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2025 Supreme(Cal) 159

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, UDAY KUMAR, JJ.
Standard Chartered Bank Limited - Appellant
Versus
Sanjib Kumar Dey, alias Sanjib Dey and another - Respondents
F.M.A. No.180 of 2025 with F.M.A. No.181 of 2025, IA No.CAN 1 of 2025
Decided on : 06-02-2025

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury, Sr. Adv., Mr. Soorjya Ganguli, Ms. Pooja Chakraborti, Ms. A. Bhattacharyya, Mr. Aritra Deb
For the Respondent: Mr. Soumya Majumdar, Sr. Adv., Mr. S. R. Saha

The court ruled that an employment contract can be determinable, allowing for potential termination without an injunction, and that specific performance is permissible under amended provisions of the Specific Relief Act.

Headnote:(A) Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Sections 14 and 41 - Employment contract - The plaintiff sought a declaration against the defendants regarding the legality of a notice issued on January 29, 2024, claiming it was a termination notice. The court held that the notice did not constitute a termination notice but indicated a potential redundancy situation, allowing for consultation. The employment contract was deemed determinable, thus precluding the grant of an injunction. (Paras 19, 21, 32, 44)

(B) Employment Contracts - Nature of - The court ruled that the employment contract was not dependent on personal qualifications, allowing for specific performance under amended Section 14(c) of the 1963 Act. (Paras 30, 31)

(C) Injunctions - The court found that since the contract was determinable, an injunction could not be granted to prevent its breach. (Paras 41, 50)

Facts of the case:
The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant bank, challenged a letter regarding potential redundancy and sought an injunction against its enforcement. The trial court granted an interim injunction, which was subsequently extended.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the notice was not a termination notice and that the employment contract was determinable, thus the injunction was not warranted.

Issues: The main issues were whether the notice constituted a termination notice, whether an injunction could be granted for a personal contract, and whether the contract was determinable.

Ratio Decidendi: The court concluded that the notice posed no immediate threat of termination, the contract was not personal in nature, and was determinable, thus no injunction could be granted.

Result: Appeals allowed, setting aside the injunction orders.

Table of Content
1. plaintiff challenges notice (Para 1)
2. injunction application filed (Para 4)
3. interim injunction granted (Para 5 , 6)
4. plaintiff's counter-argument (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18)
5. court's interpretation of notice (Para 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36)
6. contract deemed determinable (Para 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 53)
7. injunction orders set aside (Para 52)

JUDGMENT :

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

1. The two appeals are taken up for hearing together, since both arise from connected orders passed in the same suit.

2. The plaintiff/respondent no.1 is an employee of the defendant no. 1/appellant-bank by virtue of an offer of appointment and employment agreement dated January 20, 2015. The defendant no. 2/respondent no. 2 is a Mumbai branch of the appellant-bank.

3. The genesis of the appeals is a suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent no. 1, inter alia, for a decree of declaration that issuance of a letter dated January 29, 2024 by the defendants to the plaintiffs is illegal, bad in law and without jurisdiction, a declaration that the letter of appointment dated January 20, 2015 executed between the parties is still existing and cannot be cancelled unilaterally without due process of law, for other consequential declarations and for injunction.

4. In connection with the said suit, the plaintiffs/respondents filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the defendants and/or their men, agents and servants from giving effect to the letter issued by the defendants dated January 29, 2024 to the plaintiff/respondent no.1 and to allow him to continue peacefully working as Support Officer and for interim injunction in similar terms.

5. By Order No.02 dated February 26, 2024, an ad interim injunction was granted by the learned Trial Judge, restraining the defendants from giving effect to the letter dated January 29, 2024 till March 28, 2024, which order is the subject-matter of challenge in FMA 180 of 2025.

6. Thereafter the interim order was extended from time to time, lastly vide Order No.10 dated December 9, 2024, whereby the said interim order was extended till the next date, that is, February 5, 2025. The order dated December 9, 2024 is the subject-matter of challenge in FMA 181 of 2025.

7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant argues that the impugned letter dated January 29, 2024 is not a termination notice but merely an intimation of the potential redundancy situation due to proposed restructuring of the bank and, as such, the defendants ought not to have been restrained from giving effect to the same. It is argued that by virtue of the injunction order, the defendants have been, in effect, restrained from issuing any valid termination notice under Clause 6 of the Employment Contract between the parties.

8. Learned senior counsel next submits that the Employment Contract between the defendants/employers and the plaintiff/respondent no.1 is in the nature of a personal contract and, as such, cannot be specifically enforced under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1963 Act”). Moreover, the said contractual employment being in itself determinable, no specific performance could be granted in respect of the same. As such, it is argued, no injunction order could be passed in respect of the said contract.

9. Learned senior counsel argues that Clause 6.1 of the Employment Agreement contemplates early termination of the plaintiff’s employment upon the simple issuance of a written notice of three months. The said clause confers such option of early termination to both parties. As such, the contract is determinable by its very nature.

10. It is further contended that any employment contract is a contract of personal nature and, as such, no injunction can be granted in respect of breach thereof.

11. Learned senior counsel appearing for

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