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2023 Supreme(Cal) 1481

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.
Bijan Kumar Ghosh – Petitioner
Versus
Swapan Mondal and Others – Respondents
FMA No. 3390 of 2014
Decided On : 04-10-2023

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : Debjit Mukherjee, Kaustav Bhattacharya, Susmita Chatterjee, Dipanwita Ganguly
For the Respondents: Buddhadeb Ghosal, Ramprokas Banerjee, Promode Ranjan Chatterjee

The right of pre-emption under Section 4 of the Partition Act is valid throughout the pendency of partition proceedings, irrespective of limitations set by Article 97 of the Limitation Act.

Headnote:(A) Partition Act, 1893 - Section 4 - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 97 - Dispute regarding pre-emption of co-sharer in a dwelling house - Trial Court dismissed the pre-emption prayer due to limitation; Appellate Court reversed this and allowed pre-emption at any stage of the suit - The law allows co-owners the right of pre-emption in cases of undivided family property pending a partition suit - Key conditions for pre-emption were established and the appropriateness of limitation under Article 97 was challenged. (Paras 2-20)

Facts of the case:
The property was settled by a previous owner to his three sons. Disputes arose over subsequent transfers and a partition suit was filed by an appellant after some shares were transferred to strangers. (Paras 2-3)

Findings of Court:
The appellate court upheld the right of pre-emption under Section 4 of the Partition Act, asserting this right persists during the pendency of the partition proceedings while rejecting the applicability of Article 97 of the Limitation Act to the pre-emption claim. (Paras 20-21)

Issues: The core issue was whether the lower courts erred in applying Article 97 concerning pre-emption rights in a pending partition suit.

Ratio Decidendi: The appellate court determined that the right to pre-emption under Section 4 of the Partition Act exists so long as the partition suit remains pending, disregarding limitation statutes for such applications, citing established judicial precedents. (Paras 19-20)

Result: F.M.A. 3390 of 2014 stands dismissed.

Table of Content
1. background of property dispute (Para 1 , 2)
2. initial court decision on partition (Para 3 , 4)
3. formulated questions of law (Para 5)
4. trial court ruling on pre-emption (Para 6 , 7)
5. legal conditions for pre-emption (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 12 , 14 , 17)
6. application of limitation in pre-emption (Para 11 , 19)
7. observations about pre-emption applications in pending suits. (Para 13)
8. ratio concerning the applicability of limitation. (Para 18)
9. affirmation of appellate decision (Para 20)
10. conclusion and dismissal of appeal (Para 21)

JUDGMENT :

Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against Judgement and order dated 24th April 2014 passed by Learned Additional District Judge, 5th court Howrah, in Title Appeal no 152 of 2012, which was preferred against judgement and decree dated 28.08.2012 passed by Civil Judge (Sr.Division) 2nd court, Howrah in Title Suit no 25 of 1998.

2. Brief background of the present case needs to be stated at the outset. The property in dispute comprising of dwelling house over land measuring about 2 katha 7 chattak 20 sq ft, known as 6/2, Asutosh Mukherjee Lane, originally belonged to one Bhola Nath Majilya who during his lifetime executed a registered deed of “Nirupan Patra” on 10th July 1985, by which he settled the said dwelling house in favour of his three sons namely, Subuddhi Bhajan Majilya, Harekrishna Majilya and Debnarayan Majilya in equal share. Thereafter Subuddhi Bhajan mortgaged his 1/3rd share in the said premises in favour of respondent no. 1 herein, Swapan Mandal by executing an ostensible deed of sale and simultaneously an agreement of re conveyance was also executed on the same date. Subsequently on 16th Sep 1998, said respondent no. 1 Swapan Mandal reconveyed the property by executing a registered deed of Re-conveyance in favour of Subuddhi. Thereafter on 11th April 1997, aforesaid Harekrishna and Debnarayan sold their 2/3rd share of the said premises in favour of appellant herein, Bijon Ghosh. On 26th February 1998 appellant/Bijon filed Title Suit no. 25 of 1998 against said Subuddhi Bhajan and Swapan for partition and injunction relating to aforesaid suit building. During pendency of the said partition suit, Subuddhi Bhajan i.e. defendant no 2 of that suit filed one Misc. case being 5 of 2000 under section 4 of the PARTITION ACT 1893, seeking pre-emption of the transferred portion to the stranger purchaser i.e. appellant herein.

3. Learned Trial Court heard the partition suit as well as aforesaid Misc. case seeking Pre-emption analogously and by the judgement and decree dated 28.08.2012 was pleased to dismiss aforesaid Misc. case no. 5 of 2000 on the ground of limitation relying upon section 97 of the LIMITATION ACT and decreed the partition suit being Title Suit no. 25 of 1998 in preliminary form.

4. Being aggrieved by that judgment and decree, the substituted defendant/respondent no 2 series herein preferred appeal being Title Appeal no. 152 of 2012 before Learned District Judge, Howrah, which was subsequently transferred before Additional District Judge, 5th court, Howrah for disposal. The appellate court vide its judgement dated 24th April 2014 was pleased to allow the said appeal after setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court and sent back the suit on remand to the Trial Court for hearing afresh the Misc. case no. 5 of 2000.

5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of remand, passed by the first appellate court the appellant/plaintiff have preferred this Misc. Appeal before this court. While admitting the Misc. Appeal this court was pleased to formulate following substantial questions of law:

    (i) Whether the Ld. Judges in the courts below, substantially erred in law in not considering the provisions of Articles 97 of the Limitation Act, which says that the period of Limitation to Preempt a property is one year?

    (ii) Whether the ld. Judge in the lower appellate Court substantially erred in law in not considering t

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