of time to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of the arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.

JUDGMENT :

Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.

1. This is an application under section 34 (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act) filed in connection with an application under section 34 of the Act for setting aside of an award dated 17 October, 2016 (the award) filed by the respondent.

2. Briefly, this application has been necessitated in view of the hand written insertion of the words “of receipt” in the last paragraph of the award served on the respondent. By such insertion, the Arbitrator had inserted the date from which interest on the awarded amount would run. Admittedly, the said insertion does not appear in the copy of the award served on the petitioner. In such circumstances, the insertion made after the passing of the award has resulted in there being two awards dated October 17, 2016.

3. In the application challenging the award, the respondent has inter-alia taken the following ground:

“FOR THAT the Learned Arbitral Tribunal has committed patent irregularity by incorporating the words “of receipt” in paragraph No.4 at page 30 of the award impugned, which was served and/or delivered to the petitioners herein with a view to cover up the partisan approach untaken by him in communicating the Award dated 17th October, 2016, since the quoted words were not present in the Award which was delivered to the claimant/respondent and, thus, the Learned Tribunal has acted in violation of the judicial propriety and/or judicial approach and thereby the impugned Award is inimical to public policy of India and required to be set aside and/or quashed”.

4. It is contended that the aforesaid insertion had been incorporated by the Arbitrator belatedly at the time of serving the award upon the respondent by hand. As such, the Arbitrator having become functus officio could not have added to the award. Thus, it is contended that the application under section 34 (4) of the Act be adjourned and an opportunity be granted to the Arbitrator to eliminate the said technical mistake. The award served on both the petitioner and the respondent bear the same date. In support of their contentions, the petitioner relies on the decisions of Som Datt Builders Ltd. vs. State of Kerala reported in (2009) 10 SCC 259 at paragraph 23 and 27 and Kinnari Mullick & Anr. vs. Ghansyam Das Damani reported in (2018) 11 SCC 328 paragraphs 14-16 to eliminate the ground for setting aside of the award.

5. On behalf of the respondent it is contended that there are no grounds justifying reconsideration of the matter by the Arbitrator. On the other hand, under the guise of additional reasons and filing gaps in the reasoning, the award ought not to be remitted to the Arbitrator. The powers to remit under section 34(4) of the Act can only be invoked if there are inadequate reasons or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning in support of the findings in the award. In this case, there are no circumstances which make it appropriate to remit the matter to the Arbitrator. In such circumstances, a contentious issue cannot be remitted back to the Arbitral Tribunal.

6. The dispute raised in this application is with respect to the incorporation of the handwritten words “of receipt” in the copy of the award which was served on the respondent. Admittedly, no such insertion appears in the copy of the award served on the petitioner. By such insertion, the Arbitrator has clarified the date from which interest on the awarded amount would run. The benefit of this insertion is in favour of the respondent.

7. Section 34(4) of the Act provides as follows:

(4)“On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of Arbitral Tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.”

8. In Kinnari Mullick v. Ghanshyam Das